TRACK II INTERVENTIONS
AND THE KURDISH QUESTION IN TURKEY:
AN ANALYSIS USING A THEORIES OF CHANGE APPROACH

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Abstract

In October 2005, a small number of prominent members of the Turkish academy and NGO sector were brought to Sofia, Bulgaria for three days to discuss the Kurdish question in Turkey. Using the discussions from the workshop as a starting point, this article presents an argument regarding what type of Track II interventions make sense in Turkey, given the nature of the conflict there. To make this argument, the article draws on the concept of "theories of change." This concept, developed initially in the monitoring and evaluation field, refers to the idea that any intervention in society, including Track II interventions, is informed by an implicit or explicit theory of change regarding how the project will produce the desired change in society. Four theories of change are described and then assessed in the context of a conflict analysis of the Kurdish Question in Turkey. The conclusion reached is that each of four theories of change are relevant to Track II projects in Turkey. However, each theory of change is only relevant to certain elements of the overall conflict. As a result, we argue that interventions based on each theory of change must be targeted at specific sectoral and geographic audiences in order to be effective.

Introduction

In October 2005, a small number of prominent members of the Turkish academy and NGO sector were brought to Sofia, Bulgaria for three days to discuss the Kurdish question in Turkey.[1] The group discussed various scenarios that described how the Kurdish question might evolve over the next 10-15 years.[2] On the final day of the workshop, a brainstorming session was held regarding what type of Track II interventions might help to bring about the more positive scenarios and avoid the more negative scenarios.

Using the discussions from the workshop as a starting point, this article presents an argument regarding what type of Track II projects make sense in Turkey, given the nature of the conflict there. The goal is not to describe how to make specific Track II projects successful. Such specific advice on implementation can only be offered on a case-by-case basis. Instead, the goal is to define what types of projects should be attempted, that is, to identify the type of projects that if implemented successfully would

have the greatest impact and the right kind of impact. Such an approach also helps answer the more theoretical question of how to have a positive impact given the parties to the conflict, the issues at hand, the timing of the intervention, and the desired outcomes.

The article focuses on Track II interventions because certain structural features of Turkish society are in flux. In particular, as a result of the European Union (EU) process initiated in 2001 with acceptance of Turkey's candidacy to the EU, Turkey has begun to revise a whole range of policies (Martin et al., 2002: 123), many of which impact on the Kurdish Question (Martin et al., 2002: 123). This shift was crystallized in a speech given by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in August 2005 in which for the first time in the history of the Republic, he defined the "Kurdish Question" as a cultural issue and acknowledged past mistakes. Prior prime ministers had referred to the same issue, but their definitions were often vague and normally emphasized terrorism and underdevelopment.

On the other side of the equation, many Kurdish leaders also see the European Union process as a means toward resolving the fundamental, structural issues driving the conflict with the Turkish state. Ahmet Türk, co-president of the pro-Kurdish Democratic Society Party (DTP), argues that, "In a democratic Turkey, *Kurds* would not tolerate armed resistance" (Sazak, 2005: 21, emphasis added).

These developments indicate that timely Track II interventions could contribute to establishing a durable peace in Turkey. Where these types of structural changes are not occurring, as might be said about Chechnya for instance, Track II interventions have little chance of success. In Turkey, these changes have created a window of opportunity within Turkey to address many of the longstanding issues that drive the Kurdish conflict. However, as has been seen in other conflicts, simple policy changes will not be enough. In general, a broad range of society must be engaged in such processes of change if they are to have a sustainable impact on conflicts (Kelman, 2002: 93), and this applies to the Kurdish conflict as well. The goal of Track II interventions is to create this type of engagement. The recent increase in violence and ethnic nationalism within Turkey itself and the possible spillover effect of the developments in Northern Iraq (Çelik and Blum, 2007) illustrate the importance of proper Track II interventions if the progress made as the result of the EU reforms is to be sustained.

Thus, we begin with the assumption that the right type of Track II intervention in Turkey would have a positive impact. But what is the right type? Answering this question at a theoretical level is important since improperly-designed Track II interventions can have serious, negative consequences. In order to identify the right type of Track II intervention, this article draws on the concept of "theories of change" (ToC). This concept, developed initially in the monitoring and evaluation field, refers to the idea that any intervention in society, including Track II interventions, is informed by an implicit or explicit ToC regarding how the project will produce the desired change in society.

The strategy we use, instead of evaluating past practices, seeks to identify what the best practices would be, based on an analysis of relevant theories of change (also see

Çuhadar Gürkaynak and Dayton, forthcoming). The resulting contribution is two-fold. First, the arguments presented below both broaden the applicability of, and provide evidence for, the efficacy of the "ToC" concept. Second, the article further develops a new approach to strategic planning for conflict prevention in both the pre-conflict and de-escalation stages. This is significant given that the international community's emphasis in recent years has continued to shift from conflict resolution to conflict prevention (Boutros-Ghali, 1992; Evans, 2007).

The structure of the paper is as follows. After defining Track II interventions in the following section, sections three and four describe in detail the logic of each of four relevant theories of change. Section five of the article presents an analysis of the Kurdish conflict in Turkey. Finally section six integrates the discussion of the theories of change with the conflict analysis of the Kurdish conflict in Turkey to assess what type of Track II activity should be implemented in Turkey. The conclusion reached is that each ToC assessed is relevant to the design of Track II programs focused on the Kurdish Question in Turkey. However, each ToC is only relevant to certain elements of the overall conflict. As a result, we argue that interventions based on each ToC must be targeted at specific sectoral and geographic audiences in order to be effective.

Track II Interventions

The term Track II intervention, or citizens' diplomacy, is a specific term used in the conflict resolution literature to refer to informal attempts, involving small numbers of individuals, with the above mentioned objectives of changing perceptions, beliefs and attitudes. Joseph Montville (1992: 262), who coined the term Track II, defines it as, "unofficial, informal interaction between members of adversarial groups or nations with the goals of developing strategies, influencing public opinions and organizing human and material resources in ways that might help resolve the conflict."[3]

Following Montville, Louise Diamond and John McDonald (Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy, 2007) broadened the term to include activities such as problem-solving workshops, dialogues, cultural and scientific exchanges, traveling artists, sports teams, or any other contacts between people whose groups are currently engaged in a violent or potentially violent conflict. They invented the term "multi-track diplomacy" to convey the sense that there are many ways to bring people together in addition to official negotiations. [For further information see <http://www.imtd.org>. Current usage of the term Track II encompasses the various tracks that Diamond and McDonald identify, except for Track I. In this article, we use the term Track II because the term multi-track diplomacy has not gained wide currency.]

For the purposes of this article, we can gain insight into which theories of change might inform Track II efforts by reviewing how Track II practitioners describe the goals and the impacts of their programs. According to these practitioners, Track II interventions

aim to "allow communication, understanding, rehumanization of the enemy, relationship-building, and reframing of the conflict as a problem to be solved;" (Davies and Kaufman, 2002: 5) "generate insight, refocus perspective, redefine problems, (..) and to shape new frameworks within which to tackle problems, change attitudes, alter relationships," (Saunders et al., 2000: 256) and they "typically range from individual attitude change, through the generation of innovative, mutually agreeable solutions to the conflict, to improvements in the wider relationship between the parties" (Fisher, 1997: 8).

Nadim Rouhana (2000: 297) summarizes these different assessments of Track II initiatives by providing a useful list of "microobjectives," which he argues should be the result of the program's activities. Key microobjectives include:

- Increasing differentiation of the other side.
- Improving interpersonal relationships.
- Changing the enemy image.
- Communicating political needs.
- Reducing mutual stereotypes.
- Arriving at deeper understanding of psychological conflict.
- Reaching mutual understanding of political ideas.

