

MUTUAL VULNERABILITY AND THE IMPLEMENTATION OF PEACE AGREEMENTS: EXAMPLES FROM MOZAMBIQUE, ANGOLA, AND LIBERIA

Dorina A. Bekoe

Abstract

Many argue that peace agreements should contain provisions of extensive power-sharing arrangements and international intervention in order for their implementation to succeed. Yet, despite the presence of these arrangements, many countries fail to implement peace agreements or worse, return to war. Rather, as this paper argues, the implementation of many peace agreements depends on the decision-making environment: After warring factions sign a peace agreement, the promised concessions may result in changes to military or political vulnerability, making each step toward implementation contentious. To successfully implement a peace agreement, the steps taken by the signatories must result in mutually vulnerable political or military states. Importantly, varying levels of political, financial, and military intervention from the international community affect the degree of vulnerability felt by the signatories, subsequently impacting the implementation process. Examples from the cases of Mozambique, Liberia, and Angola are used to illustrate the mechanism of mutual vulnerability.

Introduction

Negotiated settlements have been increasingly accepted as the preferred way of ending a civil war. A strong indication of this is the sharp increase of United Nations (UN) missions across the globe: since the end of the cold war, the UN has more than doubled the number of its peacekeeping missions since its first one in 1948 (United Nations, 2005). However, despite the increased desire to intervene in conflicts and stop hostilities early, negotiated settlements have a poor record of success. Some studies show that only 50 percent of all negotiated settlements last beyond five years (Licklider, 1995: 685), while in others, negotiated settlements have been shown to keep the peace for only three and a half years (Hartzell, Hoddie, and Rothchild, 2001: 195). This timeframe suggests that warring parties cannot successfully implement the peace agreement. This is not surprising, given the high uncertainty of the implementation period; there is a gap between the concessions required in the peace agreement – such as demobilization or political power sharing – and the actual steps needed to achieve those goals. For

example, while a provision of the peace agreement may be demobilization, the incremental decisions to implement it, which might include when and where to deploy observers or which party moves first, change the military and political power structure of the post-conflict period. The changes in the military and political power structure may create impasses or in a worse case, result in renewed hostilities. Although the uncertainty and impasses may be unavoidable – the essence of a peace agreement is compromise – it may be possible to re-consider the means for overcoming impasses and reducing the chance that they will lead to conflict.

How can negotiated settlements be made more certain and impasses in the implementation of peace agreements overcome? While ample scholarly work considers the conditions under which parties begin negotiations or sign agreements, relatively little explores the transition from the signing of a peace agreement to its implementation. In this article I argue that peace agreements are more likely to be successfully implemented – and thus decrease the chance of a resumption of hostilities – when the signatories view themselves as mutually vulnerable. Mindful that concessions made by one side change the balance of power – and hence the vulnerability – between the factions, I argue that a peace agreement's implementation will most likely advance when former combatants find themselves mutually and equally vulnerable. I use examples from the implementation processes of Mozambique, Liberia, and Angola to demonstrate the effect of mutual vulnerability.

Four sections follow this introduction. In the next section, I briefly review common prescriptions for stability following a peace agreement. The second section following the introduction presents the theory on peace agreement implementation as a function of mutual vulnerability. The third section discusses particular instances in the three cases, to illustrate the effect of mutual vulnerability or its absence in resolving impasses. The examples of the effect or absence of mutual vulnerability on the implementation process are taken from critical aspects of the peace processes of Mozambique, Angola, and Liberia. Together, the examples illustrate the importance of understanding the military and political realities faced by the warring factions and the consequences of decision-making rules in the creation of institutions. The final section concludes with some policy recommendations.

Common Prescriptions for the Post-Accord Period

The current literature and practices generally emphasize the role of the international community and the adoption of power sharing strategies. Of the two strategies, many scholars place the onus on the international community to facilitate the implementation of a peace accord and conclude that the more involved the international community, the higher the probability for a successful negotiated settlement (Hampson, 1996). But, there are cases that starkly contradict these points. For example, while the

resolution of the Cambodian civil war is noted for the transitional administration established by the United Nations (UN) – arguably a deep involvement by the agency – its post-accord period was unstable. Similarly, the two UN missions in Angola, the UN Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM) II and III, failed despite the fact that UNAVEM III was consciously constructed to include a significant involvement by the UN in an answer to criticisms of a paltry UN presence during UNAVEM II (Anstee, 1996; Vines, 1999). Alternatively, the civil war in Nicaragua ended without a significant involvement of outside organizations. In short, the existing literature does not clarify what role the international community should play in ensuring stability during the implementation of the peace agreement. Even work that emphasizes power-sharing strategies – a commonly recommended strategy – does not provide satisfactory answers to a successful implementation (Horowitz, 1985; Lijphart, 1977; Sisk, 1996; Wippman, 1998; Hartzell, 1999). Some peace agreements have been implemented without power-sharing agreements, while other conflicts have resumed even with promises of political inclusion, proportional representation, and territorial autonomy (Liberia, Sierra Leone, Sudan, and Angola are examples). Moreover, as argued by Snyder and Jervis (1999), power-sharing may, paradoxically, result in exacerbating the security dilemma felt by the warring factions. In addition to the international intervention and the power-sharing arrangements, to more fully understand why peace agreements break down, it is important to understand the decision-making environment of the insurgent and the government leaders. Recommendations for increased international intervention and power sharing agreements fall short of this. More recent work that examines the types of groups fighting in the civil war – such as Stedman’s (1997: 5-7) typology of “spoilers” to the peace process – and the means by which the international community may meaningfully intervene, moves closer to this goal. Thus, by correctly identifying and attending to the spoilers of the peace, international organizations can successfully manage a peace process (Stedman, 1997: 5-7). On the same continuum, Cousens (2001: 16) claims the international community should work within the framework of the political environment of the post-conflict state to develop processes by which needs are addressed and institutions developed. Importantly, the international community must engage the local political community and thoroughly understand the political landscape (Kumar, 2001: 183-188). While this recent work on faction-types and post-conflict political environments sheds light on the conditions in the post-accord period that affect the advancement of a peace process, it leaves out the reactions of the faction leaders to those very conditions and how they impede or advance the implementation of a peace agreement. I look more closely at the context in which the faction leaders make decisions and react to their own environment.

