

THE EMERGING TOOL CHEST FOR PEACEBUILDERS

Chadwick F. Alger

A Peace "Tool Chest"

The basic premise of this paper is that we have learned much more about building peace in the Twentieth Century, through research and practice, than we normally tend to apply. Therefore, we will attempt an inventory of the available instruments for pursuing peace. Twenty-two peace "tools" will be presented--two that were inherited from the Nineteenth Century, and twenty that have been developed in this century. Applying the concept "tools" as a label for these twenty-two approaches can help to create a practical orientation toward their application. The enumeration of the tools in five rectangles in Figure 1 can be viewed as five tool boxes. If they were stacked




Figure 1: Peacebuilder's Tool Chest

on top of each other, they would be familiar to the auto mechanic as five drawers in a mechanic's tool chest. If you told auto mechanics that five drawers of tools were indispensable to the peace "mechanic," both as a result of learning through practice and because the world is

becoming increasingly complicated as a result of new technology, they would quickly understand. The tool chest of the auto mechanic has ever more drawers because new technology is making automobiles increasingly complicated.

We will present the tools in chronological order mainly to demonstrate that new tools arose out of experience that revealed the shortcomings of older tools. Practitioners of any trade or profession that employs tools can understand this--not only mechanics but also plumbers, carpenters, electricians, surgeons, etc.




Figure 2: The Emergence of Peace Tool

This is why they now have socket wrenches, electric drills, vice grips and lasers. Of course, it will be obvious that our chronological presentation is very simplified. Innovation in history is

very complex. We are never completely certain when a new idea first arose. In some respects all ideas embedded in peace tools are very old. While we would assert that the learning process revealed in Figure 2 certainly is reflected in the experience of some people, it is not based on intensive research on the deep historical origin of peace-related ideas.

The basic purpose of the Figure is to offer an orderly context in which to learn about the 22 tools and the fact that they are functionally interrelated.

It must be understood that new tools do not necessarily make old tools useless or irrelevant. All 22 are presently perceived to be useful by *some*, for coping with at least some kinds of peace problems. Thus, the challenge for the peacebuilder is to analyze a specific threat to peace and to decide which set of tools might be relevant for that situation. Of course, this can only be done in the light of knowledge about (1) the historical and social context of a specific threat to peace, and (2) the strengths and weaknesses of *all* available tools. We certainly know that all tools, when employed inappropriately, can make things worse, and even do great damage.

Our Nineteenth Century Heritage

As we entered the Twentieth Century, the state system had already acquired significant experience with two peace tools. **DIPLOMACY (1)** is a significant human achievement that deserves much credit for the fact that most states have peaceful relations with most others most of the time. The system of embassies that each country has in the capitals of many other countries has developed over many centuries. Formerly consisting primarily of career diplomats representing their Foreign Ministry, now many embassies include representatives of other government departments responsible for health, labor, education, trade, environment, etc. Of course, this expansion of diplomatic representation reflects the impact of new technologies on relations between states.

There are significant limitations in the capacity of the inter-state diplomatic system to permit sustained contact among all states. Large states have embassies in virtually all other states--some 185. And all of the smaller states tend to have embassies in the large states. But many smaller states cannot afford to have permanent embassies in all other states, and sometimes they may not really need permanent representation in distant small states. Instead, one embassy may be accredited to a number of states in a region. Thus, it is important to understand that there are limitations in the capacity of the diplomatic system to sustain linkage among all states.

Although we have emphasized that the inter-state diplomatic system preserves the peace most of the time, nevertheless disputes do arise and create situations in which states fear aggression by others. In such cases **BALANCE OF POWER (2)** may be used to deter aggression. In the sense in which we are using the term, employment of balance of power means that a state attempts to acquire sufficient military and related capacity to deter aggression, or attempts to deter aggression by making alliances with other states. In some cases, when balance of power is employed as a deterrent it does indeed deter aggression. On the other hand, reciprocal application of balance of power does sometimes lead to arms races.

When State A fears the aggression of State B, they may not have an accurate estimate of B's military strength, so A tends to exceed the military competence of B just to play it safe. In turn, B tends to assume that A has aggressive intentions and feels a need to have a slight advantage over A. Thus begins an arms race that then spirals out of control as suspicion and distrust escalate. Although balance of power may sometimes preserve the peace, many believed that balance of power and accompanying arms races contributed significantly to the outbreak of World War I.

In the aftermath of World War I, states created the first world organization (members from Africa, Asia, Europe and North and South America) devoted to preserving the peace. As many as 63 states became members of this League of Nations, but there were never more than 58 members at any one time. Although the League only made modest contributions to restraining inter-state violence, as the first world "laboratory" devoted to inter-state peace, it made significant contributions toward the development of the United Nations in 1945.

The League of Nations Covenant

The League of Nations Covenant, which came into force in 1920, provided members with three main peace tools. First, **COLLECTIVE SECURITY** (3) was devised to overcome the weaknesses of balance of power as a deterrent to aggression. Collective Security obligated all who were members of the League to "undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League." Those who advocated collective security believed that the pledge of *all* to resist aggression by *any* member would be such an overwhelming deterrent that none would have reasonable ground for fearing aggression. But the obvious common sense of collective security in the abstract ignores that *all* may not be able or willing to resist aggression by *any* other member. This may be explained by longstanding friendships and alliances and perhaps by fear of retribution by powerful neighbors. Also, when the aggressor is very powerful, the practice of collective security in the pursuit of peace may produce an even larger war than the initial aggression. For reasons such as these, collective security did not prevent aggression by Germany, Japan, and Italy that led to World War II.

The second main peace tool in the League Covenant was **PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT** (4), intended to prevent the outbreak of violence in those instances when routine diplomacy fails to do so. In cases where a dispute may "lead to a rupture" the Covenant requires states to "submit the matter either to arbitration or judicial settlement or to inquiry by the [League] Council." In other words, members involved in a dispute agree to involve certain "third parties" when they alone cannot control escalating hostility. In employing third parties, states are drawing on human experience in a variety of other contexts: labor-management disputes, disputes between buyers and sellers, marital disputes, etc. In giving third party approaches a place in the Covenant, the League obviously drew on earlier provisions for employment of third parties developed in the Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907.

The third main peace tool in the Covenant was **DISARMAMENT/ARMS CONTROL (5)**. Some who believed that arms races had contributed to the outbreak of World War I thought that elimination, or at least reduction, of arms would enhance chances for peace. This was an effort to codify disarmament and arms control proposals that had been advanced in earlier times. Although Covenant provisions for disarmament/arms control never fulfilled the aspirations of advocates, they did provoke the negotiation of numerous arms control measures in the 1930s. These provided valuable experience, and also a great deal of skepticism, for those who would again face similar circumstances after World War II.

The United Nations Charter

Following World War II the victorious states once again endeavored to create a world organization that would maintain the peace. When the United Nations Charter was drafted in San Francisco in 1945, it once again incorporated collective security, peaceful settlement and disarmament/arms control. Experience under the Covenant led to strengthening of collective security by explicitly providing for procedures through which members would make armed forces available for collective security response and a Military Staff Committee that would plan for the use of these forces and advise and assist the Security Council in their employment. In some respects means for pacific settlement are more fully defined. Although disarmament/arms control is again made available, the Charter emphasizes it less than the Covenant.