The microobjectives – the direct outcomes of the workshop or other intervention – according to Rouhana (2000: 297) should lead to the achievement of macrogoals, such as "influencing decision makers" and "changing the dynamics of the conflict." Virtually all Track II practitioners make some reference to these broader goals, which Fisher, following Herbert Kelman, refers to as "transfer" (Fisher, 1997: 199; Saunders et al., 2000: 257; Ross, 2000: 1005-6; Lederarch, 1999: 29-31). Davies and Kaufman (2002: 6), for instance, describe the importance of working across "vertical divisions" and argue that insights from the workshops should be, "communicated with top-level or other sectoral leaders." Çuhadar Gürkaynak (2004) defines transfer in three directions. While she refers to the transfer of workshop effects and outcomes to the negotiations and decision-making level as 'upwards transfer,' she uses the term 'downwards transfer' for the transfer of workshop effects towards the grassroots level and 'lateral transfer' to refer to the transfer of workshop effects and outcomes to other local, regional, and international track two interventions.

Thus, we define Track II intervention as a set of activities involving individuals from groups involved in a conflict,[4] which leads to the microobjectives described by Rouhana, which then lead to the macrogoal of contributing to the building of a sustainable peace.

Theories of Change

The field of conflict resolution is centrally concerned with the changes that create an escalation of conflict and changes that create de-escalation and move societies toward

a sustainable peace.[5] Christopher Mitchell (2005: 3), for instance, in a recent article, asks four simple questions:

> What sorts of changes create conflict?
> What changes exacerbate conflict?
> What changes diminish the intensity of conflict?
> What sorts of changes help to bring about the resolution or transformation of conflict?

At an academic level, conflict analysis, with its focus on the causes and consequences of conflict tends to be concerned with first two questions. The "greed versus grievance" debate provides an illustration (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004: 563-596; Ballentine and Sherman, 2003; Fearon and Laitin, 2003: 75-90). The study of conflict resolution and conflict transformation, with its focus on how conflict should be addressed, tends to be concerned with the final two questions (Ryan, 2007; Ramsbothom, Woodhours and Miall, 2005). Of course, many scholars deal with both sets of questions in their work (see, for example, Kriesberg, 2007). At the level of practice, implementers need to be concerned with all four questions, as well as well as the question of *how* to avoid the deleterious changes and produce the advantageous changes (Fewer, International Alert and Saferworld, 2003).

It is within this context that our focus on a Theory of Change approach can be understood. Track II interventions, as one form of practice, are designed to create social change by either avoiding deleterious changes or producing advantageous changes. [The theories of change that inform a given intervention rest in turn on more fundamental theories of social change that are the subject of the social change literature. See Wimmer and Kössler, 2006; Schatzki, 2002; Haferkamp and Smelser, 1992; Rogers, 1983; Bennis et al., 1976; Appelbaum, 1970.] Thus, each Track II intervention will have an explicit or implicit theory, which we refer to as a theory of change, regarding *how* the project will produce this social change. We will detail below the advantages of making this theory of change explicit as part of the program design process.

By theory we simply mean, to borrow from Ilana Shapiro, "the causal processes through which change comes about as a result of program strategies and action" (Shapiro, 2006: 2; see also Shapiro, 2005; Ross, 2000). We would add to this that the causal processes must be generalizable. That is, the ToC, must state, *in general* if we do *a* this will lead to *b*, which will lead through any number of additional intervening steps to social change *z*. It is this generalizability that distinguishes a ToC from a standard logframe analysis which describes how a specific project will create certain outcomes.

The application of a ToC approach to social programs began in the monitoring and evaluation field. Carol Weiss is largely credited with popularizing the term, "theory of change," in her various defenses of "theory-based evaluation" (Weiss, 1995). Weiss and others have pointed to several advantages to using such an approach (Fulbright-Anderson

et al., 1998; Mackenzie and Blamey, 2005; Birckmayer and Weiss, 2000; Chen, 1990). First, in situations where a control case methodology is impossible, which is the case with the vast majority of social projects, articulating a theory of change allows one to make stronger claims about the causal attribution of impact (Connell and Kubisch, 1998: 2). The strategy here is the same as that of social scientists, who, when faced with a small-n problem, turn to process tracing in order to link cause with effect.

A related benefit is that a theory of change approach allows one to identify the mechanism of change. A control case evaluation might allow one to draw the conclusion that a given intervention caused the observed change, but still not provide insight on *how* that change was created. As Yampolskaya et al. (2004: 192) note, the approach is important in order to identify, "essential components of a program for replication." This is particularly important in regard to Track II interventions in which the context of each conflict is very idiosyncratic and in which the blind application of previous models is likely to have serious, negative consequences.

Building on work done in the evaluation field, certain authors have argued that the ToC approach can be equally useful in the project design stage (Çuhadar Gürkaynak et al., forthcoming; Mackenzie and Blamey, 2005: 152; Connell and Kubisch, 1998: 1). However, the approach has not generated detailed research regarding how to use a theory or theories of change in order to design interventions that produce desired outcomes.

For our purposes, the approach is a particularly useful one because it lends itself well to meso-level planning and project design. In this paper, we ask a meso-level question: what type of Track II projects should be initiated in Turkey? This can be contrasted with micro-level decisions regarding how specific programs should be implemented, which must be left to conflict managers on the ground within Turkey, and a macro-level goals such as developing a overall strategy to resolve conflict within Turkey.

Theories of Change and Conflict Resolution

Scholars of conflict resolution in recent years have recognized the value of employing a ToC approach. This is not surprising, as the goal of conflict resolution is to create, large-scale, sustained change (Mitchell, 2005). Several of these works have attempted to identify and analyze specific theories of change that inform conflict resolution interventions. Ilana Shapiro (2006: 8-11), for instance, analyzes several theories by using a levels of analysis framework that groups theories into individual level, group-level and structural-level categories.

A project undertaken by The Reflection on the Practice of Peace Project (RPP) represents the most systematic effort to identify theories of change based on what program implementers actually do. The RPP has identified several theories of change – one or more of which inform the majority of conflict resolution projects. For the purposes of this paper, we need to identify theories of change that are relevant for Track II projects. Therefore Table 1 presents a partially-revised version of the RPP list, along with an

explanation of the TOC's relevant to Track II projects (Church and Rogers, 2006: 14-15). [The full list can be seen in the Appendix. The descriptions of each theory, except the decategorization/recategorization theory are taken from this publication. The revisions to the list are explained in the notes within the list.]

Based on this analysis, in the rest of the paper, we will focus on the four theories of change that are relevant to Track II projects:
1) *The Individual Change Theory*
2) *Civil Society Mobilization Theory*
3) *The Healthy Relationships and Connections*
4) *The Decategorization/Recategorization*

It is important to spell out in more detail the logic that underpins each of these theories. It is these logics that will be applied to the Turkish context in order to assess which theories of change are relevant to.

Four Theories of Change

A ToC consists of four linked elements. The first is the activity. Following Rouhana, we will term the second and third elements, microobjectives and macrogoals. The fourth element is the social problem to be addressed. As we are dealing with how a Track II initiative contributes to more peaceful outcomes, we will refer to the social problem as the conflict driver. Thus, in theory, the *activities* create an immediate impact among those who participated in the project (*microobjectives*). This impact is transferred to the rest of society (*macrogoals*) thereby creating a social change (*mitigation of conflict drivers*).

The following section describes in detail each of the four relevant theories of change. These descriptions have been developed inductively through a review of 41 case studies of Track II interventions that appeared in *People Building Peace: 35 Inspiring Stories from Around the World* (State of the World Forum, 1999) and *People Building Peace II: Successful Stories of Civil Society* (Van Tongeren et al., 2005). These case studies are in the form of "success stories" and do not explicitly address the issue of theories of change. Therefore we used the case studies as raw data. From this data, we first identified the relevant theory or theories of change. We then used the descriptions within the case studies to illuminate the logic of the theory of change – from activities to microobjectives to macrogoals, and to the mitigation of conflict drivers. We used this inductive approach because we are seeking to apply a ToC analysis to an actual conflict. Therefore, it was important to develop descriptions of the theories of change, not in the abstract, but based on how they are applied in practice.