Toward a Theory of a Successful Implementation¹

In many respects, the promises of power-sharing may lie too far into the future for the resolution of conflict at early moments in the implementation process.² Similarly, intervention by external actors may focus too closely on the outcomes of the peace agreement rather than the intermediate steps. Instead, I suggest that in order for signatories to a peace agreement to follow through on promises, they must feel compelled to do so not only for positive gains from compliance, but also because of negative repercussions from the opposition for reneging. In addition, the parties must retain the ability to sanction other parties for reneging³, creating mutual vulnerability. This relationship is upset and implementation stalls when, for instance, one party may take actions to diminish its vulnerability. Alternatively, the maintenance of this relationship advances the implementation process.

The Peace Agreement as a Contract

An enormous amount of uncertainty surrounds the implementation of a peace agreement and the probability of the faction leaders to honor commitments. A faction leader's decision to comply may be affected by unexpected changes in the political and military environment resulting from concessions or actions of external entities, the failure of resources and other supportive features to materialize, or events that indicate the other party will not follow through on promised actions. The common thread among these potential deal-breakers is not only the uncertainty they bring to the peace process, but the inability to fully know them *ex ante*. Importantly, unknown variables may also work to encourage compliance. These environmental changes or revelations about a faction leader's commitment alter the balance of political and military power among factions. Multiple factions render peace agreements even more complicated and raise the degree of uncertainty, as not all factions share the same goals and some may take steps to undermine the implementation process. Thus, given that peace agreements cannot fully anticipate the actions of a party after signing, the implementation process is characterized with additional bargaining and renegotiations between the faction leaders.

Because the unpredictability of external events and the actions of the signatories are similar to problems faced by firms entering into contract with other firms or their employees, they may be managed with strategies from contract theory. Upon signing a contract, firms must manage unanticipated events that could either positively or negatively affect the contract and mitigate the danger that the contracted firm will not follow through with agreed products. Because contracts, just as peace agreements, are in reality incomplete in the beginning and affected by external contingencies, the parties commonly renegotiate the terms (Salanié, 1997: 176). Indeed, two main conditions threaten peace agreements and economic contracts alike: adverse selection and moral hazard. Adverse selection refers to the possibility that the other party has hidden

information about itself that, if known, may alter its desirability as a partner. Moral hazard refers to the possibility of hidden actions by the partnering firm: there is a danger that once a contract is signed, the partnering firm may not perform as anticipated, in the absence of monitoring (Salanié, 1997; Mas-Colell, Winston, and Green, 1995: Chapters 13-14). As elaborated in Williamson (1985: 190), firms can create a “mutual reliance relation” or “hostages” – as explained in both Williamson (1985: 195-197) and Salanié (1997: 144) – to provide an incentive for the contracted entities to comply with promises and conquer the effects of moral hazard and adverse selection. Hostages refer to instruments or concessions that constrain the parties to a contract into complying with promises.

Among firms, there are several examples of hostages. Salanié (1997) points to the production by Apple Computer of specific factories for the Macintosh computer to assure Apple customers that it would provide technical support for the computer (Salanié,

find themselves mutually vulnerable, the agreement becomes self-enforcing. At that point, the implementation of the peace agreement proceeds; the presence of mutual vulnerability determines the probability that the warring factions will implement the peace agreement. On the other hand, the implementation of the peace agreement can stall if one or both factions find themselves invulnerable (Table 1).

Table 1: Likelihood of Implementation of Peace Agreement Proceeding


Faction 2	Faction 1		
		Vulnerable to Faction 2	Not vulnerable to faction 2
	Vulnerable to faction 1	Implementation proceeds	Stalling possible
	Not vulnerable to faction 1	Stalling possible	Stalling likely

Critical factors that affect mutual vulnerability include the timing of actions and the presence of external entities. The essence of mutual vulnerability lies in the incremental steps that factions take to fulfill (or renege) on their agreed tasks. For example, fulfilling a task like demobilization is dependent on intermediate steps, *inter alia*, selecting soldiers or permitting a third party to verify compliance by deployment in the country. Rules of engagement can also determine when steps are taken. For instance, rules requiring consensus may produce different compromises than rules requiring majority votes. The intermediate steps taken by factions result in changes in the economic, political, or military positions of the factions. More precisely, each step taken by a faction changes the level of vulnerability that another faction senses and therefore affects the probability that it will respond with actions that further or stall the implementation process.

Still, while factions in a peace process react to each other's moves, those moves are not always made in isolation. External states and institutions, either as a result of regional diplomatic pressures or more concrete influences such as resources, affect the actions of the domestic factions. In one respect, they can add to the level of uncertainty in the implementation process. On the other hand, the provision of sufficient funds or increased diplomatic pressure can also increase the certainty that the promised concessions or political accommodation will transpire. Thus, external states and institutions can act as agents that facilitate choices made by the factions.