But the most significant differences between the Covenant and the Charter consist of the addition of three peace tools. The first was **FUNCTIONALISM (6)** in which states cooperate in efforts to solve common economic and social problems that might disrupt normal relationships and even lead to violence. Drafters of the Charter had in mind examples such as worldwide depression in the 1930s and the inability of states to collaborate in coping with this disaster. The depression led to strikes, extreme social unrest and violence in many countries and significantly contributed to the development of totalitarian governments and aggression in some cases. Emphasis on economic and social cooperation in the Charter is signified by the creation of the Economic and social Council (ECOSOC) alongside the Security Council (responsible for collective security) which had been the only council in the League. ECOSOC was created "with a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations . . ." Its mission includes the achievement of higher standards of living, full employment, solutions of international economic, social, health and related problems and international cultural and educational cooperation. At the same time, ECOSOC has the responsibility of coordinating the activities of some 30 agencies in the UN system with responsibility for health, labor, education, development, environment, population, trade, atomic energy and a number of other global problems.

It is very important that we appreciate the degree to which the League "laboratory" provided the knowledge and experience that led to the significant place that economic and social cooperation is given in the UN Charter. Although the League Covenant gave relatively slight

attention to economic and social activities, in practice, the League became significantly involved in a great number of economic and social issues. Indeed, as the days of the League drew to an end before World War II, proposals had already been made to create a League economic and social council.

The second peace tool added by the UN Charter was **SELF-DETERMINATION (7)**. Here again the UN built on League experience. In granting independence to many nations formerly in the defeated Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires, the World War I peace settlements recognized self-determination as a tool for building future peace. In addition, parts of the former Ottoman Empire outside of Europe and other colonies of defeated states were placed under a Permanent Mandates Commission of the League of Nations, including Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon in the Middle East; Cameroons, Ruanda Urundi, Tanganyika, Togoland, Somaliland and Southwest Africa in Africa; and areas in the Pacific. These territories were administered by states who were members of the victorious coalition, with some attaining independence before World War II. It is very important that the Mandate system established reporting procedures through which administrating powers were responsible to the members of the League. This laid the foundation for later growth in the belief that those governing colonies have some responsibilities to the rest of the world. In the UN Charter the Mandates were called Trusteeships, and placed under a third Council, the Trusteeship Council. But most important for self-determination in the Charter was inclusion of a "Declaration Regarding Non-Self-Governing Territories," which covered the many overseas colonies not under trusteeship. This Declaration asserts that those administrating colonies are obligated "to develop self-government, . . . and to assist them in the progressive development of their free political institutions . . ."

Eventually this Declaration provided the foundation for prodding the overseas colonial powers to begin relinquishing control of their colonies. This led to a strengthened Declaration by the General Assembly in 1960: "Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples." Both the Trusteeship Council and the General Assembly played a very significant role in the largely peaceful dismantlement of overseas empires. In this respect, self-determination has proven to be a very useful peace tool. This remarkable transformation of the inter-state system more than doubled the number of independent states and the number of UN members.

Now the world confronts a new generation of self-determination demands by peoples in multi-nation states (as in Yugoslavia) and in multi-state nations (e.g., the Kurds). The UN system desperately needs to establish procedures whereby the legitimacy of these claims can be assessed *before* severe disruption and violence occur. At the same time, those making self-determination claims deemed to be legitimate must guarantee the rights of minorities that are inevitably present in all political units. The numerous cases in which unscrupulous leaders employ self-determination strategies for personal gain is but one example of the fact that peace tools, as well as all other tools, can be used for both noble and depraved purposes.

The third peace tool added by the UN Charter was **HUMAN RIGHTS (8)**. Although these words were never used in the League Covenant, human rights are mentioned seven times in the Charter, including the second sentence of the Preamble which announces determination "to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the

equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small." As in the case of economic and social cooperation, the Charter states that human rights shall be promoted in order to "create conditions and well-being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations . . ." Building on the brief references to human rights in the Charter, the UN General Assembly soon produced the Universal Declaration on Human Rights in 1947 which is now widely accepted as part of international common law and has even been applied by domestic courts in a number of states.

In order to strengthen the legal status of the Declaration, its principles were in 1966 put in treaty form by the General Assembly, as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. In addition, an array of more specialized treaties have been developed on genocide, racial discrimination, women's rights, children's rights, forced labor, cruel and inhumane punishment, rights of refugees and other human rights problems. All of these help to prevent the creation of unacceptable conditions of human depravity that may lead to severe unrest and even fighting.

Readers have noted that in Figure 2 peace tools 1-5 are placed in the category Negative Peace and tools 6-8 are in the category Positive Peace. Put in the simplest terms, Negative Peace is achieved by stopping violence. Positive Peace is achieved by building societies and inter-state relationships that do not generate conditions likely to precipitate violence or other causes of human suffering and deprivation. The first tends to depend largely on the expertise and activities of professional diplomatic and military people. The second draws on expertise in a diversity of professions coping with economic and social problems. The distinctive character of negative peace and positive peace cannot be pushed too far because they are intertwined. But it is important to understand that in this century practitioners learned that in applying tools that focused mainly on stopping the violence, or directly preventing it from breaking out, they often found themselves confronting overwhelming escalations of violence that could not be stopped. In other words, they learned that they were too late and realized that something should have been done earlier to cope with underlying causes of violence--before things got out of hand. This led to supplementing those peace tools employing a more negative peace emphasis with those more focused on positive peace.

Because the concept power, and power politics, super power and world power are frequently used in works on international relations, it is useful to point out that our Twentieth Century journey in the quest for peace has greatly expanded the instruments through which power can be exercised. This concept has been frequently associated with one kind of power, military power. Kenneth Boulding insightfully drew our attention to "the three faces of power:" (1) threat power--the power to destroy, (2) economic power--the power to produce and exchange, and (3) integrative power--the power to create such relations as love, respect, friendship and legitimacy (Boulding, 1989). The "peace tools" invented in the Twentieth Century apply a diversity of forms of economic and integrative power. Thus, self-determination employs the power of legitimacy in the quest for peace, and Functionalism employs a variety of kinds of integrative power. In other words, our quest for peace has revealed that power employed in problem-solving is often more effective than threat power.

United Nations Practice

The post World War II context in which the United Nations emerged provided two severe challenges to those attempting to apply the six "peace tools" incorporated into the Charter. First, the East-West conflict escalated into confrontation between two military blocs: the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), led by the United States and the Warsaw Pact, led by the Soviet Union. The Charter assumed that these states would collaborate in the Security Council in employing peaceful settlement and collective security in order to preserve the peace. But instead, the "policemen" threatened world war with each other and became indirectly involved in conflicts in Africa, Asia and the Middle East. There was particular danger that conflicts in the Middle East and the Congo (Zaire) would escalate into a world war. As a response, **PEACEKEEPING (9)** was invented. Although some variations have been employed, peacekeeping essentially involves a cease fire, followed by creation of a demilitarized corridor on each side of a truce line. This neutral corridor is patrolled by a UN peacekeeping force.