Theory of Change	Relevance to Track II Projects
The Individual Change Theory Peace comes through transformative change of a critical mass of individuals, their attitudes, behaviors, and skills.	*Relevant:* Many Track II projects seek to transform the attitudes behaviors, and skills of participants.
The Healthy Relationships and Connections Theory (Church and Rogers, 2006: 14. Also, see Shapiro 2006: 10, Ross 2000: 1022-23.) Peace emerges out of a process of breaking down isolation, polarization, division, prejudice and stereotypes between/among groups. Strong relationships are a necessary ingredient for peace.[a]	*Relevant:* Virtually all Track II projects focus to some degree on improving relationships and breaking down isolation of groups in conflict.
The Withdrawal of the Resources for War Theory Wars require vast amounts of material (weapons, supplies, transport, etc.) and human capital. If we can interrupt the supply of people and goods to the war-making system, it will collapse and peace will break out.	*Not relevant:* Methods based on this theory normally attempt to change policies so that resources for war are disrupted, e.g. reduce budget allocations, imposes arms embargoes, etc.
The Reduction of Violence Theory Peace will result as we reduce the levels of violence perpetrated by combatants or their representatives.	*Not relevant:* Methods based on this theory normally target violence directly through insertion of peacekeeping forces, monitoring of ceasefires, facilitating disarmament negotiations, etc.
The Root Causes/Justice Theory We can achieve peace by addressing the underlying issues of injustice, oppression/ exploitation, threats to identity and security, and people's sense of injury/victimization.	*Not Relevant:* This is a difficult theory to assess. While the goals would be ascribed to by many Track II practitioners, Track II projects are not normally concerned with issues of social justice in the same way a civil rights or anti-globalization activist would be. Also, methods using this theory normally take sides. Track II practitioners normally do not.
The Institutional Development Theory Peace is secured by establishing stable/reliable social institutions that guarantee democracy, equity, justice, and fair allocation of resources.	*Not Relevant:* Although Track II projects may seek to create advocacy movements, they do not seek to directly establish or support institutions within society.
The Political Elites Theory Peace comes when it is in the interest of political leaders to take the necessary steps. Conflict resolution efforts must change the political calculus of key leaders and groups.	*Not Relevant:* Although Track II projects may seek to pressure political elites, they normally do so through civil society mobilization (see below), not through direct efforts to change the political calculus.
Civil Society Mobilization Theory[b] "When the people lead, the leaders will follow." If we mobilize enough opposition to war, political leaders will have to pay attention.	*Relevant:* Many, but not all, Track II projects have the goal of building coalitions to place pressure on political elites to create peaceful change.
The Economics Theory People make personal decisions and decision makers make policy decisions based on a system of rewards, incentives and punishments/sanctions that are essentially economic in nature. If we can change the economies associated with war making, we can bring peace.	*Not relevant:* Methods based on this theory normally target war economies, e.g. boycotts or products from certain areas, disruption of cartels, campaigns targeting organized crime, and so on.
The Decategorization/Recategorization Theory[c] Peace comes through a process of de-emphasizing the identities in conflict, such as ethnic identities, and the creation or strengthening of over-arching or cross-cutting identities.	*Relevant:* Many Track II projects seek to work with cross-cutting groups of participants, such as doctors, academics, or mothers, in an attempt to emphasize identities different than the ones in conflict and to create bridges across conflict divides.

a   The original list included a "Public Attitudes Theory," which we have not included that because the logic was the same as the Healthy Relationship and Connections Theory. It differed primarily in the methods identified, namely the use of the mass media
b   The original RPP language uses the term "grassroots mobilization". We consider that misleading as many practitioners talk now about working "middle-out" instead of "bottom-up" to define a strategy of identifying and mobilizing key, mid-level business leaders, civil-society leaders, youth leaders, and other opinion makers.
c   This theory was not in the original RPP list, but we consider it important. For a discussion of this theory, see Shapiro(2006: 19).

Table 1: Theories of Change and Relevance to Track II Projects

The Individual Change Theory

The issue of "individual change" versus the "collective change" that is the foundation of the *Healthy Relationships and Connections Theory* discussed below raises some of the more fundamental, and largely irresolvable, issues in the social sciences. Clearly, building healthy relationships changes individuals, and changed individuals can better form healthy relationships. Trying to resolve the chicken-egg question of whether the agent or the structure is primary goes far beyond the scope of this article. Thus, for the purposes of this article, the *Individual Change Theory* identifies a process that focuses initially and *primarily* on the individual.

The premise of the individual change theory is that various types of work with an individual can change the attitudes and behavior of that individual. A review of the People Building Peace projects reveals three basic categories of work: trauma healing and reconciliation, training and skills-building, and various forms of self-reflection and introspection. *Activities* in this category from the *People Building Peace* volumes include:

- Projects focused on individual skills-building in conflict resolution, active nonviolence, intercultural understanding and reduction of prejudice, anger management, etc.
- Trauma healing, therapy and support for victims and perpetrators of violence. This can include promotion of events, such as sporting events, that signal a return to normalcy in society.
- Projects focused on personal self-reflection leading to reconciliation, forgiveness, or behavior change.

All of these projects are focused primarily on the individual with the goal of changing the way individuals interact with society and particularly individuals on the other side of the conflict divide. As noted above, these activities can be seen as preparing individuals to have the interactions with individuals from the other side of a conflict divide that define Track II interventions. These future interactions need not be part of a Track II project. Often the goal of individual-change projects is to foster Track II-style interactions in the individuals' everyday life – at work, church, pursuing hobbies, etc.

Not surprisingly, the *microobjectives* within this ToC are change at the individual level. These changes can include a change in attitude, behavior and/or skill. Taken collectively however, the idea is that this change allows the individual to interact with society in ways create more peaceful, less violent outcomes.

The *macrogoals* within this ToC consist of the spread of these changes in attitudes, behavior, and/or skills to persons beyond those directly involved in the intervention. And more importantly, the spread of these changes must become self-sustaining. [Ilana Shapiro rightly points out that much of the thinking regarding how this shift from microobjective to macrogoals takes place relies on Everett Rogers' diffusion of innovations theory and the related concept of a critical mass of individuals. Rogers argues that the adoption of innovation in a social system follows a horizontal S-shaped pattern

over time. Thus, as more individuals adopt an innovation the rate of adoption accelerates until there are only a few holdouts at which point the rate levels off. See Shapiro, 2006: 20.]

These innovations create new patterns of behavior which in turn reduce the severity of certain *conflict drivers*. Judging from a review of the projects in People Building Peace and People Building Peace II, the macrogoals within the individual change ToC appear to be targeted at three conflict drivers in particular. The first conflict is a lack of conflict management skills. The premise here is that social conflict is ubiquitous. As a result, individuals in society must have the skills to manage conflict. In the absence of these skills, small conflicts can escalate and/or coalesce thereby creating large-scale social conflict.

The second driver is past conflict. It is well-established empirically that past violent conflict increases the likelihood of future violent conflict (Gurr, 2000: 70). The premise here is that introspection, trauma healing, reconciliation processes and so on can help break the "cycle of violence," within societies.

Finally, the third, more intangible, conflict driver might be called hopelessness. Many of the projects that rely on this ToC discuss issues related to a lack of hope for the future. This can cause both destructive behaviors among those who see no future for themselves as well as withdrawal among those who might successfully advocate for peaceful change. The premise here is that changing attitudes about the future will change behaviors and therefore change society.

Civil Society Mobilization Theory

Unlike the other Theories of Change discussed in this section, the *Civil Society Mobilization Theory* is focused on the impact elites in general and political elites in particular can have. The basic premise is that political leaders, at the national, regional, and local level, have the capacity to create peace if they receive enough pressure from society to do so. Thus, the central goal of activities in this category is to change the behavior of these political leaders by creating broad-based societal pressure.

Activities from the *People Building Peace* volumes in the category include:
- Grass roots/civil society organizing to establish peace zones/peace communities;
- Consensus-building workshops with middle and grass-roots level participants to build agreement on desirable policy changes, creating joint statements/resolutions, and so on;
- Capacity-building projects to improve skills in advocacy and coalition-building.

Many of these activities overlap with more general civil society capacity-building programs. These activities become part of a Track II intervention when they seek to build diverse coalitions that include individuals from multiple sides of a conflict or conflicts.