The relationships between the timing of moves and the international community are depicted in Figure 1.


Figure 1: Generating Mutual Vulnerability



Focusing on the role played by mutual vulnerability reveals the continuing bargaining between the factions in the post-accord period. To graphically depict this process, assume, for simplicity, there are two factions, player 1 and player 2. Figure 2 depicts the bargaining process between two players that sets the optimal set of concessions, C_1 for player 1 and C_2 for player 2, which leave both players mutually vulnerable.⁴ C_1^* and C_2^* are the optimal set because the utility curves on which they lie are tangent to each other. Thus player 1 and player 2 do not have any incentive to trade for more or less of C_1 or C_2 . Players make concessions based on their relative strength or ability to protect themselves from adverse actions. This *vulnerability line* (VL) in figure 2 reflects these relative strengths. For simplicity, in figure 2, VL assumes that the players are equal in strengths by placing the intercept at the origin. The equation of the line is $C_1 = mC_2 + b$; in this case, b , the intercept, equals zero and m , the slope, equals one. In other words, an increase in concessions by player 1 by one unit is equal to one unit increase in concessions by player 2. Since VL is the relationship of strength between the players, it acts as a boundary for both players. It holds the set of possible concessions available for each player. For player 1, all possible concessions lie northwest of VL and for player 2, all possible concessions lie southeast of VL. The utility curves U_1 for player 1 and U_2 for player 2, where i indicates the number of the utility curve, show the preferences of the players.⁵

For player 1, moving in the northwest direction is preferable because she concedes less, while player 2 concedes more: U_{11} is preferred to U_{12} . For player 2, moving in the southeast direction is preferable because he concedes less, while player 1 concedes more: U_{21} is preferred to U_{22} . The set of concessions for each player lies along their respective utility curves. In figure 2, C^* , where both player's utility lines reach VL , indicates the optimal amount of concessions: C_1^* is the optimal amount of concessions for player 1 and C_2^* is the optimal amount of concessions for player 2. When both players reach VL , their concessions are exactly equal to their strengths; therefore they are mutually vulnerable. Thus, for the implementation of a peace agreement to advance, concessions must lie on VL . Any point on VL suffices, as even small amounts of vulnerability can move a process ahead.

Figure 2: Mutual Vulnerability as an Equilibrium Condition



The remainder of this paper evaluates the existence of mutual vulnerability at critical impasses during the implementation of the peace agreements in Mozambique, Liberia, and Angola.

Resolving Impasses through Mutual Vulnerability

Mozambique: Negotiating Territorial Administration

The Government of Mozambique, represented by the Revolutionary Front of Mozambique (Frelimo) and led by Joaquim Chissano, and the insurgent force, the

Mozambique National Resistance (Renamo), led by Aphonso Dhlakama, signed the General Peace Agreement (GPA) on October 4, 1992, after a two year peace process (1990 - 1992), handled primarily by the Italian Catholic lay group, the *Comunità di Sant' Egidio*. While Mozambique continues to remain largely at peace thirteen years after signing the General Peace Agreement in 1992, its successful peace settlement was not predicable in 1992. The General Peace Agreement, which was implemented during the transition period between 1992 and 1994, did not call for power-sharing or permanent territorial autonomy, widely accepted as prescriptions for conflict management (Lijphart, 1977, 1990; Horowitz, 1985; Sisk, 1996). Nonetheless, peace ensued and the peace agreement was implemented (Armon, Hendrickson, and Vines, 1998; Hume, 1994; Synge, 1997).

A particularly important phase was the extension of the state's administration to all of Mozambique. At the end of the war in 1992, it was estimated that Renamo controlled about twenty-five percent of Mozambican land, corresponding to six percent of the population. Pockets of Renamo-controlled territory were scattered all over Mozambique, but the largest concentrations were in Manica, Sofala, and Zambézia provinces, in the central part of the country (Hanlon, 1994c: 8). Indeed, throughout most of the implementation period, there were effectively two administrations in Mozambique: the regions controlled by Renamo and the regions controlled by Frelimo (Hanlon, 1994a: 1). However, territorial administration by Renamo was meant to be temporary; eventually, the General Peace Agreement stated, sovereignty would be returned to the government (GPA, Protocol V, Part III, section 9d). Following the signing of the General Peace Agreement, it was clear that the government intended for the specially created Commission on State Administration to facilitate this transfer, whereas Renamo intended to hold on to its land until the election. Eventually, Renamo stalled the process in August 1993, making entrance to its areas by government and humanitarian entities very difficult (Hanlon, 1993a,b,c,e; 1994b,d; 1995) and threatening to impede the next task, demobilization. The advent and resolution of this impasse illustrates the mechanism of mutual vulnerability.

Establishing Administrative Autonomy: Promises in the Peace Accord

For both the government and Renamo, territorial sovereignty was a critical component of the peace process. The General Peace Agreement allowed Renamo to control its own areas temporarily (GPA, Protocol V, Part III, section 9d). Specifically, the General Peace Agreement (GPA) stated (Protocol V, Part III, section 9d) "...the areas controlled by RENAMO shall employ only citizens resident in those areas, who may be members of RENAMO." By this agreement, if the government did not follow through on certain political promises, Renamo had not lost because it still was in charge of its own areas – a point also noted by Matteo Zuppi of *Comunità di Sant' Egidio* (interview

September 7, 2001). The cost of such a concession was high for the government because it weakened its sovereignty.