Peacekeeping is fundamentally different from collective security in several respects. Peacekeeping forces require the permission of states on whose territory they are based. Although big powers have provided logistical support, until quite recently the troops normally come from smaller states deemed to be politically acceptable by the parties to the conflict. The troops normally only carry small arms that are used in self-defense. Their primary protection is the fact that their blue helmets, and the UN emblems on their jeeps, are given legitimacy by the members of the UN under whose authority they are acting. UN peacekeeping forces have successfully kept the peace in the Congo (Zaire), Middle East, Cyprus and other places for many years. But there has not been equal success in resolving the conflicts that have made them necessary.

The end of the Cold War has permitted rapid expansion of the number of peacekeeping forces, to Cambodia, the former Yugoslavia, the Iraq-Kuwait border, Somalia, and other places. In some instances, as in Somalia and the former Yugoslavia, UN forces have been employed without first acquiring a ceasefire, and in situations where there is no clear authority that could grant permission for entry of the UN force. These efforts tend to be referred to as "peace enforcement," i.e., limited use of arms toward the end of restoring peace. Whether "peace enforcement" will become a useful peace tool is still much in doubt because of the tendency of the use of even limited violence to result in escalation.

The second post-war challenge to the UN was the struggle for, and acquisition of self-determination by, overseas colonies of European-based empires. This not only transformed the inter-state system but also brought fundamental changes in the United Nations. There was rapid doubling of UN membership, largely by addition of new members from Africa, Asia, the Caribbean and Pacific Islands. Very significant has been widespread poverty in most of the new states, thus creating a deeper gulf between rich and poor UN members. Other terms applied to the two groups have been Developed Countries (DC) and Less Developed Countries (LDC). Also the term Third World has often been used for the poor countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America, as distinguished from the First World (free market industrialized countries) and Second World (Soviet bloc).

The entry of so many Third World countries into the UN significantly affected the political context in which the three peace tools added to the UN Charter would be employed. First, functionalism is most effectively employed as a peace strategy in instances where those collaborating have relatively similar economic and social levels. It is difficult to create collaborative exchange and cooperative arrangements between those who are very rich and have significant technological advancement and those who are poor and technologically less developed. In these situations the more advantaged partner will tend to dominate the weaker partner who will in turn fear domination. This does not provide good conditions for mutually beneficial collaboration.

Second, after Third World countries became independent, aspects of self-determination that were less conspicuous during the struggle for political independence became more apparent. On the one hand, increasing awareness developed that political independence did not necessarily lead to independence from economic and cultural domination by European centers. On the other hand, the degree to which the new states were creations of European colonial administrators became more apparent. For example, many African states were made up of a number of African peoples, and many African peoples were divided by arbitrary political boundaries. Thus, even after the granting of independence to colonially created states, it was apparent that a new generation of self-determination problems would be confronted in the future.

Third, the entry of so many Third World countries into the inter-state system, and into the UN, produced a stronger challenge to the human rights priorities of Western states. These states have a tendency to give priority to civil and political rights--voting, free speech, privacy, freedom of movement, organizing, freedom of religion, equality before the law, etc. On the other hand, Third World states tend to give priority to economic and social rights--right to education, equal pay for equal work, food, clothing, medical care, etc. Significantly, the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, approved by the UN General Assembly in 1948 tends to list civil and political rights first and economic and social rights next. The Western emphasis tends to be that "freedom" has priority before all other rights. But the Third World emphasis is that unless basic economic and social needs are acquired one has no capacity for enjoying opportunities provided by "freedom."

Prodded by the growing divide between the rich and the poor in the United Nations, three peace tools developed out of UN practice were largely a product of growing insight on the relevance of economic conditions and relationships for peace. **ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (10)** became a growing policy concern both within the UN and outside. The basic idea was that the rich-poor gap could be diminished if the rich countries provided development aid to the poor countries so that they could "take off" and become developed. It tended to be assumed that development in Third World countries should be patterned after the industrialized countries of Europe and North America. Emphasis was placed on heavy industry and economic infrastructure such as roads, railroads, airports and dams. In earlier efforts food and agriculture tended to be given low priority. Aid was primarily provided by special development loan funds and technical assistance programs that emphasized the transfer of knowhow, often through providing technical experts and the tools they require. Economic development programs were established not only by UN agencies and regional international governmental organizations but also by governments

in the industrialized countries. It was frequently argued that the multilateral programs of the UN and other international organizations were more fruitful because they were more likely to be based on economic development criteria, but that bilateral programs tended to be less economically productive because they tended to be more shaped by bilateral political factors.

Many people would argue that both bilateral and multilateral economic development programs have often contributed to peace by diminishing poverty. But overall they did not diminish the rich-poor gap in the world. Indeed, as economic development programs grew in the 1950s and 1960s, the rich-poor gap continued to grow. Critics of these development programs began to argue that the gap was growing because of the nature of the economic relations between the developed countries and the Third World. In other words, they attributed the growth in the rich-poor gap to the international economic structure in which countries in the Third World were perceived to be dependent upon the industrialized countries. From this perspective, it was seen that the growth in the rich-poor gap would continue until this dependency relationship was overcome.

This led to Third World demands for **INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC EQUITY** (11). The Third World movement for a more equitable international economic system was centered in (1) the Non-Aligned Movement, an organization of some 100 countries from all parts of the world that were neither aligned with the NATO states nor the Warsaw Pact states and in (2) the United Nations conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). The latter began as a UN conference in 1964 and later became a permanent UN organization, with headquarters in Geneva. The Third World caucus in UNCTAD came to be known as the "Group of 77," although it eventually included some 120 states. In these two organizations the Third World devised a program for a New International Economic Order (NIEO). Among their demands were (1) stabilization of the prices of Third World commodities (coffee, tea, cocoa, etc.) in order to build a predictable economic base for development programs, (2) pegging the price of these commodities to the price of manufactured products which the Third World buys from industrialized countries, (3) access of Third World products to First World markets, (4) Third World access to technology useful in their development programs, and (5) international regulation of the activities of transnational corporations in Third World countries.

As revealed in the name of the new UN agency, UNCTAD, the basic thrust of these demands were that development aid would be less necessary in an international economy structured so that the Third World could "earn a living." Instead, it was asserted that the international economy is structured so that the benefits pile up in corporate headquarters and banks in the industrialized countries, thus making it necessary for Third World countries to seek aid. Unfortunately, from a Third World perspective, although an extensive campaign was waged in the UN General Assembly for NIEO principles, for the most part the industrialized countries were very unresponsive. This has generated considerable animosity in the Third World as the gap between the rich and the poor continues to grow. At the same time, there was puzzlement over the apparent inability of the Third World to reach the people of the industrialized countries with the reasonableness of their appeal. For example, there was a tendency for the press in the United States to picture Third World demands in the General Assembly as reckless demands for

special privileges by an "African-Asian-Latin American horde" which was not grateful for all of the aid that they had received.

Frustration over failure to convince people in industrialized countries about the justness of their NIEO appeal contributed to the demands of the Third World for **INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS EQUITY (12)**. Observing that the headquarters of the world news agencies (United Press, Associated Press, Reuters, etc.) were in industrialized countries, and citing examples of biased reporting on the Third World, the Third world began to ask for a New International Information and Communications Order (NIICO). The demands for a NIICO was also stimulated by technological change in communication, particularly the communications satellite that makes it possible, using satellites in geostationary orbit, for those having the technology to reach into every country and virtually any village in the world. Of course, this technology has been developed, and is largely controlled, by giant communications corporations headquartered in the industrialized countries.

