

POWERFUL ACTORS MAKE A DIFFERENCE: THEORIZING POWER ATTRIBUTES OF NONSTATE ACTORS

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Abstract

Considering the increasing role of nonstate political actors in world events, this article examines the influence of these players on international crisis dynamics. A theoretical index is developed to assess the power status of nonstate actors (NSAs), taking into account their unique characteristics, advantages and weaknesses. When applied to ethnic-NSAs that participated in interstate crises, in the Cold War and in the post-Cold War periods, the findings indicate that powerful ethnic-NSAs affect crisis outcomes, and would do better to do so under circumstances that suit their power resources and skills, namely, in the post-Cold War multi-centric world system, in crises that involve a small number of states as direct crisis actors and in prolonged international hostile situations. In conclusion, the article highlights the importance of developing theoretical tools for systemic analysis of NSAs in world politics, and suggests directions for future research in this field of IR. It also implies that to be effective, promoting peace and stability, crisis management should involve states and NSAs.

Introduction

The changing world order encompasses changes in the nature of international conflict, highlighting the rise in the number, power and salience of ethnic nonstate actors (ethnic-NSAs) in major world events. While global terrorism attracts the attention of scholars who study the origins, nature and behavior of NSAs, predominantly in the post-Cold War system, the study of international crises typically concentrates only on rivalry between nation states. The focus of this study is the role of ethnopolitical actors in international crises, that is, in interstate disputes which, along with sovereign states, involve ethnic nonstate groups as central players.

In most crisis research ethnic groups are not considered as major actors, and their role in and impact on international crisis dynamics has therefore been marginalized. The starting point of this article is that ethnic groups are important actors who should be integrated into a research framework on international crisis. Thus, the theoretical aim of this study, in the broadest sense, is to shed light on these actors and their role in international crises within the changing world order.

The essay is designed to achieve three main objectives: theorizing the power attributes of ethnic-NSAs; postulating and testing hypotheses about the effects of these actors on international crises; and examining trends in the role of NSAs in crises over time. The scope of this inquiry is global and long term, including a comparative aggregate analysis of 120 interstate-ethnic crises occurring between 1945 and 2004, taken from the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) dataset.

The study follows in the footsteps of the work by Ben-Yehuda and Mishali-Ram (2006) which examined the role played by NSAs in crises. Like their study, this paper examines crises in which both states and NSAs are involved and focuses on crisis outcome – a core crisis factor that has implications for our understanding of international conflict. However, unlike previous studies, this essay aims to expand our knowledge of ethnopolitical NSAs, exploring some of their unique traits and regarding them as explanatory factors in crisis dynamics. Specifically, the analysis focuses on power attributes of ethnic-NSAs, in an attempt to understand their influence on the way crises end.

To begin with, many scholars have studied state power and its significance in international conflict, while the power attributes of nonstate actors still need to be theorized in order to enable a systematic analysis of such actors in world events.¹ In order to accomplish this task, a new index of NSA power is developed and introduced, taking into account the unique characteristics, advantages and weaknesses of these players. This theoretical power index will then serve as a tool for an empirical comparative analysis of crises, where a main research question will be examined: how does the level of ethnic-NSA power affect international crisis outcome? The main hypothesis regarding this question postulates that the involvement of powerful ethnic-NSAs increases the likelihood of agreement in international crisis outcome.

I turn first to review the literature of international crisis and conflict, then studies on power in IR. This is followed by a theoretical framework, comprising definitions of concepts and outlining the index of NSA power, research hypotheses and methodology. Thereafter, data analysis is presented and discussed. The closing chapter addresses the main research question and in conclusion shows that powerful ethnic-NSAs do indeed have an effect on crisis dynamics, which effect changes over time. It emphasizes the importance of developing theoretical tools for systemic analysis of NSAs in world politics and suggests directions for future research in this field of IR.