The concession on administration acquired even more importance because the issue of sovereignty had been so significant during the negotiations. Renamo repeatedly challenged the government's claim to sovereignty while the government was adamant that Renamo recognize it as the sovereign power in Mozambique (Hume, 1994). Even after the first protocol of the negotiations was signed – which Hume (1994:71) remarks both sides considered a mutual recognition of Frelimo as the government and Renamo as the opposition – the government's sovereignty was questioned throughout the peace process (Hume, 1994). Acknowledging the government's sovereignty could increase Renamo's vulnerability to treatment as a less than equal partner.

Mutual Vulnerability through Territorial Control

The implementation of territorial transfer stalled in August 1993 when Renamo was required to demobilize at the same time: in January of 1993, Renamo had promised to demobilize once UN deployment had reached 65 percent (United Nations, 1995a: 170-171); in May 1993, the UN had fully deployed (United Nations, 1995b: 185). Thus at that time, not only would Renamo lose its territory, it would lose its military as well – arguably its most important bargaining chip. Hence, in August 1993, Renamo and the government were not mutually vulnerable. In August of 1993, while Dhlakama had accepted that at some point the Renamo-controlled areas would be folded into one administration, he expressed concern that this would mean the end of administrative influence. At that point, the peace process stalled (Hanlon, 1993d: 2,3) and Chissano and Dhlakama held a summit from August 23 - September 3, 1993 to resolve the impasse.

The summit resulted in providing both Renamo and the government with the ability to hold each other hostage. At the summit, the government conceded that Renamo could appoint three advisors per province to the Frelimo governors in Renamo zones. Significant rights and privileges were secured for the Renamo advisors. Importantly, the advisors' opinions would take priority during decisions concerning the Renamo-controlled zones and the government's provincial directors would be required to assist the advisors in any way possible. In addition, Renamo reserved the right to staff the civil service posts in its zones. Other benefits to the staff included a wage commensurate with their counterparts in government, a house, and transportation (United Nations, 1995c: 197). Thus, while the government took the helm of the provinces, Renamo retained considerable influence over outcomes. Under the compromise, the government was able to retain the right to sovereignty by not appointing Renamo members, but at the same time Renamo was not denied access to political power. Allowing Renamo to continue to manage its own zones provided it with the means to assert itself politically; it was able to hold the government hostage to devising policies beneficial to Renamo.

The new agreement at the summit made the government and Renamo mutually vulnerable and resolved the impasse. The negotiations over the state's administration were costly to the government and built-in vulnerability to Renamo's political influence through the rights given to the advisors. At the same time, denying Renamo the governors' post in its zones cost Renamo a measure of sovereignty. As such, the government could weaken Renamo's hold over Renamo-areas – holding Renamo hostage to the government's decision to some degree.

Angola: Stalled Demobilization

Following its independence from Portugal in 1975, the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), resumed the battle for political power (Lodico, 1996; Hare, 1998; Tvedten, 1997). Despite two diametrically designed peace accords, the 1991 Bicesse Accords – also known as the Estoril Accords or Peace Accords for Angola – and the 1994 Lusaka Protocol, Angola's civil war continued until the death of Jonas Savimbi by government troops on April 4, 2002. The Bicesse Accords brought relative peace for nearly 18 months, during which time the parties, with the help of the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM) II, moved toward elections. After the first-ever presidential elections in September 1992, Jonas Savimbi, leader of the UNITA insurgency refused to accept that he received fewer votes than the MPLA's – the government – José Eduardo Dos Santos, citing fraud, and resumed hostilities against the MPLA a few months later (Anstee, 1996: 185-357). The Lusaka Protocol could never be fully implemented, nor could it prevent the deterioration of each party's commitment to peace and the subsequent resumption of war.

In general, the process in Angola may be characterized as lacking mutual vulnerability. A particularly poignant example is the failure to complete demobilization during the implementation of the Bicesse Accords. The goal of the Bicesse Accords was to move the country toward elections at the end of September 1992. To that end, the implementation of the Bicesse Accords consisted of two tasks: first, the extension of the state administration through UNITA's return of its territory to the government; second, UNITA and the government were to demobilize (United Nations Security Council, 1991a: paragraphs 4-7; 50-51). While the extension of state administration proceeded, demobilization did not. Understanding why demobilization failed during the implementation of the Bicesse Accords demonstrates the adverse effects of the absence of mutual vulnerability.

Assembly and Demobilization of Troops

Demobilization was to be preceded by the assembling of troops by both the government and UNITA. The assembling of troops was to have been finished by August

1, 1991 (United Nations Security Council, 1991b: paragraph 24), but it was not completed until April 1992 – and even by then, the two armies had not fully assembled their troops. After the assembling of troops, the Bicesse Accords called for some soldiers to be selected for the new joint army, the Angolan Armed Forces, while the others were to be demobilized. For UNITA, demobilization was the complete surrender of the threat to the government; an unarmed insurgent force spells the end of the civil war and conceivably stops the government from having to negotiate. Indeed, Kingma (1997: 151-165) states that one lesson learned is that demobilization will not occur if the insurgents believe that only the military option can be used to influence the government. The Angolan government faced a cost in disarming its forces, as well. For the Angolan government, demobilization reduced its ability to keep the insurgents at bay. A reduced government force may facilitate the continuation of the civil war if UNITA would not reciprocate with demobilization. For these reasons, demobilization in Angola had the *potential* to produce the most vulnerability between the parties. For demobilization to succeed, it should have been accomplished bilaterally and at an equal pace.