The struggle for a NIICO has been largely waged in the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), with its headquarters in Paris. This dispute illuminates how technological change may transform the context in which a peace tool is applied and thereby generate conflict in its definition and use. The UNESCO Constitution, adopted in London in November 1945, asserted "that ignorance of each other's ways and lives has been a common cause . . . of that suspicion and mistrust between peoples of the world through which their differences have all too often broken into war." The Constitution asserted that these conditions could be overcome through education, pursuit of objective truth and "the free exchange of ideas and knowledge." The last would be employed "for the purposes of mutual understanding and a truer and more perfect knowledge of each other's lives." In practice, what was believed to be the essential spirit of these worlds was incorporated into the words "free flow of communication."

Those emphasizing free flow of communication as a prerequisite of peace in the aftermath of World War II tended to be thinking of totalitarian governments as the primary threat to its fulfillment. But as newly independent peoples in the Third World became increasingly sensitive to the quality of their recently won political independence, they developed growing awareness of the one-way international flow of news, radio and TV broadcasts, films, books and magazines. Indeed, some Third World cultures have been so deeply penetrated by media from industrialized countries that their survival is in jeopardy. Out of this dissatisfaction came a replacement for the earlier communications slogan "free and balanced flow of communication."

But how is "balance" to be achieved while still remaining "free." This is a virtually important peace issue that must be resolved through international dialogue and debate. On the one hand, the Western democracies fear that intrusions on "free flow" will lead to government interference that will prevent fulfillment of the essence of the UNESCO aspiration--unfettered possibility for people to obtain a "truer and more perfect knowledge of each other's lives." On the other hand, the Third World fears that "free flow" mediated by giant global communications corporations will be largely one-way flow, with content dictated by these corporations. Neither outcome is in the interest of people in any part of the world. Communications is a vital aspect

of peaceful global relations. Ways must be found to structure communications in such a way that they foster peace rather than produce deeply felt animosity.

Although environmental issues have been a significant human problem at least since the Industrial Revolution in the late Eighteenth Century, **ECOLOGICAL BALANCE (13)** became a widely recognized problem in world relations as a result of the UN Environment Conference held in Stockholm in 1972. But at this time there was tendency for the industrialized countries to take the lead and for Third World countries to see it as a strategy to prevent them from industrializing too--thus as a way to keep them poor. But by the time of the UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 all parts of the world agreed that ecological balance is a problem confronted by all peoples. Furthermore, whereas in 1972 very few tended to see ecological balance as a dimension of peace, this perspective is now widely shared.

The relationship between ecological balance and peace can be viewed from at least two perspectives. One perspective achieved widespread visibility during the UNCED Conference when disputes erupted about (1) who is responsible for global pollution, (2) which ecological problems should receive priority and (3) who should pay "to clean up the mess?" In a context of growing pollution, and increasing sensitivity to the negative effects of pollution, these questions are likely to create increasing conflict in the future. Particularly acrimonious at the UNCED Conference was the debate between representatives of industrialized and Third World countries. The Third World drew attention to the fact that the industrialized countries are the primary polluters. From this they conclude that the industrialized countries should accept special responsibility for paying for programs to restore ecological balance. At the same time, Third World countries point out that these same countries have enjoyed the benefits of industrialization while polluting air, water and land. Therefore, if Third World countries are to be deprived of the opportunity to develop in the same way as the industrialized countries, but are to employ more costly approaches, the industrialized countries have an obligation to provide financial support for "sustainable development."

A second perspective on the peace-ecological balance relationship is that by disrupting normal relationships between specific human beings and their environment, pollution directly produces peacelessness for these people. In some cases, as with the destruction of the habitat of people in rain forests with bulldozers and explosives, it is as quick and devastating as war. Although not directly resulting in loss of human life, the total and irreversible destruction of habitat, culture and way of life can in some ways be more devastating than air bombardment of cities. In other cases, the result may be death, as in the case of poisoned air, water, earth and food. Although this form of death may be slower than war, it may be more painful. In many respects it shares some of the long-term characteristics of injuries of those wounded in war.

The rapidly growing intrusion of new technologies on the commons makes provisions for **GOVERNANCE FOR THE COMMONS (14)** an increasingly significant peace issue. By the commons we refer to areas outside the territorial boundaries of states that tend to be assumed to be spaces available to all, a term early associated with the village green in the center of small towns and also city parks. In the international context, the oceans and space are generally thought of as commons, and many would add Antarctica. We shall use the example of the

oceans in our brief discussion, an exceedingly significant commons because it covers 70% of the surface of the globe. Before the days of more intrusive technology, the two main issues in the ocean commons tended to be establishing agreed upon borders of states, early set at a three mile limit, and insuring "freedom on the seas" in all of the rest of the oceans. But new technologies for ocean transit, fishing, drilling for gas and oil, mining minerals on the seabed and ocean research--as well as increased use of the oceans as dumping grounds for waste produced on land--has raised a host of new problems with respect to the ocean commons. Occasionally reports on these problems reach the headlines with reports on disputes over fishing rights and limits, oil spills in oil tanker collisions at sea and tankers running aground.

A historic step in building for positive peace was taken in 1982 with the completion of a comprehensive treaty for governance of the oceans, the United Nations Law of the Sea Treaty. Completed after 10 years of negotiation, a US negotiator, Elliott Richardson, called it the single most important development in international law since the drafting of the UN Charter. The treaty provides for a new organization in the UN system, the International Sea-Bed Authority, with its own Assembly, Council and Secretariat, as well as an International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea and a branch to oversee the mining of manganese nodules on the sea bed--the Enterprise. The treaty has already received more than the sixty ratifications required for its implementation.

Responsive to great technological change in the use of the oceans, the treaty extends the territorial limit of states to 12 miles, gives states with seacoasts right to exploit gas and oil off their coasts up to a 200 mile limit (and in some case 350 miles), provides rules so that the manganese nodules on the seabed are shared between the industrialized countries and the Third world and requires that industrialized countries sell mining technology to the Third World. Very significant here is the fact that the treaty has anticipated eventual conflict over the manganese nodules (containing nickel, cobalt and copper as well) after supplies on land are consumed. At the same time, the treaty builds on UN experience by providing new procedures for achieving consensus in the Assembly and Council of the Authority by providing for delays in final votes while the chairs of these bodies try to work out a consensus.

The treaty also offers new approaches for peaceful settlement of disputes. Not only are there provisions for getting quick decisions from the International Tribunal, but states involved in a dispute are offered five different options for working toward a settlement: the International Tribunal, the International Court of Justice, an arbitral tribunal provided for in the treaty and special arbitral tribunals consisting of experts in the issue under dispute. In the latter course the parties to the conflict jointly pick the members of the tribunal. Thus, the treaty at the same time makes the options for peaceful settlement more obligatory and more concrete and offers new approaches that may offer parties to a conflict more confidence in the process. These provisions are clearly based on learning that has taken place in the UN "laboratory" since 1945.