International Conflict, Nonstate Actors and the Theory of Power

Crisis, conflict and war have long been, and still remain at the center of world politics. According to ICB, an international crisis occurs when there is a change in type and/or an increase in the intensity of disruptive interactions between two or more states, with a heightened probability of military hostilities. These changes, in turn, destabilize

the relationship between them and challenge the structure of an international system. The primary condition for such crisis is that at least two state adversaries are involved (Brecher and Wilkenfeld, 2000: 4-5). This definition regards crises as interstate occurrences. Although the state is not the only actor in terms of crisis, it is considered as the most important actor in IR, especially when military-security issues are concerned. Even where Brecher and Wilkenfeld do acknowledge the role of nonstate actors in destabilizing regional/global relations, their main analysis is characterized by a state-centric orientation, focusing on state attributes such as regime type, territorial size and state interests.²

Nonetheless, the ethnic revival in the twentieth century, a continuation of the late nineteenth century phenomenon of nationalism, has become a major source of international turmoil.³ Ethnic groups struggle for their rights, confront sovereign states and catalyze international crises, which then involve nation states as adversaries. Alongside the overall decrease in the occurrence of interstate crises since the two closing decades of the 20th century, there is an increase in the occurrence of interstate-ethnic crises, which threaten to split existing countries with the intention of creating new independent entities. [On the trends of crises in past and recent times see: Brecher and Wilkenfeld, 2000; Carment and James, 1997; Davis and Moore, 1997; Wilkenfeld, 2003.] These trends indicate the centrality of ethnic-NSAs in the current global system and calls for the integration of such actors into theoretical frameworks on major interstate disputes.

However, adherents of the realist paradigm usually do not consider nonstate entities as important actors in major world events because they do not believe that nonstate actors wield sufficient power to affect global disputes (Ferguson and Mansbach, 1999; Mansbach and Vasquez, 1981b). When such actors are examined it is mostly within the context of international terrorism or in intrastate ethnic conflicts. Moreover, widely used datasets do not contain information about nonstate actors, whether ethnically defined or otherwise, and yet we know they play an important role in interstate conflict.⁴ The Minority at Risk project (Davenport, 2004) offers measure of several dimensions of ethnopolitical groups' capacity, like group identity cohesion, group organizational cohesion and group strategies. An earlier version of Phase IV MAR data (Gurr, Marshall and Pitsch, 1999) includes variables for transnational support. These measures, however, are examined in the context of minorities in ethnic strife, and not within the realm of interstate crisis.

Other scholars (like Ben-Yehuda and Mishali-Ram, 2003, 2006; Carment and James, 1995, 1997, 2004; and Mishali-Ram, 2006), have already recognized the relationship between ethnic conflict at the state level and its spillover to international conflict, pointing to the growing role of ethnic groups in challenging international security. Their part has become even more prominent in the post-Cold War era, both in theory and practice in world politics. This study too acknowledges the possibility that nonstate actors may play considerable roles in international conflict. More specifically, the analysis focuses on ethnopolitical groups that transcend the boundaries of a single

state, interact with other states and become a driving force toward international confrontations. However, while previous studies on crisis and ethnicity focused either on states or on minorities/ethnic groups, this essay presents an actor-based approach for the analysis of international crises and addresses interstate hostile situations that involve not only states, but also ethnopolitical NSAs. Furthermore, the study characterizes and measures the power and skills of the involved ethnic-NSAs.

The behavior of organized political groupings is driven by the quest for power. The analysis of state power has been notable in the study of IR since the birth of the nation-state, with the aim of better understanding state choices and behavior. [See for example: Bloomfield and Moulton, 1997: 1-5; Brecher and Wilkenfeld, 2000: 54; Morgenthau, 1978: 2-3.] When examining interstate crises, Brecher and Wilkenfeld (2000: 27-29, 54-55) adopted mainly a military-security view and developed a scale of 'power status' including small, medium, great and superpowers, all observed within the context of the international system in which the crisis occurs. The ICB power index is composed of measures of the human, territorial and other resources available to the actor, including population size, GNP, alliance capability, territorial size, defense budgets and nuclear power, as measures of overall state power. They have also analysed the discrepancy of power between the contending states, based on their power score at the onset of a crisis (2000: 27-29, 54-55). However, power relations are not limited to the military-security issue alone. Power is relative and dynamic, and requires a multidisciplinary approach. It should be measured in terms of events, rivalries and circumstances: power in context, rather than power as statistical data. Such an analysis of power must take into consideration various resources and the multiple types of players on the world stage.

When addressing change and continuity in world politics, Rosenau (1990, 1997) pointed to a decline of state and a proliferation of nonstate actors which have become a powerful force in global relations due to new skills acquired by them. According to this analysis, the changing world order has become multi-centric, involving both a powerful state system and a less structured system of nonstate actors. Likewise, in his analysis of the multifaceted and changing nature of world power, Nye (1990: 181) spotlighted the merits of 'soft power' that stem from the ability of actors to set the agenda and determine the framework of a debate. In the case of state power, Nye pointed to intangible resources such as culture, ideology and institutions. Such resources may certainly be used by nonstate players as well.