Two contrasting features marked the troop assembly and demobilization processes in Angola: (1) UNITA quartered troops at a faster pace than the government (see Table 2), but demobilized at a slower pace (Anstee, 1996: 52; Rial et al., 1992: 11); (2) although it demobilized more quickly than UNITA, the government did not demobilize completely. Indeed, despite the perception that the government was successfully demobilizing – Cohen (2000: 114) has written about the government’s “spontaneous demobilization” – more than 50 percent of the government’s troops remained mobilized in September 1992, the end of the implementation process.

Table 2: The Pace of Troop Assembly

Date	Proportion of troops assembled	
	Government (percent of total)	UNITA (percent of total)
October 22, 1991	68,666 (60)	26,968 (54)
February 26, 1992	62,446 (54)	46,314 (93)
June 17, 1992	42,600 (37)	31,700 (85) ⁶

At the end of the process, there existed more government than UNITA troops outside the assembly areas. In explaining the government’s poor record of assembling troops, the election observers remarked that it reflected the weak hold the government had on its soldiers, and the general disorganization of its forces (Rial et al., 1992: 11). In addition, the conditions at the assembly areas led some troops to leave – citing poor living areas, late salaries, insufficient food and medicine shortages, and very lengthy stays at the assembly areas (UN Security Council, 1992a: paragraph 12). The attempts by both the government and UNITA to try to stem this effect through improving conditions

at the assembly areas did not change things (UN Security Council, 1992a: paragraph 13). The appeal to the international community for \$447 million did not materialize (Jett, 2000: 97) – reducing further the amount available to reintegrate each demobilized soldier.

The Bicesse Accords scheduled demobilization for July 1991 (Anstee, 1996: 47) but it did not begin until almost a year later in April 1992. In all, the government was to demobilize a total of 115,640 troops and UNITA was to demobilize 49,800 (Anstee, 1996: 48). The Joint Political-Military Commission agreed to begin demobilization with a two-month (March - April 1992) experimental phase. In this phase, the Joint Political-Military Commission agreed that demobilization of a first batch of 30,537 government troops and 3,000 UNITA troops would take place between March and April 1992. The first part of this experimental phase would begin with the demobilization of 2,945 government (FAPLA) troops and 180 UNITA (FALA) troops. The parties would complete the subsequent phases by the following dates:

- Experimental phase, part 2 - April 8: 12,135 FAPLA troops and 820 FALA troops
- Experimental phase, part 3 - April 15: 15,457 FAPLA troops and 2,000 FALA troops (Luanda Radio Nacional Network, 1992a).

Table 3 shows that the parties did not meet the demobilization benchmarks for the experimental phase. In fact, neither side completed other phases of demobilization by September 29, 1992 – Election Day. Although the government demobilized more, it did not demobilize completely – a fact that the existing literature does not emphasize. Noting the incomplete demobilization of both armies during a meeting on September 7 and again two days before the elections, on September 27, 1992, Dos Santos and Savimbi agreed, essentially on paper, to join both armies into the Angolan Armed Forces and dissolve their FAPLA and FALA forces (Anstee, 1996: 59, 157).

The failure of demobilization, it is acknowledged, facilitated the return to war. What can explain the failure of demobilization? The chronology in Table 3 includes three other events affecting the degree of mutual vulnerability caused by demobilization. First, the allegations of UNITA's 20,000 hidden army were disproved – although several hundred unaccounted for men were found (United Nations Security Council, 1992b: paragraph 13b). Conversely, the government's anti-riot force, an emergency police force that the government had assembled, was certified and operating in plain view. Third, when the rate of the troop assembly and the extension of state administration are accounted for, the chronology shows that the government's announcement of anti-riot police occurred at the start of demobilization *and* at the time that the Government regained control of almost all the territory.

Table 3 brings out the appearance of the anti-riot police during a very politically and militarily vulnerable time for UNITA in the implementation period. The timing of the discovery of the anti-riot police at the confluence of the end of the extension of the state administration and the assembling of troops – Table 2 shows the government had assembled 37 percent of its troops against UNITA's 85 percent – increased UNITA's perceived vulnerability to retaliation by the government. In contrast, at that time, the

government was technically in control of the country, had not completely demobilized and had just unveiled a new secret force, whereas the existence of UNITA's "secret army" was proved false. The appearance of the anti-riot police undid the credibility of the government's commitment of demobilization, especially since the government itself confirmed their existence. Even though the government had out-paced UNITA in demobilization, by creating the anti-riot police the government conceivably insulated itself against any military vulnerability it would suffer from demobilization.