Non-governmental Organizations and People's Movements

The final "drawer" in the "tool chest" outlined in Figure 1 consists of non-governmental organizations and people's movements. The term non-governmental organization (NGO) is a concept evolving out of international organization research and practice to distinguish inter-state organizations such as the UN that have governments of states as members from international organizations whose members consist of national associations or individuals that are not government officials. Prominent examples are organization such as the international professional associations (doctors, lawyers), international scholarly associations (political scientists and sociologists), international religious organizations (virtually all faiths and denominations), and international organizations focusing on specific issues, such as Greenpeace, Amnesty International and World Federation of Mental Health. NGOs made up of members from a number of countries are often referred to as International NGOs or INGOs. The more than 4000 INGOs mirror virtually all those to be found within single countries. Many of these INGOs focus on peace issues but most do not. At the same time, movements arise to address specific peace issues such as disarmament, poverty, human rights and ecological balance. At times these movements are coalitions of already existing NGOs and INGOs but they may also include, and may be led by, others who become mobilized in response to a specific issue. Thus, because of considerable overlap, we combine NGOs, INGOs and peoples movements in our discussion.

People's organizations (PO) is a useful short title for the growing involvement of people outside of government in world affairs in general, and peace issues in particular. But before briefly describing their activities and contributions, we must recognize that the involvement of POs in the pursuit of peace is not something new. Peace movements have existed in a number of countries since the early Nineteenth Century. A striking example of an international movement was the gathering of social scientists from 20 countries in Paris in 1937 which urged coping with "the causes of war, by seeking to substitute for it peaceful methods of satisfying the profound need for change of which war is the expression and the instrument" (quoted by Chatfield, 1984, p. 3).

POs have mobilized people for peace action by bringing pressure on governments to employ all of the peace tools that we have enumerated. For example, during the Cold War it was often peace movements that kept disarmament and arms control on the public agenda at times when governments of both of the superpowers seemed disinterested. Many organizations have had sustained involvement in movements advocating economic aid and adjustment in international economic practices. Many would assert that the towering achievements in drafting, and embryonic efforts at monitoring, international human rights standards have been attained largely because of sustained PO initiatives and pressure on individual states and UN organizations. At the same time, many would give POs considerable credit for placing environmental issues high on the global agenda. Reflections of this were the widely reported activities of the assembled POs from all over the world at the UNCED Conference in Rio de Janeiro in 1992.

POs have also been the inventors and advocates of at least eight new peace tools. It must be made clear that these do not replace tools already employed, but they do illuminate

weaknesses of old tools, or the fact that there is no tool for coping with specific causes of peacelessness. **Second Track Diplomacy (15)** addresses the limitations of diplomacy and peaceful settlement by recognizing that negotiations stalled or broken off by governmental representatives may be revived by initiatives outside of government. Consisting at least in part of people outside of government, this approach offers a "second track" that may reach into alternative representatives of governments, often at a lower level. This approach has been advocated and employed largely by scholars, often including those who have had wide governmental experience.

One form of second track diplomacy originated by an Australian official turned scholar, John Burton, is given the name "problem solving workshop." Burton is concerned that representatives of states often do not *resolve* conflicts, but tend instead to arrange *settlements* that "paper over" underlying grievances which will be the source of escalating conflict in the future. This is because representatives of states sometimes do not adequately represent the needs of all that will be affected by the settlement. To overcome this shortcoming, problem solving workshops assemble both governmental and non-governmental people who can widely represent the needs of all parties, including those not adequately represented by representatives of states. The workshops consist of meetings between these people and social scientists who help them to probe deeply into the basic roots of the conflict, stimulate dialogue between the parties in search of mutually acceptable solutions and introduce social science insights where they are deemed to be useful. Burton is particularly reluctant to have these social scientists pose solutions because he believes that viable solutions must come from the participants themselves. Not all practitioners of this approach share Burton's reluctance. This approach has been widely practiced in international disputes, including Cyprus, the Middle East, Northern Ireland and the Argentine-British war over the Malvinas/Falkland Islands.

The exceedingly slow progress in disarmament/arms control negotiations has provoked the development of four approaches that could in some instance be viewed as supplements to negotiations and in others as substitutes. These approaches sometimes diminish the need for specific kinds of weapons and at other times attempt to offer non-violent substitutes for weapons. **CONVERSION (16)** is targeted at the conversion of military production to that which satisfies civilian needs, such as housing, appliances, etc. This approach tends to illuminate the domestic sources of arms races in that arms production is often advocated as a way to create jobs for factory workers, engineers and researchers. It follows that the communities in which those employed in arms development and production live come to depend on arms production to keep the local economy prosperous. But arms production as a means for providing employment may, of course, contribute to arms races by provoking other countries into responding by building more weapons. Conversion plans, drafted largely by POs in local communities, advocate ways in which more jobs can be created through investment in civilian production than through less labor-intensive military production.

In the Twentieth Century the explosive power and geographical reach of weapons has increased to the point where virtually any place on earth might be reached with a nuclear missile that might obliterate a large metropolitan area or make a rural area of similar size a desert. On the other hand, it is those who have this long-range destructive capacity that are most fearful that

they may be destroyed. Why? Because Country A that has long-range nuclear weapons fears that Country B might destroy its weapons with their nuclear weapons. Why? Because Country B fears that Country A might make a "first strike" against its weapons. To overcome the fact that those with the most powerful offensive weapons are least secure, some advocate **DEFENSIVE DEFENSE (17)**, that is, defense employing weapons that are defensive in nature. This approach has largely been advocated by POs and scholars in Europe.

There is no doubt that it is sometimes difficult to distinguish between defensive arms and offensive arms. On the other hand, there is also no doubt that some arms, such as intercontinental missiles, aircraft carriers and long-range bombers have obvious offensive capacity. Other weapons, such as land mines and fixed shore batteries, can be employed in a strictly defensive capacity. In certain respects weapons between these extremes could be used for either offense or defense. But it cannot be denied that certain arms are essentially defensive, such as short range mechanized forces, interception aircraft and mobile anti-aircraft missiles (Fischer, 1984: 47-62). Combined with other peace tools, efforts of State A to present a defensive posture to State B diminishes the fear of State B that A will be aggressive. This approach motivates states to acquire understanding, more than they often do, of how their weapons are perceived, and the consequences of this perception. At the same time, the defensive defense approach may stimulate arms designers to employ new technology in the design of weapons that are convincingly limited to defensive purposes. Instead, it would seem that up to this point new technology has largely been directed toward bigger and bigger weapons with ever more distant reach.

NON-VIOLENCE (18), used by POs in the pursuit of social change, can be viewed as a substitute for the use of arms. Employment of non-violence diminishes the need for police, and military forces employed for internal security within a state, to use their weapons. This can diminish the need for and employment of armed forces in countries where the military is expected to make a significant contribution to maintaining internal order. Indeed, much of the arms trade in the world is less motivated by the fear of neighboring states than by the fear of internal uprisings.

Presently there is a growing interest in non-violence throughout the world as an increasing number of people acquire first-hand knowledge of the failure of the employment of arms to bring peace. Significant is the way in which non-violence training gives those involved penetrating understanding of reasons for the often thoughtless impulse to respond with violence when provoked by others, and the long-term negative consequences of responding with violence. At the same time, they learn reasons why non-violent responses are more likely to receive non-violent responses in return. This restrains the launching of violence spirals which escalate into ever larger violent reactions.