These activities have two *microobjectives*. The first is to create, strengthen, or enlarge peace constituencies in some form. By peace constituencies, we mean coalitions

of individuals from multiple sides of a conflict who are openly committed, and willing to devote resources, to building peace and ending violence. The more symbolic activities help create these constituencies by demonstrating that a commitment to peace is possible and that an individual who commits to peace will have allies. Other more targeted activities' work with smaller groups to show individuals that peace is both possible and in their best interests. The second microobjective of these activities is to develop strategies that these peace constituencies can use in order to influence political leaders.

The *macrogoal* of these activities is to actually influence political leaders to take actions that reduce violence and create peace or to install new political leaders that are part of the peace coalition. The premise is that in all kinds of political systems, not just democracies, the support of the population creates political power, and conversely, the loss of that support is politically dangerous. Therefore, peace coalitions, if large enough, should be able to change the political calculus of political leaders.

From a review of the *People Building Peace* volumes several *conflict drivers* can be identified that this pressure on political leaders is designed to ameliorate. The first is political decisionmaking. It is political leaders that often make the decision to use violence in pursuit of political goals. Alternatively, it is political leaders that implement policies that can build or sustain peace. Peace coalitions seek to change the political behavior away from the decision to use violence and toward creating policies that create peace.

The second conflict driver is greed. Political leaders often foster conflict in order to profit from conflict environment. In many cases, this involves the manipulation of the larger population through ethnic scapegoating, fear-mongering, and so on. Peace coalitions can serve to counter this manipulation and reduce the opportunities to profit from conflict.

Finally, there is a less tangible conflict driver that can be identified in the projects, which might be called institutional inertia. Political leaders make their calculations in response to existing political structures, institutions, and mindsets. If conflict has gone on long enough, the conflict itself becomes part of these structures. In this type of situation, peace coalitions often seek to create change for change's sake, in order to disrupt the existing political structures that are perpetuating the conflict.

The Healthy Relationships and Connections Theory

This ToC is described by the RPP as a process in which, "peace emerges out of a process of breaking down isolation, polarization, division, prejudice and stereotypes *between/among groups*" (Church and Rogers, 2006: 14, emphasis added). This idea that these problems exist between *groups* is crucial. In comparison to the *Individual Change Theory*, described above, this ToC is based on the premise that groups have collective attributes and attitudes which can be changed.

Activities in this category from the *People Building Peace* volumes include:

- Workshops focused on improving inter-group relationship through facilitated dialogue of some sort;
- Community development projects requiring the participation of two or more groups to implement. These are often referred to as "joint projects;"
- Joint activities such as sporting events, summer camps, research projects;
- Creation of local peace councils to improve relationships between groups in conflict.

The first *microobjective* of these activities is to change the attitudes that participants in the program hold about other groups. Again, this is similar to the individual change theory. The difference is that the attitudes being targeted are attitudes the individuals hold as the result of being members of the group. The second microobjective (with the exception of the media campaigns) is to use this change of attitude to create relationships or improve existing relationships between a small number of individuals from different sides of a conflict divide. A third microobjective of these programs is to provide an alternative, more peaceful model for how different sides in a conflict can interact.

The *macrogoals* of these activities is to scale up these changes to the level of the entire group. And, as with the individual change theory, these changes must become self-sustaining. Self-sustaining change at the level of the group is more than the aggregate of many individuals changing their attitudes or improving their relationships with individuals from the out-group. Instead such change requires that the fundamental in-group enforcement and socialization practices of the group change. Perhaps individuals who marry members of the out-group are no longer ostracized, or children are allowed to attend mixed schools. Thus, the true macrogoal of these activities is a change in the culture of the group that results in more positive relationship toward a particular group with which they have traditionally been in conflict.

These macrogoals reduce the severity of a specific set of *conflict drivers*. From the review of the *People Building Peace* projects, several drivers can be identified. The first driver, as with the *Individual Change Theory*, is previous conflict. Stronger inter-group relationships can break cycles of violence in which one group seeks revenge on another group for real or perceived past injuries. The second driver is a lack of communication. Again, if we start from the premise that social conflict is ubiquitous, then it can be argued that communication is necessary to manage these conflicts. Better relationships leads to more communication and more shared understanding which leads to less conflict. Related to this is the third driver, delegitimation, or in its extreme form, dehumanization, of the individuals in the other group. Almost by definition, stronger relationships make it more difficult to scapegoat or dehumanize another group, and therefore reduce the likelihood of inter-group violence.

The Decategorization/Recategorization Theory

Activities, such as inter-group dialogues and community-level joint projects are often criticized for reifying and hardening group identities. For instance, requiring that "Hutus" and "Tutsis" cooperate to implement a joint project legitimizes and privileges those identities in ways that may undermine different forms of identity. Proponents of programs that use the *Decategorization/Recategorization Theory* would argue that reconfiguring conflict-prone identity structures is a more effective strategy that reforming the culture of existing identity groups (Horowitz, 1985: 601-652).

Specifically, the goal is to emphasize "cross-cutting identities," namely, identities that include members of both groups that are in conflict. These cross-cutting identities can be based on gender, employment, hobbies and interests, and so on (Çuhadar Gürkaynak and Dayton, forthcoming: 10). [Cross-cutting identities are often referred to as "superordinant identities"(Çuhadar Gürkaynak and Dayton, forthcoming: 10).]

This ToC relies on the premise that identities are malleable. Perhaps because conflict hardens identities, only six of the projects within the People Building Peace volumes relied on this theory of change. *Activities* included:
- Workshops, joint projects, or activities designed to create or strengthen cross-cutting identities, e.g. musicians, lawyers, youth, athletes, and so on;
- Projects that create or support peace coalitions with individuals from both sides of a conflict that are centered on cross-cutting identities, e.g. Musicians for Peace.

The *microobjective* of these programs is to create or strengthen a relationship based on an identity that is different than the identities driving the conflict. While as with the healthy relationship theory, the goal is to improve relationships across a conflict divide, the goal of these projects is not to improve relationships between groups *qua* groups, but to improve relationships between individuals centered around a cross-cutting identity. The projects do this by providing a venue for individuals to realize what they have in common as the result of this third identity, e.g., mothers are concerned about their children, doctors are concerned about getting medicines, environmentalists are concerned about pollution in rivers, and so on.

The *macrogoal* of these programs is to move from strengthening the relationship to actually creating a shared identity among these groups that crosses the conflict divide. It is important to emphasize that the goal is rarely if ever to erase the identity that defines the conflict. Few projects would try to eliminate a national or ethnic identity. Instead, the goal is to increase the salience of alternative identities based on gender, employment, vocation, and so on, with the end result being that individuals within the society identify with a multiplicity of groups.

The *conflict drivers* targeted by projects using this ToC are quite similar to those targeted by the healthy relationships and connections theory. In many ways, these projects represent a different strategy to arrive at the same outcomes of: disrupting the cycle of conflict and revenge, increasing communication, and reducing devaluation and dehumanization.

In addition, these programs seek to address a set of structural *conflict drivers* created by the pattern of identities in a society. Many conflict analysts have argued that the existence of cross-cutting loyalties within a society is a key factor in dampening potential conflicts. In contrast, if important loyalties overlap, e.g. all farmers belong to one ethnic group and all fishermen to another, conflict becomes more likely. The primary goal of decategorization/recategorization projects is to strengthen the identities that create these cross-cutting loyalties (Boards, 2003; Horowitz, 1993).

A Conflict Analysis of the Kurdish Question

This section presents a conflict analysis of the Kurdish Question in Turkey as of October 2007 (for an example of earlier analysis, see Beriker-Atiyas, 1997). The analysis is based on the workshop described above as well as previous and subsequent research conducted by the authors. The framework for the analysis, is loosely based on Paul Wehr's (1979: 19-22) conflict assessment guides.