Table 3: The Pace of Demobilization in Angola

Date	
March 31, 1992	2,945 Government troops demobilized - 10 percent of experimental phase goal 180 UNITA troops demobilized - 6 percent of experimental phase goal (Luanda Radio Nacional Network, 1992a).
April 15, 1992	9,994 Government troops demobilized - 33 percent of experimental phase goal 180 UNITA troops demobilized (Anstee, 1996: 51)
April 30, 1992	Government in control of 95 percent of territory (Voice of Resistance of the Black Cockerel, 1992a).
April 1992	UNITA has approximately 90 percent of troops assembled (Anstee, 1996: 52).
June 16, 1992	UNITA military leadership voices concerns about anti-riot police at formal meeting between FALA -FAPLA (Voice of Resistance of the Black Cockerel, 1992b).
June 20, 1992	<i>Post-experimental phase</i> 18,400 Government troops demobilized - 16 percent of total troops 1,500 UNITA troops demobilized - 3 percent of total troops (United Nations Security Council, 1992b: paragraph 19)
June 29, 1992	Extension of state administration is complete (Luanda Radio Nacional Network, 1992b).
July 31, 1992	Savimbi raises the issue of the anti-riot police with Anstee (Anstee, 1996: 72)
August 6, 1992	27,504 Government troops demobilized (24 percent of total) 7,257 UNITA troops demobilized (15 percent of total) ⁷
August 6, 1992	Anti-riot police force their way to Savimbi's residence (Anstee, 1996: 72).
August 15, 1992	UNITA demands demobilization of anti-riot police (Anstee, 1996: 73).
September 2, 1992	54, 737 Government troops demobilized - 47 percent of total 7,257 UNITA troops demobilized - 15 percent of total (United Nations Security Council, 1992a: paragraph 13).
September 27, 1992	Savimbi and Dos Santos join the two forces into one and disband the respective armies of the Government and UNITA (Anstee, 1996: 67).

From August 6, the date the anti-riot police barged in on Savimbi's residence – which in many ways confirmed UNITA's fears of the purpose of the anti-riot policy – no more UNITA troops were demobilized. The government admitted that the actions of the anti-riot police were wrong, but Anstee (1996: 72-73) admits, "from then on, the issue hotted up in an atmosphere of tension and deteriorating relations that worsened as the election date drew near". The issue of the anti-riot police became the topic of two

emergency Joint Political-Military Commission meetings later in August and a topic during the next to last meeting in September 1992 between Dos Santos and Savimbi (Anstee, 1996: 73-76). Savimbi considered the anti-riot police not, as the government asserted, legitimate under its right to develop emergency security agents, but rather “a parallel army” whose existence made demobilization unattractive (Anstee, 1996: 154). Indeed, Herman Cohen (2000: 114-115) states that UNITA kept weapons hidden because of the anti-riot police. Moreover, UNITA accused the government of breaking the Triple Zero Clause⁸ because the establishment of the anti-riot police was being assisted by Spain (Anstee, 1996: 71). Despite all the trouble caused by the anti-riot police, the UN simply told the government to emphasize that they would only be used in times of crises (United Nations Security Council, 1992a: paragraph 19).

The harm caused by the anti-riot police was further compounded by the unwillingness of the government to include UNITA members in the police force. When the government refused Savimbi’s request to confine the anti-riot police to barracks, UNITA eventually requested that 7,000 to 8,000 of its members join the police and anti-riot police. However, the Government provided only 1,200 spots for both. The government justified the low number of police force and anti-riot recruits offered to UNITA by stating that the Bicesse Accords stipulated that UNITA’s involvement in the police was to be “at the invitation of the government” (Anstee, 1996: 70). At this remark, UNITA stopped sending potential recruits (Anstee, 1996: 70). On September 7, when the government finally did offer UNITA 8,000 positions in its national police and anti-riot forces, the elections were three weeks away, and the implementation was slow. At the time of the elections, only 39 of the 183 UNITA members that were selected for inclusion in the national police were being trained (United Nations Security Council, 1992a: paragraph 19).

The anti-riot police emerged at a politically and militarily precarious point for UNITA. The seeming confirmation in UNITA’s view that the anti-riot police were a shadow force also undermined any mutual vulnerability gained by the assembly of troops and demobilization. In a sense, the implementation process had stalled even before the return of hostilities sparked by Savimbi’s refusal to accept defeat in the elections.

Liberia: The Importance of Rules

The implementation of the peace agreements in Liberia’s first civil war point to the importance of institutional rules in maintaining a peace process. Liberia’s first civil war, from 1989 to 1997 (the second civil war occurred from 2001 to 2003), required fourteen peace and cease-fire agreements before disarmament and elections could take place. Early in the peace process (in 1990) the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) created an Interim Government of National Unity (IGNU), a transitional government that would manage the country through demobilization and eventually elections. However, because the main insurgent force, Charles Taylor’s

National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), never accepted the ECOWAS-backed IGNU, and continued to govern “its” territory in Gbarnga with the National Patriotic Reconstruction Assembly Government (NPRAG), there was a dual administration in Liberia. Consequently, an important factor during the process of designing peace agreements was developing a model of governance in the implementation period. To this end, the 1993 *Cotonou Accord* provided for the eventual dissolution of both the IGNU, the NPRAG, and other factional governments and the creation of the Liberia National Transitional Government (LNTG), which would be governed by a Council of State. The Council of State was particularly important because its purpose was to make the political decisions for the country, govern through disarmament and the elections, and serve as the theater in which parties interacted with each other and could compare first hand the benefits of political versus military gains.


While the Council of State was not the only factor affecting the implementation process, it still held some importance because without it, the political decisions necessary for implementing the peace agreements could not occur. In all, eight main insurgent forces were present during the first Liberian war. The membership of the Council of State was altered and contested three times during the remainder of the civil war. The disagreements surrounding the membership of the Council of State and its impasses could be traced to the requirement of consensus for decision-making and the related advantages or disadvantages perceived by the parties (on consensus, see United Nations Security Council, 1993a: Part II Political Issues, Section B, Article 12, no 7i,iv). The repeated formation of the Council of State point to the importance of rules, their effect on actions by factions, and their impact on creating mutual vulnerability. The focus of this section is on the interaction of the membership and the rules of decision-making and their effect on establishing an institution.