Unfortunately, many people still tend to wrongly perceive non-violent action as passive. Instead non-violence actively engages in conflict, but without inflicting violence on others and without violating its fundamental values. This strategy is based on the insight that social change created by violence may establish institutions of violence that outlast the revolution and may put in power people who habitually use violence. Those who advocate non-violence first try to reach opponents through petition, argument and discussion. If that fails, direct action such as non-

cooperation with authorities, civil disobedience and fasting may be employed. But fundamental is the consistent recognition of opponents as fellow human beings. As stated by Ghandi in his campaign against British imperialism: "Whilst we may attack measures and systems, we may not, must not attack men. Imperfect ourselves, we must be tender towards others and slow to impute motives" (quoted by Ambler in Smoker, Davies, Munske, p. 201).

Those who advocate non-violence are often confronted with the question: "But would you have employed it in resisting Hitler or Stalin?" No doubt some, who fervently believe that one should never violate one's own values, even under severe provocation, would answer yes. But this kind of question makes a fundamental mistake in assuming that a peace tool must be useful in *all* situations. The essential questions are whether it is useful in some situations and in identifying these situations. There is no doubt that Gandhi made fundamental contributions to the Indian struggle for independence; there is no doubt that Martin Luther King did the same for the struggle of African-Americans for their constitutional rights in the United States. At the same time, it is also certain that their non-violent leadership saved many lives by helping both countries to avoid cycles of violence that would likely have occurred had non-violent strategies not been employed.

CITIZEN DEFENSE (19) is closely related to non-violence employed for social change, but this tool employs non-violent techniques for national defense. Citizen defense goes one step further than defensive defense by also eliminating defensive weapons. Fundamental to civilian defense is deterrence through convincing a potential invader that there would be no payoff from invasion. Instead there would be a struggle in which the invader would be continually challenged. Citizen defense requires large-scale, well-publicized organization and planning for massive refusal to cooperate with the invader's military government. Police would refuse to arrest local patriots, teachers would refuse to introduce the invader's propaganda, workers would use strikes and delays to obstruct the invaders from acquiring their needs. Politicians, civil servants and judges would ignore the invaders orders. Local plans would be made to maintain local media, schools and other local services.

This kind of resistance would have to be backed-up by underground broadcasting stations and presses, storage for food, medicine, water and fuel, and plans for dispersion of people to places where these facilities would be located. Gene Sharp, a strong civilian defense advocate and strategist asserts that "non-violent action resembles military war more than it does negotiation; it is a technique of struggle. As such, non-violent action involves the use of power" (Sharp, 1970: 21). At the same time it requires patriots with courage, ingenuity, tenacity and unusual creativity.

People who have lived their entire life in societies in which there is an unquestioned reflex in which violence is responded to with violence frequently have difficulty in accepting the fact that non-violent defense makes sense. But the argument for non-violent defense is persuasive enough that it must be included in any peacemakers "tool box." After all, there is always the possibility that military defense will be perceived as potentially aggressive. What often begins as truly defensive precautions may inadvertently involve a state in an arms race. At the same time, arms production and employment always takes resources that could be devoted to human needs. Furthermore, armed defense in modern war almost always results in the

destruction of cities, their populations and the economic and social infrastructure. These costs and likely consequences of military defense impel us to approach with an open mind an alternative that does not in any way threaten neighbors and that is focused primarily on defense of life and social institutions.

Sharp reports that there have been many instances of effective non-violent defense, such as early resistance by American colonists, 1773-1775; Hungarian passive resistance against Austrian rule, 1850-1867; Finland's disobedience and noncooperation with the Russians, 1898-1905; and resistance in several Nazi-occupied countries, especially Norway, the Netherlands and Denmark (Sharp, 1970: 20). Of course, civilian defense has never been employed in the way in which Sharp advocates, as a total substitute for military defense and with comprehensive governmental planning and training that reaches into every community. At the same time, there would have to be a comprehensive information program that communicated convincing evidence of this preparation to potential invaders. On the other hand, it would also seem feasible to combine certain elements of civilian defense, in tandem with very modest military preparations. Perhaps this would serve the security needs of some citizens without the provocative consequences that arise through total dependence on weapons for defense.

SELF-RELIANCE (20) emerged as a peace tool in the context of a dialogue focused primarily on the economic dimensions of peace which evolved from functionalism, to economic development, to international economic equity--each successive approach attempting to cope with limitations of that which had preceded it. Some critics of the New International Economic Order's approach to obtaining international economic equity are critical of its emphasis on creating a more equitable trading system. They observe that this would tend to increase the utilization of land in rural areas of the Third World for producing agricultural exports, thereby requiring those tilling small farms to become employees of large plantations. Thus, the rural masses would become dependent on trade in an international economic system in which profits would tend to gravitate to owners of agricultural industries, thereby increasing the gap between the rich and the poor. At the same time, rural people would become increasingly dependent on external sources for food and other necessities that had been produced at home. In making this argument, critics of the NIEO cite as examples African areas formerly self-sufficient in food production which now import food from abroad. Of course, the drastic change in local economies foreseen would also lead to equally dramatic changes in local culture which is intertwined with the local economy.

A very significant contribution of the self-reliance critique is that it shifts attention to the consequences of international economic relationships for the mass of individuals. It asks, what will be the impact of economic development and international economic equity strategies, which are designed and implemented by decisions in national capitals, on the mass of individuals who have not participated in making these decisions? By raising these questions insight is gained with respect to the fact that, although our discussions of peace tend to focus on relations between leaders of states and nations, the presence or absence of peace is most accurately measured by the degree to which the masses are experiencing peace in their daily lives.

Johan Galtung illuminates the meaning he gives to self-reliance and asserts its significance by making it a defining characteristic of development in two senses. First, he asserts that

development should develop individual human beings, not things. Says Galtung, "development theory and practice have to be rooted in a theory of human needs that includes the five fundamental needs [food, clothes, habitat, health, education] but also goes beyond them, to such needs as freedom, work in the sense of creativity, politics, togetherness, joy, a sense of meaning of life." Second, Galtung declares that "development can only take place through autonomy, and a first step is to rely on your own forces and own factors, on your own creativity, your own land, raw materials, capital--however limited they are, at the individual level, the local level, the national level and the level of [regional] collective self-reliance." Concretely, Galtung means that "one tries to produce things locally rather than to obtain them through exchange . . ." The rationale for this is to reduce dependency on powerful external suppliers. Says Galtung, "most important in this connection is self-reliance in foodstuffs, in order not to get into a dependence that can be used by the food-rich to blackmail a country into submissiveness."

Emphasized is the fact that self-reliance does not mean self-sufficiency, or the absence of trade, but it does mean "reliance on oneself to the point that your own capabilities are so well developed that if a crisis should occur, then one could be self-sufficient." Galtung is particularly concerned when a local community, country or region does not make sufficient use of its own potential but submits to long-term economic exchange in which primary products are exchanged for manufactured goods. In this case, he sees that there is enduring acceptance of a long-term inferior position in which it will be difficult to satisfy the basic needs of local people (Galtung, no date: 12-13).

Self-reliance is a useful example of the degree to which there are connections and overlaps between peace tools. We have already noted that self-reliance challenges development practices that might frustrate the full development of individual human potential and that might contribute to conflict produced by growing disparities in wealth. At the same time, self-reliance shares much with self-determination, although in this case it is not applied to nationality and ethnic groups but to the individual human being and a diversity of kind of economic units. Also, self-reliance, in its pursuit of human fulfillment, pursues some of the same goals as human rights, particularly those considered to be economic and social.