Summary Description

Although it is one the Middle East's oldest conflicts, the Kurdish Question has not attracted a great deal of attention from the conflict resolution field, not only because it is a deep-rooted protracted conflict which is hard to transform, but also because until recently the Turkish state denied the existence of such a conflict, instead referring to it as a problem of terrorism. There have been virtually no attempts to promote dialogue on the Kurdish Question. One of the only exceptions is an initiative undertaken by *Toplumsal Sorunları Araştırma Merkezi* (TOSAM: Center for the Study of Societal Problems) (Ergil, 2004). This effort is not widely known about among Turks or Kurds. It also received much criticism in Turkey both for the way the project selected its participants and for its overall methodology.

Overall the conflict can be considered to be in the re-escalation stage, with ongoing periods of increased and decreased tensions. Currently tensions are increasing after roughly five years of what could be termed negative peace. The negative peace period began after the capture of Abdullah Öcalan when the PKK declared a period of 'inaction.' It ended in June 2004, when the PKK began to launch new attacks on Turkish security forces.

As with many conflicts of this kind, the Kurdish Question has deep roots, dating back at least to the late-Ottoman era during which there were eighteen Kurdish rebellions in the period 1924-1938. However, the "current" Kurdish conflict could be said to have begun in 1984 with the emergence of the *Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan* (PKK: Kurdistan Workers' Party) as a separatist group within the Turkish state.

The PKK launched its first attack on the Turkish state in 1984. In 1987, the government declared emergency rule in thirteen Kurdish populated provinces. From 1987 through 1998, the war between the Kurdish insurgents and the Turkish military forces claimed 27,000 lives (Kirişçi, 1998). Recent casualties have pushed the total casualty number higher.

Taking into account the level of violence, number of deaths, and military expenses, the 1987-1999 period can be considered as the peak of the conflict. In the 1999-2004 period, there was a de-escalation of the conflict and some softening of attitudes on both sides. This short-lived negative peace is now being replaced by a re-escalation of violence, although the severity of the conflict remains short of where it was during the 1987-1999 period.

In the last few years, several issues in particular have re-ignited tensions around the Kurdish Question in Turkey. These include:

- The PKK's ending its unilateral ceasefire (June 2004);
- The decision of the European Court of Human Rights that the trial of Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of the PKK, was 'not fair' (May 2005);
- The burning of a Turkish flag by Kurdish demonstrators (March 2005);
- Violent uprisings following the funerals of several PKK members in Diyarbakır (April 2006) and increased clashes between the PKK and the Turkish army (since Summer 2006);
- Bombings of non-military sites in Ankara and İzmir by the PKK in April-May 2007;
- Multiplying number of attacks by the PKK against the Turkish Army and killings of Turkish soldiers (October 2007);
- Increased number of declarations by the Turkish military and opposition parties regarding the need for cross-border operations into Northern Iraq (May-October 2007), and the start of the cross-border operation (December 2007).

More generally, it is possible to identify three fault lines along which the Kurdish conflict in Turkey plays out. At one level, the conflict is between the Turkish state and an ethnic minority. At another level, the conflict is between the Turkish state and an insurgent group, the PKK. At a third level, the conflict exists, in the form of social tension, between Turks and Kurds throughout Turkey, especially in the bigger cities in western Turkey.[6] One of the workshop participants in Sofia, representing an NGO from southeastern Turkey, argued that in many cities in western Turkey, the polarization of Turks and Kurds is accelerating. Because of rising security fears, some Kurds are leaving smaller towns or the mixed areas of larger cities and moving to the Kurdish quarters of cities or returning to the Southeast. The increase in Turkish ultranationalist uprisings following the flag burning event in March 2005 has contributed to this trend.

The first and second levels of the conflict appear especially intractable because historically the Turkish state has rejected any Track I engagement with Kurds or the PKK. Moreover, the leader of PKK is captured and there is no agreement on who represents the

heterogeneous Kurdish community. In such a case, the importance of Track II becomes even sharper.

Parties to the Conflict

Primary Parties: The primary parties to the conflict are the organs of the Turkish State, the PKK, and the Turkish and Kurdish citizens of Turkey. [As is always the case with ethnic issues, language becomes difficult and controversial. Here, "Turkish" and "Kurdish" refers to ethnicity and ethnic origin.]

Turkish State and Its Organs: Two of the conflict fault lines described above identify the Turkish state as a key party to the conflict. At the moment, the most important actors are the ruling AKP (Justice and Development Party) government, the Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan; and the Turkish security forces, including the military, the police, the Village Guards,[7] and the Gendarmerie (a hybrid police-military force responsible for rural security). During the period of negative peace from 1999-2004, the military's public visibility decreased. Since the most recent upsurge in violence beginning in March 2006, the military, and the other security forces, have re-emerged and are once again playing a more active role in the conflict. Although the Turkish security forces have always been a central actor in this conflict, their significance varies over time depending on the context within which Kurdish Question is perceived by the Turkish public. Recently, their role has become more pivotal, mainly as the result of the PKK rescinding its promise of "inaction" and increased violent attacks by the PKK on the civilians in western Turkey and on the military in the southeast.

As of late-2007, there are three basic approaches by the Turkish state's vis-à-vis the Kurdish Question, which in many ways are contradictory, and which seem to ebb and flow in response to events within Turkey. The accession negotiations with the EU negotiation, among other developments, have lent credence to an approach that focuses on legal reform and policy instruments to manage the conflict. This trend is exemplified by the Prime Minister Erdoğan's speech in Diyarbakır, referenced above, in which he acknowledged the existence of "Kurdish Problem" and said the problem could only be solved, "with more democracy, more civil rights and more prosperity." To date however, there have been few policies based on this diagnosis.

Erdoğan's reference to prosperity points to the second approach, which relies on economic development of the Kurdish-populated regions. This approach has always been favored by those within Turkey, who, in an effort to defend the idea of a unitary Turkish state, see the conflict as stemming from underdevelopment as opposed to ethnic issues.

Finally, the security-based approach, in which the Kurdish Question is framed as an illegitimate threat, or in simpler terms, a terrorist threat against the state which must be defeated militarily, continues to exist alongside the other approaches. As has already been noted, this approach has been on the ascendant recently as the result of the ongoing upsurge in violence.

PKK: On the Kurdish side, the PKK can be considered the primary party in this "armed" conflict. According to Orhan Doğan, a former Kurdish member of parliament, who was released in June 2004 after 13 years in prison, there are still 3,000 PKK combatants in Turkey ("Orhan Doğan: Ocalan...," 2005: 6). In addition, the PKK has several subgroups that perform nonviolent political, social, and community functions. Based on one of the author's personal observations in southeastern Turkey, the PKK remains the actor that garners the most support from the Kurds in the region. [Ayşe Betül Çelik's fieldwork, June 2004 and February 2007.]

Turkish and Kurdish Citizens of Turkey: Clearly the citizens of Turkey, both Kurdish and Turkish, are parties to the conflict. As the conflict has spread to the large cities in western Turkey, these "actors" have become more central to the overall conflict. In addition to the citizens themselves, the NGOs, community groups, and other civil society organizations that Turks and Kurds have formed to represent their interests are relevant parties to the conflict. These run the gamut from organizations that are strongly pro-Kurdish, to Turkish nationalist organizations, to more independent research and advocacy organizations.

Secondary Parties: The most important secondary parties at the moment are the European Union and the United States (US). Since the acceptance of Turkey's candidacy to the EU, the EU has become an important actor on Kurdish issues through its pressure on Turkey to implement democratic reforms and improve its human rights record. In the context of the Kurdish question, the EU is most concerned about human rights abuses, the cultural rights of minorities and the removal of the state of emergency in eastern and southeastern Turkey. The participants at the workshop considered the EU negotiation the single most important issue in determining how the Kurdish Question in Turkey would unfold over the next ten years (for further analysis, see Çelik and Blum, 2007).

This influence is complex though and capable of creating a nationalist backlash. There is a durable belief among Turkish citizens that the Kurdish Question is in fact the result of the actions of foreign powers, including the United Kingdom, France, Greece, and the USA. This belief is widely known as Sevres Paranoia, which refers to fears that there are external powers who are trying to challenge the territorial integrity of the Turkish state and implement the provisions of the Sevres Treaty of 1920.