The Liberian Council of State I

At the time of the *Cotonou Accord* in 1993 the warring factions included the NPFL and ULIMO; thus, the Council of State called for the IGNU, NPFL, ULIMO, and two additional representatives that would be jointly selected (United Nations Security Council, 1993a: Part II Political Issues, Section B, Article 14(c)). At the time, this configuration was acceptable and made each group mutually vulnerable to the others because no faction threatened another (Figure 3).

- (1) The NPFL could not expect ULIMO or the IGNU to join together as ULIMO was also fighting against the government;
- (2) ULIMO could not expect cooperation between the IGNU and the NPFL;
- (3) The two remaining members, David Kpomakpor and Thomas Ziah, were to be chosen by joint agreement (The Associated Press, 1993).

Figure 3: Council of State I




This configuration was able to move the implementation process forward by selecting the members of the electoral commission, Supreme Court justices, and other government positions (United Nations Security Council 1993b: paragraph 7). The implementation process began to unravel as the requirement for demobilization approached and the factions started to experience internal divisions and the emergence of new factions. Hostilities resumed in mid- to late 1994 (Bekoe, 2003: 270-271).

The Liberian Council of State II

After the resumption of hostilities in 1994 led to the Akosombo and Accra Agreements, the composition of the Council of State changed. While the Accra Agreements generally re-affirmed the Akosombo Agreement, their main difference was to include the representatives of new factions that had formed. Namely, these new factions included, the Liberia National Conference (LNC), a group of civil society organizations, and the other splinter groups, which united to form an anti-NPFL coalition, the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) / coalition [AFL, Lofa Defense Force (LDF), Liberia Peace Council (LPC), NPFL-Central Revolutionary Council (CRC), and ULIMO-Johnson (ULIMO-J)] in the Council of State (see Figure 4). Notably, the NPFL-CRC, led by Tom Woewiyu, broke away from the NPFL and ULIMO split into the ULIMO-J and ULIMO-Kromah (ULIMO-K) factions in 1994. Finally, Tamba Tailor, a chief selected by the NPFL and ULIMO-K, would chair the Council of State (United Nations Security Council 1995e: Part II Political Issues, Section A).

Figure 4: The Council of State II



The requirement of consensus did not foreshadow any predictable cooperation between the groups; the members of the executive Council of State were each mutually vulnerable:

- (1) The NPFL could not expect ULIMO-K to join together with the AFL/coalition as neither ULIMO-J nor the LPC supported ULIMO-K (Alao, 1998: 39).
- (2) ULIMO-K could not expect cooperation between the AFL/coalition and the NPFL:
 - The NPFL-CRC had split from the NPFL.
 - The LPC had fought against the NPFL.
 - ULIMO-J had attacked the NPFL positions (Alao, 1998: 37-39).
- (3) ULIMO-K and the NPFL would not cooperate as ULIMO-K sponsored a host of anti-NPFL groups: Bong Defense, Nimba Defense, Bassa Lofa Defense, and Congo Defense (Alao, 1998: 38-40).
- (4) Tamba Tailor had the support of both NPFL and ULIMO-K.
- (5) Civil society, represented by the LNC, would likely not join with the warlords.


While the configuration looked acceptable on paper, the actual representative of the AFL/Coalition was problematic. After the Accra Agreements both Hezekiah Bowen for the AFL and George Boley for the Coalition were equally supported for consideration as the representative of the AFL/Coalition (Ghana Broadcasting Corporation Radio Network, 1995a). Facing a deadlock, ECOWAS members from Ghana, Burkina Faso, Nigeria, Guinea, and Côte d'Ivoire proposed an expansion of the Council of State to six members to include Tom Woewiyu, the NPFL dissident who formed the NPFL-CRC. But, Taylor stated that he would not serve on the Council of State if Woewiyu served as well (Paris AFP, 1995). In addition to the personal animosity, the addition of Woewiyu would favor the anti-NPFL group. If in the previous construction no group could form a foreseeable alliance, under this proposal, the two members of the AFL/coalition could conceivably form an anti-NPFL block and the previous mutual vulnerability would erode. Indeed, no resolution on the Council of State occurred. At the end of January 1995, just one month after the last agreement, the peace talks were suspended (Ghana Broadcasting Corporation Radio Network, 1995b). By April, hostilities had resumed (United Nations Security Council, 1995d).

The Liberian Council of State III

Following the collapse of the Accra agreements, the subsequent Abuja Accord of August 19, 1995, still proposed a Council of State of six members, but because of the previous deadlock, nominated George Boley of the LPC as the sixth member. Reportedly, ECOWAS heads of state persuaded Woewiyu to cede his seat on the Council of State to George Boley of the LPC (Adebajo, 2002: 60). The acceptance of Boley is not surprising; in the past, the LPC had battled against both ULIMO-K and the NPFL (Alao, 1998: 39). Hence, the addition of Boley would disadvantage neither ULIMO-K nor the NPFL. Indeed, in time, Boley would be at odds with Taylor and Kromah ("Out of

Control,” 1996: 2). Professor Wilton Sankawolo was selected as the Chairman, while the five other members – namely, Taylor for the NPFL, Lieutenant-General Kromah for ULIMO-K, Boley for the AFL/Coalition, Oscar Quiah for the LNC, and Chief Tamba Tailor – were designated Vice-Chairmen, all with equal status. Sankawolo did not pose a political threat and did not have a political agenda (“Peace in Sight, 1995: 8). While ULIMO-K was allotted a seat on the Council of State, ULIMO-J was not (see Figure 5). Instead, the Abuja Agreement accommodated Johnson’s ULIMO-J faction by the provision of several ministerial posts (United Nations Security Council, 1995b; United Nations Security Council 1995c: Part II Political Issues, Section A).