The **FEMINIST** (21) perspective is particularly useful in shedding light on the degree to which values associated with militarism and military organizations permeate societies and how this came to be. At the same time the feminist perspective provides a vision of alternative kinds of societies. It is necessary to consider the feminist perspective as a separate tool because women's perspectives and experiences have been largely omitted in most works on international relations and peace. One need not be a female in order to approach human behavior with a feminist perspective, but there is no doubt that the actual experiences of women has sharpened their perceptions and understanding of the roots of violence. This understanding is provoked by the violence experienced by women from the hands of men within societies, through rape and family violence. At the same time it is women, and their children, who suffer most extensively from militarization and war. This includes not only the growing destruction of civilian societies by war but also the diversion of resources away from the needs of families into military weapons and organizations. Not insignificant is the fact that these military organizations are male-

dominated and that they were created by political and military decisions made almost exclusively by men.

The feminist perspective takes note of male dependence on violence within societies, as a means for satisfaction of needs, for solving problems and for signaling individual significance and identity. Why are these attributes so prevalent in men and rare in women? Why are they much more prevalent in some cultures than in others? Why are they so prevalent in some men but not in others? In responding to these questions feminists conclude that the tendency to employ violence as a tool for coping with problems in human relationships is learned through early socialization of males in certain cultures. They are taught that to be a man you must be aggressive and respond to provocative frustrations with violence. Not to reply with violence is not to be in control and to deny one's "manhood." This form of socialization is then easily transferred in response to disappointments and frustrations in relations between gangs, between labor and management, and readily applied to questions of national and international peace and security.

Thus the fundamental contributions of the feminist perspective as a peace tool are (1) to question the inevitability of violence as a tool in the pursuit of peace and security, (2) to illuminate its negative consequences and (3) to provoke thought about where the roots of the "violence habit" is to be found. Very significant is the fact that the last question directs our attention beyond arenas of inter-state conflict and into the daily life of individual societies--including our own.

The feminist perspective also offers a fourth contribution by providing visions of alternative ways for solving human problems. It is obvious that women also experience disappointments and frustrations and, like all normal human beings, engage in conflict in striving for personal goals. But, according to Betty Reardon, the "feminine view . . . emphasizes human relationships and how people behave to fulfill their human needs." Where the "masculine mode of thinking is that of a hierarchical organization . . . the feminine mode is based on a kinship model of less structured organization designed for the fulfillment of the needs of those in kinship networks. The values of such a mode tend to be familial, nurturant and inclusive. Whereas, the masculine values are more organizational, competitive and exclusive." From this it follows that "a feminist world security system would attempt to include all people and all nations based on a notion of extended kinship including the entire human family" (Reardon, in Smoker, et al., pp. 138-39).

In other words, the feminist vision of a peaceful world tends to begin with family and kinship relations and then extends the quality of these mutually nurturing relationships to the world. It is less inclined to make unquestioned assumptions about the need for a state/military apparatus to oversee these world relationships. Of course, once again, we are encountering an overlap with peace tools already presented. In essence the feminist perspective offers insight on the need for positive peace tools. In this sense the feminist perspective confirms and supports the need for peace tools such as non-violence, self-reliance, economic equity and human rights. On the one hand, some have achieved their understanding of the need for these tools through experiences in the struggle for peace that revealed the shortcomings of negative peace tools, and of some positive peace tools as well. On the other hand, others (feminists) have reached the

same insights by understanding coming out of the experiences of women--in times of war and "peace"--in everyday life. Of overwhelming importance is the fact that the feminist perspective not only illuminates the *need* for certain positive peace tools; feminine practice throughout the world also demonstrates that they work!

One professor of psychiatry discerns similarities between the trauma of "shellshock" experienced by soldiers in war and that experienced by women in civilian life: ". . . the psychological syndrome seen in survivors of rape, domestic battery and incest was essentially the same as the syndrome seen in survivors of war" (Chesler, 1992: 11). This leads her to reach this challenging conclusion:

The fate of this field of knowledge depends upon the fate of the same political movement that has inspired and sustained it over the last century. If in the late 19th century the goal of that movement was the establishment of secular democracy. In the early 20th century its goal was the abolition of war. In the last 20th century its goal was the liberation of women. All of these goals remain. All are, in the end, inseparably connected (Herman, 1992, quoted by Chesler, 12).

PEACE EDUCATION (22) can be viewed as the obvious candidate to be the last tool to be presented because it obviously comprises all that has gone before. But it is certainly not last in importance. Indeed, the successful employment of all that we have learned about peacebuilding in the Twentieth Century is dependent on peace education. Now broadened interdependence has directly involved *everybody* in a diversity of human enterprises that either contribute to or detract from peaceful human relations on a global scale. This is why it is now necessary that *all* begin to comprehend the peace potential generated in a diversity of "peace laboratories" in this century.

Over and over again in real-life "experiments" with an array of peace tools, practitioners have found the need to probe deeper and deeper into the causes of peacelessness. At the end of the quest a diversity of non-governmental/citizens movements were discerned to be a necessary "drawer" in the "peace tool chest" because the roots of peacelessness extend into domestic societies, local communities and even families. Thus, the seeds of peace must be planted, watered, nurtured and cultivated there. This means, of course, that *all* require peace education. Obviously it is not a subject essential only for present or future government leaders. Indeed, implementation of their peace plans requires the active support that only a citizenry with comprehensive peace education can provide. Furthermore, *comprehensive* peace education deepens insight on peace potential, particularly with respect to certain positive peace tools, and most specifically those requiring broad participation. It is obvious that the full extent of this potential has not yet been realized. Most people have not been challenged to join the quest for peace. This should be the purpose of peace education.

There are those who tend to limit peace education to what they call conflict management or conflict resolution. Sometimes these approaches focus on managing or resolving conflicts in the schools, between neighbors, between business enterprises and their customers, and between labor and management. There are many community programs that attempt to offer conflict

resolution alternatives to the courts, thereby relieving overcrowded court agendas. These programs are very helpful, both in resolving conflicts and in educating those involved about ways for diminishing the social disruption, and violence potential, of human conflict. But obviously these approaches are only one aspect of peace education. We believe that peace studies must offer comprehensive coverage of the diverse causes of peacelessness and their relationship. This encourages a long term perspective that illuminates strategies for removing the roots of disruptive peacelessness before they get out of control. History is replete with examples where conflict resolution approaches have offered too little, and too late. Even those practicing the employment of only one "peace tool," such as conflict resolution, need to understand where this "tool" fits in the full array of those available. After all, we would not prefer to have a personal surgeon who is not aware that some gallstones can now be eliminated by drugs and sound waves.

Finally, peace education with a comprehensive view is essential because it will probably be the only occasion in which young people are challenged to put into words their vision of a peaceful world. Because of the emphasis on extreme conflict and violence by the media, and because the academic study of international relations tends to emphasize the same phenomena, young people tend to assume that a world with widespread violence is inevitable. As a result, when students are asked to describe their personal vision of a peaceful world, they find it difficult to describe anything other than what they perceive the present world to be like. But peace education with a broad perspective cultivates the capacity of students to perceive widespread peace in the world, and significant achievements in efforts to diminish the scope of peacelessness. This enhancement of capacity to perceive peace potential makes it easier for students to employ their own values in envisioning their preferred peaceful world for the future.