From this stand point, scholars have examined the role of nonstate actors in world politics, but have not classified the power resources held by these actors in a way that they may be compared with measures of state power. Such measures should consider the unique characteristics of nonstate political actors, such as the absence of sovereignty, territory and major military force on the one hand, and the presence of irregular military forces with a fighting spirit, conducted by smaller and more disciplined institutions on the other. These actors operate according to relatively uncomplicated bureaucratic

procedures, yet largely depend on the political, financial and military support of states as their patrons.

Mansbach and Vasquez's study (1981a) on the creation of political actors was a groundwork that attempted to underline the unique traits of nonstate actors in which they established a basis for evaluating the stages of an actor's evolution. Among other things, they examined the birth of new actors as independent participants in world politics and looked at the circumstances under which the actors change or even cease to exist. The formation of an organized actor indicates strength and stability, and therefore a basis for power. The potency of an actor is reflected in a number of characteristics, such as unity, level of institutionalization, legitimacy, media control and others. For instance, unity, – patterns of cooperation and concerted action among actor members – indicate strength and solidarity. So does a high level of institutionalization: an organized hierarchical actor with a recognized elite of decision-makers reflects integration and power (Mansbach and Vasquez, 1981a: 74-76). While Mansbach and Vasquez refer to all types of political actors, states and NSAs, some of the characteristics they introduced are used in this study to develop an index that measures NSA power. This index will then be applied to ethnic-NSAs that participated in international crises from the second half of the twentieth century to the early years of the new millennium.

Measuring the Power of Nonstate Actors

The present article focuses on the role played by ethnic-NSAs in interstate crisis. To begin with, the choice to spotlight ethnopolitical actors does not mean that all nonstate actors are ethnic in nature. There are some important nonethnic political NSAs that participate in international crises, like the Vietcong in Vietnam, the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia and the Contras in Nicaragua.⁵ Instead, this choice is rooted in the nature of many disputes in current world affairs, which often involve clashes of ethnic and religious identities between different types of players.⁶ In other words, this study views the ethnic dimension in world politics as a central factor affecting interaction processes. From this point of view, the essay focuses on the unique input of ethnic-NSAs, thus broadening our horizons when dealing with ethnicity in IR.

The operational question is how does the level of NSA power affect international crisis outcome? The crises examined here are interstate confrontations that involve states and nonstate ethnopolitical actors.⁷ The role played by *Hizbullah* in the Arab-Israeli conflict in general, and its major part in the second Lebanon War crisis (2006) in particular, illustrate the nature of the interstate-ethnic crises examined in this study.

The analysis begins with a short survey of the ethnic-NSAs that take part in these cases. It then compares crises in the Cold War period and those occurring in the post-Cold War era in order to detect changes over the course of time. The dependent variable

relates to crisis dynamics, focusing on crisis outcome, and the explanatory variables, integrated into a theoretical index, relate to unique power attributes of ethnic-NSAs.

Crisis outcome describes the manner in which a crisis ends. ICB variables are used and tested in terms of termination in agreement. To this end, a distinction is made between cases that concluded in compromise and those that ended in non-conciliation. The examination is based on the assumption that crisis termination in agreement reduces the level of threat and stress existing between rival states and thus decreases the likelihood of recurrent dispute, further contributing to broader conflict resolution.

Ethnic-NSAs are political actors defined by common identity and core characteristics, such as nationality, religion, language, race and ancestry, culture and history. An ethnic-NSA differs from its adversary state(s) in one or more of four sub-categories of ethnicity: ethnic-religious, ethnic-tribal, ethnic-racial and ethnic-national. The African National Council (ANC) for example, is an ethno-racial actor that clashed with the white apartheid regime in South Africa.

Despite an increase in studies in the field of ethnic conflict, to date no acceptable measurements for examining the power traits of ethnopolitical actors have been determined. In this study a theoretical and operational index is developed and introduced in order to measure the power attributes of ethnic-NSAs. Such index enables a comparative analysis of ethnopolitical groups and developing theories to explain both their behavioral features and their role in major world events.