Figure 5: Council of State III



The six-member Council of State created mutual political vulnerabilities between the parties represented. The relationship was the same as described under Council of State II and the addition of Boley did not advantage either the NPFL or ULIMO-K. Under this configuration (Figure 5), the Council of State agreed to a cessation of hostilities in November 1995, more ECOMOG deployment further inland, and the re-opening of roads by other factions (United Nations Security Council, 1995a: paragraphs 6-7).

However, the unity also came at a cost. Placing ULIMO-J outside of the governing structure effectively eliminated them from the decision making process. Although some means existed by which ULIMO-J may have influenced governmental decisions, the Council of State, vested with executive power over the government’s ministries until the elections, held power over ULIMO-J. In December 1995, Johnson declared that differences in political power with the other ministers prompted him to threaten to pull out of the government. Moreover, ULIMO-J’s marginalization corresponded to a time of intra-factional and intra-ethnic dissent in ULIMO-J – which resulted in the replacement of Johnson by William Kayree and the charging of Johnson with murder. The arrest warrant led Johnson to stage an attack in Monrovia, re-opening

the civil war until Johnson was granted asylum in Nigeria and the signing of the Abuja-II agreement that ultimately ended the war (Bekoe, 2003: 275-278).

Conclusion

The examples from Mozambique, Angola, and Liberia highlight the importance of taking into account the decision-making environment of the factions when evaluating the implementation process of a peace agreement. When faced with a choice of implementing a particular aspect of a peace agreement, faction leaders compare their present political, military, and economic position with their future positions *as well as the positions of their opponents*. When factions assess that they will be mutually vulnerable, they are more likely to implement agreements than when one side has an advantage. Thus, in Mozambique and Liberia, when the factions felt that they had a governing structure that provided sufficient mechanisms to both advance their interests and prevent their opponents from taking adverse actions, they were more likely to implement required tasks.

The examples in the cases demonstrate the continual and *ad-hoc* bargaining process that characterizes the implementation period. It underscores the incompleteness of peace agreements at the signing ceremony. For example, the Mozambican peace agreement to grant temporary territorial control to Renamo evolved into the creation of official government posts for Renamo. This was an unforeseen condition and not one likely to have been agreed to by the government at the negotiating table. However, it was needed to move the process along. The *ad-hoc* nature of the bargaining stems from an evaluation of the decision-making environment faced by the faction leaders and the timing of actions that can result in the creation of a particular environment. Thus, the appearance of the anti-riot police in Angola at the time they were unveiled (when UNITA had turned over its territory and begun a demobilization process) may have had a different effect if they had been discovered earlier in the process. Similarly, the rules that determined the members of the Council of State were a function of events in the Liberian civil war.

The cases briefly show the effect of intervention (or lack thereof) of the international community in creating mutual vulnerability. Angola's demobilization period was a case in point. Not only did the international community sluggishly fulfill pledges to fund the demobilization and reintegration programs, but some members also funded the anti-riot police, which exacerbated the weak vulnerability that existed between the parties. In a second example, the ECOWAS leadership was instrumental in dissuading Tom Woewiyu from seeking a seat on the Council of State – an occurrence that would have derailed the fledgling institution.

Knowing the potential impact of mutual vulnerability, how can the international community more effectively direct its interventions? First the international community

must ensure adequate funding for the reintegration package offered to ex-combatants to encourage demobilization. Equally important, demobilization should be carefully managed to avoid placing one faction in a disadvantageous position. Second, there must be a more concerted effort to invest in political party development. For insurgent groups participating in the political process for the first time, trading military power for political power will be more palatable if there is a chance that their participation will not be in vain. Finally, developing local government administration will decrease the importance of the central government; it will reduce the stigma of being a permanent political minority and offer hope of winning political influence elsewhere.

Notes

1. A version of the theory section first appeared in Bekoe (2003).
2. This is not an unusual occurrence. In the context of legislative cooperation, Weingast and Marshall (1988: 139-143) discuss the difficulties encountered by representatives in contracting for votes, under the promise of future cooperation.
3. These ideas come from the literature in game theory. See for example Robert M. Axelrod (1990), Robert H. Bates (1991), Drew Fudenberg and Jean Tirole (1991), David Kreps (1990).
4. I thank Edward Kutsoati for his help in this section. For more on bargaining see Thomas Schelling (1980).
5. More detailed information on utility curves can be found in any microeconomic theory textbook. A particularly useful text is Hal R. Varian (1992).
6. For 1991 see the United Nations Security Council report (1991a: paragraph 24) and documentation by Anstee (1996: 48). For February 1992, see the United Nations Security Council report (1992c: paragraph 11). For June 1992, see the United Nations Security Council report (1992b: paragraph 16).
7. Note that in Anstee (1996: 56, 66) this is reported as 34 percent and 24 percent, respectively.
8. The Triple Zero Clause refers to the cessation of the supplying of lethal materials by the United States, the USSR, and other countries. It was established in the precursor to the Bicesse Accords, the "Washington Concepts Paper", which was drawn up by Former US Assistant Secretary of State for Africa during the Bush Administration, Herman Cohen, and Yuri Yukalev, the USSR's Foreign Ministry Director for African nations. The "Washington Concepts Paper" served as one of many attempts to bring UNITA and the MPLA to peace talks (see Cohen, 2000: 105-107; footnote numbers 41 and 43).

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