In addition to its traditional support for Turkey as a key strategic partner, the US has become an important actor in regard to the Kurdish issue as the result of the Iraq invasion. The formation of an autonomous Kurdish region in Northern Iraq has changed the dynamic of the Kurdish Question in Turkey. The attraction Kurds feel toward Northern Iraq, both because of ethnic ties and because living standards are higher than in southeastern Turkey, has slowed the integration of Kurds into Turkish society. This, in addition to the fact that the autonomous region demonstrates that Kurds are capable of successfully ruling themselves, has made both Turkish state officials, and Turkish citizens in general, uneasy.

Issues

There are several concrete issues that are of immediate relevance to the Kurdish Question today. First, the special security policies in the Southeast cause deep resentment on the part of the Kurds. Among the biggest consequences of the conflict in the region is the legitimization of restrictive, some would say repressive, governance in the Southeast. From 1987 to 2002, for instance, the region was ruled under extra-ordinary measures known as the *Olağanüstü Hal* (OHAL: State of Emergency) regime.[8] Even though the regime had been phased out by 2002, its legacy and the mistrust it created between the local population and public officers remain a problem in the region.

Of particular importance is the continued existence of the Village Guards. The Village Guards are often hostile to the villagers, threaten the lives of the returning internally-displaced Kurds and can spoil indigenous efforts to establish peaceful co-existence in the region (Aker et al., 2005). The necessity of abolishing the Village Guard system was underlined by the United Nations after the visit of the UN Special Representative of the Secretary General on the Rights of the Internally Displaced People in 2002 (Deng, 2002).

Second, there is the issue of political underrepresentation. This issue is exemplified by the constitutional restrictions on forming ethnic parties (the Constitutional Court has banned four pro-Kurdish parties)[9] as well as the restrictiveness of the threshold system applied in the electoral law. The electoral threshold, which requires a party to receive 10% of the vote nation-wide in order to win any seats in parliament, has been considered discriminatory against Kurds. Kurds who win elections in the Kurdish majority areas in the Southeast, for instance, are precluded from becoming parliamentarians because Kurdish parties cannot poll 10% nationwide.

Third, there is the issue of cultural and minority rights. Teaching the Kurdish language, education in the Kurdish language, and the ability to publish and broadcast in Turkish are among the key cultural rights issues currently. In regard to these issues, there is always a *de jure* and a *de facto* component. That is, these rights must be granted from the center, but conditions in the Kurdish-populated areas must be such that these rights are able to be exercised. Kurds attempting to establish language schools, for instance, have complained about onerous safety inspections which can delay the opening of schools for months and years (Doğan, 2003).

Fourth, there is the issue of economic underdevelopment of the Kurdish-populated regions in southeastern Turkey. Although Kurds outside the Southeast do not represent an economic underclass in Turkey,[10] southeastern Turkey continues to lag far behind other regions in Turkey on most economic indicators.

Finally, as in all conflicts, violence and the threat of violence, has become not only a consequence of the conflict, but a key issue that shapes the conflict as well. The recent upsurge in violence in the Southeast, as well as the violence and the threat of violence

between Turks and Kurds in the cities in the west, has once again changed the dynamics of the conflict in numerous ways.

Theories of Change and the Kurdish Question in Turkey

This article laid out a step-by-step logic for four theories of change: the Individual Change Theory, the Healthy Relationships and Connections Theory, the Decategorization/Recategorization Theory and the Political Elites/Civil Society Mobilization Theory. The goal of this section is to integrate those logics with the conflict analysis of the Kurdish Question in order to understand which theories of change should inform Track II interventions designed to address the Kurdish Question in Turkey. The Healthy Relationship Theory and Decategorization/Recategorization Theory are addressed together because as noted above they address similar conflict drivers.

The key question here is does the logic of the particular theory of change make sense when applied to the Turkish case, meaning can one systematically move from activities to outcomes (i.e. mitigation of conflict drivers), using the particulars of the Kurdish conflict in Turkey? Or given the particulars of the situation in Turkey, does it become difficult to create a logical sequence that moves from activities to outcomes?

In brief, the section will conclude that effective projects based on each ToC could be designed and implemented in Turkey, but only if those projects are targeted at certain elements of the conflict, certain geographic regions, and certain segments of the society.

Individual Change Theory

Activities in this category include projects focused on individual skills-building, trauma healing, support for victims and perpetrators of violence, and personal self-reflection leading to reconciliation and forgiveness. These activities seek to create the macrogoal of sustainable changes in behavior at the individual level. Through this change, three specific conflict drivers are mitigated:
1) A lack of conflict management skills in an environment where social conflict is ubiquitous;
2) Past conflict and the cycle of violence;
3) Hopelessness.

Projects that rely on this ToC should be targeted at the Kurdish-populated areas of southeastern Turkey. This is the case for several reasons.

First, social conflict in the Southeast is ubiquitous, but not clearly defined along inter-group lines. The anti-PKK policies of the security forces, including the various anti-insurgency campaigns (particularly the creation of internally displaced people through the clearing of villages), the special governance provisions, and the co-optation of residents of the area through the Village Guards program have created a large amount of conflict

and turmoil in the region, but it is *not* primarily a Turkish-Kurdish conflict. It is primarily a conflict between security forces and residents.[11]

Individual conflict management skills are important so that individuals and organizations in the region can overcome the mistrust between the state organs and the Kurdish residents. Programs in this category might seek to create critical mass of individuals that could manage the multiplicity of small conflicts created by this mistrust – conflicts that could overtime lead to new outbreaks of violence.

This is particularly important since in Turkey outbreaks of violence in the southeast are viewed by outsiders through the lens of ethnic conflict even if the violence is primarily a response to local security policies and members of the Turkish state bureaucracy.

Second, many of the activities in this category target individuals that have experienced violence. In Turkey, a significant percentage of the individuals who have experienced violence as the result of the Kurdish conflict live in the Southeast. Thus, it is in this region where disrupting the cycle of violence is of the greatest concern. The history of violence creates the needs for programs in this category designed to support victims and perpetrators of violence, to encourage healing, and to foster individual reconciliation.[12] Such programs at the individual level are of particular importance because, again, the violence is not simply between groups. While Turkish Army forces may leave the region if violence subsides, those who participated in the Village Guards program remain in the communities. Such a situation requires some process of individual reconciliation if healthy communities are to be rebuilt.

Finally, it is in the Southeast as where the conflict driver of hopelessness is of the greatest concern. As was noted above, the Kurds in the rest of Turkey do not form an underclass. There are opportunities for them to succeed within the Turkish economy. In the Southeast however, economic underdevelopment means economic opportunities are constrained. This combined with the effects of 20-plus years conflict has created a sense of hopelessness among many in the region. This conclusion is based on statements made by participants at the workshop who are living and working in the Southeast.

While Track II projects cannot improve the economy in the Southeast directly, this type of hopelessness does create the need for activities in this category that create a sense of empowerment, as well as more optimism about the future, through skills-building, individual reconciliation, and helping individuals cope with past trauma.

Thus, the logic of interventions based on the Individual Change Theory makes sense when applied to the particulars of the situation in Southeast Turkey. Conversely, the logic begins to break down if one envisions such interventions being undertaken outside of the Southeast. The vast majority of individuals outside the southeast has not and will not be involved directly in the conflict. While certain individuals outside the southeast need conflict management skills, have experienced violence and could contribute to a cycle of violence, and have a degree of hopelessness, these individuals are quite dispersed. So it is not clear how work designed to change the attitudes, behavior

and skills of individuals could create the critical mass necessary to have an impact on conflict drivers unless such programs were undertaken on a massive, and ultimately, unrealistic scale.[13] The exception to this would be projects targeted at internally displaced Kurds, who are living in the western cities of Turkey.