Ethnic-NSA power refers to the power status of ethnopolitical actors, measured separately for each of the cases in which they are involved over the course of time. Ethnic-NSAs do not have territorial sovereignty, nor do they have military and economic capabilities similar to those of states. NSAs usually do not have world agenda access through legitimate communications media nor via representation in international organizations and forums. These actors, once organized as political actors, have unique characteristics and sources of power. Thus, evaluating the power of these groups is complicated and requires an exclusive approach.

Two general assumptions are made here regarding NSAs: the first is that they change over time, in defined stages of development. The second is that the more developed the actor – the greater its power. Based on the study of Mansbach and Vasquez (1981a) on the growth of political actors, I have developed a new qualitative index of NSA power. According to Mansbach and Vasquez (1981a), the creation of organized actors indicates an underlying strength that serves as a basis for power. The actor's power is reflected in characteristics like unity, level of institutionalization, legitimacy and media control. Likewise, the power index in the current study includes four categories: 1. *power type*; 2. *power resources*; 3. *diplomatic power*; and 4. *institutional power*.

Development of the NSA power index was carried out in two stages. First, each of the four attributes of power was defined and its values detailed. Then the values of each attribute were classified as *low* or *high*. When employing the scale, the actor is assigned a value of '0' (low) or '1' (high) in each of the categories. Thus, an ethnic-NSA attains a

power status ranking between 0-4 in the final index: the minimal score characterizes the least developed and least powerful actors, while the maximal score typifies the most developed and most powerful ones. The attributes of NSA power and how they are coded are detailed in the research design below and summarized in Table 1.

Table 1: Power Index of Ethnic-NSA – Attributes, Values and Assumptions

Attribute	Value	Assumption	Power status
Power type	Political	Uni-type – limited power	Low (0)
	Military		
	Political dominant	Multi type – greater power	High (1)
	Military dominant		
	Political and military equally dominant		
Power resources	Manpower and weaponry low	Both/weaponry resources low – limited power	Low (0)
	Manpower high weaponry low		
	Manpower low weaponry high	Both/weaponry resources high – greater power	High (1)
	Manpower and weaponry high		
Diplomatic power	No recognition by any state	Low recognition – limited power	Low (0)
	Recognition by small/medium states		
	Recognition by regional great powers	High recognition – greater power	High (1)
	Recognition by global great/superpowers		
Institutional power	Minimal/low level of institutionalization	Low institutionalization-limited power	Low (0)
	High level of institutionalization	High institutionalization-greater power	High (1)

Three of the power elements – power type, power resources and institutional power – are internal aspects of the actors' overall power. They define the nature of the ethnic-NSAs as political actors operating to promote collective goals. Diplomatic power, on the other hand, is an external aspect which emphasizes the international characteristics of those ethnic-NSAs which have evolved into transnational actors, operating within and among other states and involving themselves in international conflicts and crises. Each NSA is assessed according to the four categories in all the crises in which it participates.⁸ However, it should be noted that each actor has its own dynamics and pace of development and a periodic regression in its evolution is possible. Thus, any

measurement of an actor's evolution must be viewed to an extent as a qualitative, and not quantitative measurement.

Power type. Sovereign states fulfill multiple functions, dealing with all aspects of their citizens' lives. Ethnic-NSAs, on the other hand, are usually focused on achieving specific goals for a distinct group, so that their functions are more limited. Power type addresses the functional orientation of the ethnic-NSAs, representing the main power domains that characterize them – political and military. The first indicates political support and influence in the domestic politics within which the actor is involved. The second refers to the actor's military functions. The power type variable examines whether single or multiple power elements characterize the actor's behavior, and which of them is dominant. Multiple functions indicate a high level of development, wherein the actor's capabilities and modes of behavior are diverse. The assumption is that the more varied the power type of an actor, the greater its power.


Power resources. Even the most powerful ethnic-NSAs have fewer capabilities than states. The first critical resource of an actor is its human resources. Harnessing people to the collective cause of the ethnic group is a preliminary condition for the creation of a political actor. Since one of these actors' imminent modes of behavior is military, the other important resource for its operation is weaponry. Power resources refer therefore to the capabilities of the ethnic-NSA in the areas of *manpower* and *weaponry*. The first refers to active members of the organization. The latter denotes the amount and quality of arms possessed by the actor. The number of active members in the organization serves as an indicator for power status since the number of men in a group affects its possibilities to operate in promoting the objectives of the organization. The amount and quality of weapons held by the actor is even more essential for its overall power, as they affect its ability to fight its rivals on the military level. The assumption is that the greater the actor's resources, in terms of manpower and weaponry, the greater its power.