Approaching peace education as a quest for ways through which one's personal vision of a peaceful world could be achieved is absolutely necessary if people in an interdependent world are to join the quest for peace. Students soon learn that pursuit of their vision requires two other kinds of knowledge. First, they must have an accurate picture of the present world. Second, they must have knowledge about how the present might be moved toward the preferred world. Since the achievement of significant goals always takes time, they must also think about what should be the first steps and what should follow. It should be obvious that this kind of peace education requires (1) very intensive study of the present state of human relations with a broad perspective. (2) It also requires systematic thinking about strategies for change based on knowledge about the past successes and failures of these strategies. And (3) it constantly challenges students to clarify and revise their preferred future. Did my first vision leave out the special problems of the Third World? Was my proposal for a stronger world court too simplistic? Was my view of human rights too narrow? Why did I leave out the commons? Did I adequately recognize that, for many people, peace means more than stopping the shooting? Thus, having a personal vision of a peaceful world is absolutely necessary if peace education is to be meaningful. This makes possible a challenging dialogue between the world as it is and the world as it might be, mediated by theories ("tools") about how to get there (Galtung, 1977: 56-65).

Table 1 : Summary of Approaches to Peace

<i>NAME</i>	<i>INSTRUMENT</i>
DIPLOMACY	Inter-state Communication
PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT	Good offices, conciliation, arbitration, judicial, etc.
SECOND TRACK DIPLOMACY I	Communication involving non-state actors, including problem-solving workshops
PEACEKEEPING	Cease-fire Patrol/Observation

BALANCE OF POWER	Military Balance
COLLECTIVE SECURITY	II Military superiority under system-wide authority

DISARMAMENT	No weapons
ARMS CONTROL	Reduce weapons
DEFENSIVE DEFENSE	III Reduce military threat
CONVERSION	Convert to civilian production

NON-VIOLENT POLITICS	Diminish need for weapons as instruments for social change
CITIZEN DEFENSE	IV Diminish need for weapons for national defense

SELF-DETERMINATION	
HUMAN RIGHTS	V Autonomy/Independence for identity groups Legitimize transnational standards for economic, social, political, cultural rights

FUNCTIONALISM	
DEVELOPMENT	VI Collaboration in solving common problems Overcome poverty/economic inequity
SELF-RELIANCE	Human development based on local definition of needs

INT'L ECONOMIC EQUITY	Overcome poverty/economic inequity produced by international economic system
INT'L COMMUNICATIONS EQUITY	VII Overcome one-way international communication that inhibits mutual understanding and tends to overwhelm cultures
INT'L ECOLOGICAL BALANCE	Overcome destruction of habitat
GOVERNANCE FOR COMMONS	Collaborative problem-solving Sharing/equity in use of the commons

FEMINIST	
PEACE EDUCATION	VIII Illuminating the roots of militarism and violence within societies Learning about the causes of peace; Learning about the diversity of peace strategies; Acquire a personal vision of peace
PEOPLES MOVEMENTS	Broaden opportunities for participation in definition of peace and in choice of peace strategies

Overview of Approaches to Peace

We have presented 22 "peace tools" in our survey of the quest for peace which has spread across the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries. The "tools" were somewhat arbitrarily gathered into five categories: Nineteenth Century, League Covenant (1919), UN Charter (1945), UN Practice and NGO/Peoples Movements. Figure 3 presents a complementary perspective in which the eight categories are based on the instrument, or means employed in the quest for peace.

Group I basically employs spoken and written *words*. The enduring significance of this approach was underlined by Jules Cambon 60 years ago: "The best instrument of a Government wishing to persuade another Government will always remain the spoken words of a decent man" (1931: 12). Fundamental is the worldwide system of embassies that has developed over many centuries. Very significant has been the development of procedures for widening the diplomatic dialogue to include a variety of kind of mediators, or "third parties." Another more recent innovation has been efforts to establish "second track" communication by bringing in additional government officials, former officials, representatives of private groups and social scientists. Peacekeeping is placed in this group primarily because it is a means for obtaining and maintaining a ceasefire so that negotiations can then be undertaken for coping with the conflict which precipitated the violence.

Group II basically employs *military power* as a deterrent to aggression, in the form of balance of power exercised through alliances and the exercise of military superiority through a system-wide collective security system.

Group III basically employs strategies for *eliminating* or *reducing* the number and power of *weapons* through disarmament, arms control, defensive defense and conversion.

Group IV basically attempts to *diminish* the *need for weapons* by providing alternative means for achieving social change (non-violent politics) and for national defense (citizen defense).

Group V basically employs *protection* of the *rights* of identity and self-determination for groups and protection of the human rights of individuals--economic, social, political and cultural.

Group VI basically employs *collaboration in solving common economic and social problems*. But in situations in which there are wide gaps between the rich and the poor, strategies are required to cope with poverty and economic inequity. Furthermore, strategies for overcoming these gaps require concern for the self-reliance of those who are the targets of development strategies.

Group VII basically employs approaches that seek to attain *equitable international economic, communications and ecological systems*. Inevitably this also requires collaborative problem-solving in governance for the global commons (oceans, space, Antarctica) and equitable sharing in the use of the commons.

Group VIII basically requires the linkage of the population at large to the quest for peace, through *education* and *organized participation*. Feminist perspectives illuminate the roots of militarism and violence within societies. Peoples movements offer opportunities for people to participate in the building of more peaceful societies. Peace education prepares people for

enlightened participation and at the same time stimulates them to acquire their own vision of a peaceful world toward which their personal participation is directed.

References

Alger, Chadwick F. 1989. "Peace Studies at the Crossroads: Where Else?" In George Lopez, ed. *Peace Studies: Past and Future, The Annals*. American Academy of Political and Social Sciences. pp. 117-27.

Ambler, Rex. 1990. "Ghandian Peacemaking." In Paul Smoker, Ruth Davies, and Barbard Munske, eds. *A Reader in Peace Studies*. New York: Pergamon Press. pp. 199-205.

Burton, John. 1990. *Conflict: Resolution and Provention*. New York: St. Martin's Press.

Cambon, Jules. 1931. *The Diplomatist*. London: Philip Allan.

Chatfield, Charles. 1984. "Concepts of Peace in History." Conference on Peace Research in History.

Chesler, Phillis. 1992. "The Shellshocked Woman." *The New York Times Book Review*, August 23, pp. 11-12.

Galtung, Johan. 1977. *Methodology and Ideology: Theory and Methods of Social Research*, Vol. 1. Copenhagen: Christian Eljers.

Galtung, Johan. no date. "Self-Reliance and Global Interdependence: Some Reflections on the 'New International Economic Order,'" University of Oslo.

Herman, Judith Lewis. 1992. *Trauma and Recovery*. New York: Basic Books.

Reardon, Betty Reardon. 1990. "Feminist Concepts of Peace and Security." In Paul Smoker, Ruth Davies, and Barbard Munske, eds. *A Reader in Peace Studies*. New York: Pergamon Press. pp. 136-43.

Sharp, Gene. 1985. *National Security through Civilian-Backed Defense*. Omaha, Neb.: Association for Transarmament Studies.