In response, one could argue that the goal of the program is to focus on the attitudes, behaviors, and skills of key policymakers or other powerful individuals outside the Southeast that can influence the actions of the Turkish state and security forces. From the description above of the individual theory of change as it has been applied in actual cases it is clear that the goals of such activities are not to change individuals in order to directly change policy. This is understandable. Such a strategy would make the mistake of conflating powerful individuals with powerful roles. If one were to simply change the attitude and behavior of a high-ranking policymaker within the Turkish state, without changing anything else, that person would not be able to stay in their role, and therefore would not be able to create the envisioned policy change. The individual change theory relies on a critical mass of individuals, not a select few.

Civil Society Mobilization Theory

The activities in this category focus on programs, such as establishing peace zones, consensus building and coalition-building, training in advocacy, and grass-roots organizing, etc. that can help place pressure on political elites to implement policies that help create and strengthen peace, reduce the ability of politicians to profit from conflict, and disrupt institutions that prolong conflict through processes of political inertia.

There are several salient points from the conflict analysis above regarding this type of intervention. The first is the tensions between the three approaches – political/legal reform, economic development, and security-based – that exist within the Turkish political arena for addressing the Kurdish Question. These various approaches to dealing with the Kurdish Question in Turkey indicate that there is an active political debate, often implicit as opposed to explicit, regarding the proper way to address the issue. In this type of situation, activities within this category can have an impact by providing political incentives to one side of the debate and political disincentives to the other.

Given that Turkey is a democracy in which there are channels of influence from civil society to political leaders, broad multi-ethnic, peace coalitions could provide political incentives to those political leaders that support political/legal reform and economic development over a security-based approach. This indicates that interventions in this category should be implemented in Ankara and other loci of political power at the national level, such as Istanbul and Diyarbakır.

Such activities are of particular importance in Turkey at the moment because many of the political/legal reforms are being pushed by the EU. Given the effects of Sevres Paranoia, and the potential for a nationalist backlash, it is important for Turkish

politicians to feel pressure from organizations and movements within Turkey to implement these reforms. It is also important for Turkish politicians that support reform to be able to point to indigenous sources of support in order to defend themselves against charges that they are succumbing to external influences.

Since the capture of Öcalan in 1999, there have been several efforts to apply this type of pressure to political elites. Attempts known as Aydın Girişimi (Initiative of the Intellectualls), Yurttaş Girişimi (Initiative of the Citizens), Barış Grubu (Peace Group) are all examples of attempts to pressure policymakers in Ankara to give more emphasis to political/legal reforms and acknowledge the Kurdish problem. In fact, it can be argued that Prime Minister Erdoğan's famous speech is the result of such initiatives.

However, it became clear from discussions at the workshop that for these initiatives to create the impact needed to mitigate conflict drivers, it is necessary that a much broader segment of the Turkish elite acknowledge the fact the Kurdish Question is not only an issue for the Kurds, but that it is a problem for all of Turkish society to resolve. It is somewhat ironic that, for this reason, participants in the workshop argued that any project designed to build a broad-based advocacy coalition should begin with several workshops held by and for Turkish intellectuals. These workshops would signal to the Turkish public that the issue is of critical importance to the whole of Turkish society.

The second salient point from the conflict analysis is the issue of *de jure* versus *de facto* reform in the Southeast. It is clear that reforms must both be initiated at the center *and* actually put into practice on the ground in the Southeast in order for them to have any impact on the conflict. This illustrates that activities in this category also need to be implemented in southeastern Turkey. For these reforms to be *owned* by the Kurdish population, peace coalitions need to be built in the Southeast to monitor the implementation of reforms and to provide local political leaders with political incentives to implement reforms.

Again, such interventions are particularly important in Turkey as much of the impetus for reform comes from external pressure from the EU. If there is not indigenous pressure for these reforms as well, there is the danger that they will simply exist "on paper" in order to meet EU demands, but that they will not have any impact on day-to-day life in the Southeast.

Finally, there is much in the conflict analysis that indicates the potential benefit of disrupting certain political institutions and mindsets. As noted above, interventions in this category often seek to address the conflict driver of institutional inertia. After twenty years of conflict, there are numerous institutions in Turkey that hinder efforts to address the Kurdish Question, and that exist primarily because of political inertia. At the workshop, one participant noted that civil society had contributed to changing the debate on the Cyprus issue in Turkey through the dissemination of new policy models for addressing the issue. These new models helped disrupt the "traditional" way of addressing the problem. Interventions in this category could create similar positive

disruptions both in Ankara and the Southeast if they are accepted and owned by a broad spectrum of Turkish society.

Thus, projects based on this theory of change have applicability where the institutions of the Turkish state are implementing policies that relate to the management of the Kurdish question. It is in these locations, primarily Ankara, Istanbul and Diyarbakır, that changing the incentive structure of political elites can have the greatest impact.

The Healthy Relationships and Connections Theory and
The Decategorization/ Recategorization Theory

To review, activities in the Healthy Relationships and Connections Theory consist of projects that create structured interaction between members of groups in conflict. The objective of these projects is to change attitudes of each group about the other and therefore improve inter-group relationships. Interventions in the Decategorization/Recategorization theory create similar linkages, but within certain sectors such as musicians or college students. The goal of these programs is to create a shared identity among these individuals that crosses the conflict divide.

The conflict drivers addressed by interventions in these categories include: the existence of cycles of conflict and revenge, lack of communication between groups, devaluation and dehumanization, and the lack of cross-cutting loyalties.

Compared to the other two theories of change already discussed, this category seeks to deal more directly with relations between groups. The component of the Kurdish conflict in Turkey that involves the Kurdish ethnic group and the Turkish ethnic group in direct conflict with each other is the social tensions at the community level primarily in the larger cities in Turkey. As has already been noted, these tensions are on the rise and in many cases are causing Kurds to move to Kurdish neighborhoods in the larger cities or back to the Southeast. Based on anecdotal evidence, it appears that both Turks and Kurds within the larger cities increasingly perceive the conflict in Turkey in macro-ethnic terms.

The perception of the conflict in these terms indicates that need for interventions in this category, which if successful, could improve communications and strengthen relationships between ethnic Turks and ethnic Kurds. This would improve efforts to manage conflict between the two groups and undermine efforts at devaluation and scapegoating. It could also help disrupt cycles of conflict fueled by inflammatory rhetoric and low-level violence within these mixed communities.

Track II workshops consisting of intergroup dialogues, joint projects, and other strategies should be designed to target specific problematic neighborhoods in the larger cities. A small number of these projects already exist. For instance, at the moment there is a project initiated by a university in Istanbul to bring together Roma, Kurds, and African residents in the Tarlabaşı neighborhood of Istanbul, where there are repeated cases of prejudices, discrimination and maltreatment directed to Kurds (Çelik, 2005; Kılıç, 1991).

In addition, because Kurds in Turkey are present in virtually all sectors of society, there are many opportunities to create cross-cutting groups of Turks and Kurds based on a "third" identity. Complicating the identities of Turks and Kurds by emphasizing these alternative identities could help disrupt the group polarization based on ethnic identity by increasing the salience of cross-cutting loyalties. As with the interventions described above, such programs could disrupt cycles of conflict and revenge, improve conflict management efforts, and undermine efforts at devaluation and scapegoating.

At the workshop, for instance, a Kurdish lawyer proposed a project that would bring together the bar associations of Diyarbakır, the biggest city in the Southeast, and Trabzon, a city in the Black Sea region, which has become notorious for anti-Kurdish violence and political murders. Perhaps counter-intuitively, we would argue that this project would be most effective if its activities were focused in Trabzon instead of Diyarbakır. Projects similar to this, again targeting specific problematic areas and neighborhoods, could be repeated in Turkey in various sectors.

The last lesson to be learned here is a negative one. The logic of The Healthy Relationships and Connections Theory and The Decategorization/Recategorization Theory begins to break down if applied to programming in the Southeast. There is a natural tendency for conflict resolution practitioners to want to work in the Southeast where the impacts of the conflict are felt most directly. However, we would argue that inter-group work based on these theories of change does not make sense in the Southeast. The conflict there is not primarily a conflict between Kurds and Turks, *qua* Kurds and Turks. As argued above, the conflict there is a trilateral conflict between Kurdish residents, Kurdish militant groups, and the security institutions of the Turkish state. Overlaying a two-sided Turk versus Kurd understanding of the conflict onto this set of conflict dynamics, will be ineffective at best, and could do harm by collapsing the distinctions between Kurds and militants on the one side and Turks and the Turkish state on the other.

Conclusion

The purpose of this article is two-fold. The first and primary goal is to develop an understanding of what type of Track II interventions should be designed and implemented to address the Kurdish conflict in Turkey. We consider this an important goal because, as we argued above, structural changes in Turkey have created a window of opportunity to address to address the Kurdish Question. These structural changes, combined with the recent upsurge in violence, indicate that Track II interventions are needed and could have a positive impact if designed and implemented properly.

Based on the integration of the conflict analysis with the logic of the four theories of change described above, we reached the conclusions that all four theories of change are relevant, but programs based on each theory of change should be targeted at specific sectors of the population and be implemented in certain regions.

The secondary goal is to provide a model regarding how practitioners can use a theories of change analysis as a strategic planning tool to design effective conflict resolution programs. For Track II practitioners working on other conflicts, this model can be applied to other conflicts by substituting a conflict analysis for the conflict in question and then conducting the type of analysis that was conducted in section five above. As was the case above, such an analysis would help illuminate what types of Track II projects should be initiated.

The model can also be applied to other types of conflict resolution programs in addition to Track II initiatives. Once one or more theories of change are identified as relevant, a similar analysis as was presented in the rest of the article could be conducted, ending in prescriptions regarding what type of project should be initiated in this particular sector.

Finally, it should be noted that there are limits to the prescriptions that can be developed in the absence of continued direct consultations with conflict managers and other stakeholders in Turkey. While the arguments in this article can assist with the crucial process of articulating the logic that underpins Track II interventions and other conflict resolution activities and can help stakeholders and third parties make basic strategic decisions, decisions regarding the final design and implementation of such activities must be made in response to the local context and in conjunction with local stakeholders.

Notes

1. "Kurdish Question" has been the academic term used to refer to the conflict. It has been argued by Ayata and Yükseker (2005) that its use was an attempt to escape state repression by academics in the 1980s and 1990s when the state refused to acknowledge the existence of the conflict.

2. The workshop was entitled "Trajectories of Ethnopolitical Conflict in Turkey." It was organized by the Center for International Development and Conflict Management at the University of Maryland, Sabanci University, and the IRIS Institute of Bulgaria. Support for the workshop was provided by the Hewlett Foundation. An earlier paper by the authors was developed base on this workshop using a scenario-based approach to analyze the Kurdish question in Turkey (see Çelik and Blum, 2007).

3. The terminology problems in the Track II field are well-known. In some contexts, the term Track II has the connotation of a informal process that runs parallel to Track 1, such as the ●slo talks focusing on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. We use Track II in a broader sense in this article. All interventions that have gone under the label interactive conflict resolution, citizen's diplomacy or simply, problem-solving, are included in our conception of the term Track II interventions. For good overviews of Track II interventions, see Fisher, 1997; Davies and Kaufman, 2002. For good case studies, see Fisher, 2005.

4. Two issues should be noted here. First, individuals from more than one group need not participate in a Track II intervention at the same time. Certain Track II interventions may involve individuals from just one side of the conflict. Such activities are often used to prepare individuals to successfully interact with individuals from the other side of the conflict divide. Second, the "groups" in question are not necessarily the ethnic or identity groups such as Turks and Kurds or Serbs and Croats that often serve as the label of the overall conflict. The groups, for instance, may be members of the security forces, or government officials.

5.   Recently, there have been several critiques of linear representations of change in favor of more dynamic representations, such as those that can be produced using tools from complexity theory. The central focus on change remains however. See Kavalski, 2007: 435-454; Lederach, 2005: 32-3; Davies, 2004: 3-18.

6.   Traditionally, this problem has been under-publicized, but since 2004, NGOs have been reporting more frequently on such tensions, especially in Istanbul and Izmir.

7.   Village Guards are locally-recruited civilians armed and paid by the state to oppose the PKK. According to Abdülkadir Aksu, Minister of the Interior, there were 12,279 voluntary village guards in the region as of November 2003. Again according to him, 5,139 provisional village guards "committed crimes" between 1985 and mid-2006. The national media have carried various stories in recent years about village guards' criminal activities such as the abduction of women, aggravated assault and forming armed gangs (see Kurban et al., 2006).

8.   The OHAL regime was put into effect in 1987. Diyarbakır, the biggest city in the region, for example, was ruled by this regime from August 1987 to November 2002. The governors of the cities under the OHAL regime have the right to pass regulations that function like laws. Governors, for instance, have the authority to expel citizens from the region, and restrict basic civil liberties including the right to ownership and free expression.

9.   These are HEP (Halkın Emek Partisi/People's Labor Party), DEP (Demokrasi Partisi/Democracy Party), ÖZDEP (Özgürlük ve Demokrasi Partisi/Freedom and Democracy Party), and HADEP (Halkın Demokrasi Partisi/People's Democracy Party). A fifth party, DEHAP (Demokratik Halk Partisi/Democratic People's Party) has recently decided to join the DTP (Demokratik Toplum Partisi/Democratic Society Party).

10. This is a complex topic that cannot be done justice here. In particular, there is a longstanding debate over whether Kurds can succeed as Kurds, or whether they must assimilate in order to be successful.

11. To provide just one example, Human Rights Watch claims that Village Guards are often occupying the houses and land of Kurdish villages that had been displaced. See Human Rights Watch (2004), "Backgrounders: Turkey – Internally Displaced Persons," <http://hrw.org/backgrounder/eca/turkey/2004/10/1.htm> Accessed June 25, 2006.

12. The distinction between individual and national/political reconciliation is borrowed from Hayner who argues that individual reconciliation can be more complex and more difficult to achieve, especially through establishing truth commissions (see Hayner, 2002).

13. There is potential for a partial exception here. As noted above, projects focused on individuals can be seen as preparing them to engage in inter-group work. Below we will argue that inter-group work does make sense outside of the Southeast. Therefore it is possible in certain situations that activities based on an individual change theory would make sense outside of the Southeast if the activities were linked to larger projects based on the healthy relationships and/or decategorization/reacategorization theories.

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Appendix 1: The Reflecting on Peace Project Theories of Change

1) **The Individual Change Theory**: Peace comes through transformative change of a critical mass of individuals, their consciousness, attitudes, behaviors, and skills.

2) **The Healthy Relationships and Connections Theory**: Peace emerges out of a process of breaking down isolation, polarization, division, prejudice and stereotypes between/among groups. Strong relationships are a necessary ingredient for peacebuilding.

3) **The Withdrawal of the Resources for War Theory**: Wars require vast amounts of material (weapons, supplies, transport, and so forth) and human capital. If we can interrupt the supply of people and goods to the war-making system, it will collapse and peace will break out.

4) **The Reduction of Violence Theory**: Peace will result as we reduce the levels of violence perpetrated by combatants or their representatives.

5) **The Root Causes/Justice Theory**: We can achieve peace by addressing the underlying issues of injustice, oppression/ exploitation, threats to identity and security, and people's sense of injury/victimization.

6) **The Institutional Development Theory**: Peace is secured by establishing stable/reliable social institutions that guarantee democracy, equity, justice, and fair allocation of resources.

7) **The Political Elites Theory**: Peace comes when it is in the interest of political (and other) leaders to take the necessary steps. Peacebuilding efforts must change the political calculus of key leaders and groups.

8) **The Grassroots Mobilization Theory**: "When the people lead, the leaders will follow." If we mobilize enough opposition to war, political leaders will have to pay attention.

9) **The Economics Theory**: As a politician once said, "It's the economy, stupid!" People make personal decisions and decision makers make policy decisions based on a system of rewards/incentives and punishments/sanctions that are essentially economic in nature. If we can change the economies associated with war making, we can bring peace.

10) **The Public Attitudes Theory**: War and violence are partly motivated by prejudice, misperceptions, and intolerance of difference. We can promote peace by using the media (television and radio) to change public attitudes and build greater tolerance in society.