Diplomatic power. When states gain independence they are recognized as sovereign states by other countries and international organizations. As such, they have the exclusive right to control the country, including the use of force. Conversely, ethnic-NSAs, who are contending with sovereign states, rarely achieve formal recognition or the support of most countries in either their regional subsystem or the global one. Their main rival states actively obstruct the actors' attempts to gain recognition and support. Yet, legitimacy and recognition are vital conditions for any actor that operates in the international sphere. Thus most ethnic-NSAs make efforts to obtain them and many succeed. Diplomatic power then, relates to the international recognition given by states and is expressed in active support – moral, political, economic, or military. It serves as an indicator of NSA power since the extent of state support to an ethnopolitical actor affects the distribution of power and the ability of the actor to achieve its goals. The assumption is that the more powerful the supporting state, the greater the diplomatic power of the ethnic-NSA.

Institutional power. While all states have governments that centralize control over their territory and population, ethnic-NSAs do not have formal and obligatory frameworks to control their people. It is therefore important that these groups develop functioning institutions early on. Minimal institutional power characterizes ethnic-NSAs in their early stages of development, when the group is still disorganized and difficult to define. As recognized leadership evolves, a preliminary institutional organization is built up, comprising a few professional institutions with weak coordination among them. Then, as the actor continues to operate, harnessing people and resources, a well-developed organization is likely to emerge. Institutional power refers to the degree of institutional development in the organization and the existence of a recognized leadership. It serves as an indicator of power status since it reflects the levels of order, discipline and coordination within the organization, and affects the extent of its efficiency. The assumption is that the greater the level of an actor's institutionalization, the greater its power status.

The relationship between ethnic-NSA power and crisis outcome is examined controlling for crisis context and attributes. The context variables relate to the period within which the crisis takes place (Cold-War and post-Cold War periods) and the presence of Protracted Conflict (PC) between the adversary states. The crisis attributes examined here are the number of crisis actors and the duration of the international crisis. Figure 1 is a schematic representation of the Ethnic NSA-Crisis Model to be explored.

Figure 1: Ethnic NSA-Crisis Model



Applying the index of NSA power to interstate-ethnic crises, five hypotheses are spelled out and tested:

Hypothesis 1: The greater the power of the ethnic-NSA in a crisis, the more likely an agreement outcome.

Hypothesis 2: The influence of powerful ethnic-NSAs on crisis outcome is greater in post-Cold War crises than in crises occurring during the Cold War period.

Hypothesis 3: The influence of powerful ethnic-NSAs on crisis outcome is greater in crises that occur within a context of PC than in crises that take place in non-PC situations.

Hypothesis 4: The lesser the number of crisis actors, the higher the influence of powerful ethnic-NSAs on crisis outcome.

Hypothesis 5: The longer the duration of the crisis, the greater the influence of powerful ethnic-NSAs on crisis outcome.

The hypothesis that powerful ethnic-NSAs increase the likelihood of agreement in crisis outcome (Hypothesis 1) is based on previous findings, which indicate that interstate crises tend to end in agreement more than interstate-ethnic crises. Ben-Yehuda and Mishali-Ram (2006: 69) found that states behave differently in interstate crises, where only state adversaries are concerned, than in interstate-ethnic cases, where ethnic nonstate actors and issues are involved. These results indicate that in the former type of crisis, states are more likely to follow diplomatic norms and procedures of international law to manage the dispute, and in order to achieve their goals. Based on this finding, it is logical to expect that well-organized, developed and supported NSAs resemble state actors in their behavior within international crises. As NSA power status increases so does its standing as a negotiating entity, due both to its capacity and its interests as an institutionalized actor.

The rationale for the hypothesis regarding the role of ethnic-NSAs in post-Cold War crises (Hypothesis 2) is based on the characteristics of the new international system, where ethnic conflict is central to the international agenda. While there has been a gradual decline in interstate conflict and crisis since the end of the Cold War, the spread of ethnic and nationalist conflict poses the greatest threat to peace and stability at the beginning of the 21st century, involving various ethnopolitical actors in both domestic and international violent disputes across the globe. The environment of changing world order is anticipated to have increased the role played by ethnic-NSAs in major world events in general, as is expected to be expressed in their influence on the course of international crises.

A setting of protracted conflict between crisis adversaries is expected to amplify the role played by powerful ethnic-NSAs in crises (Hypothesis 3), because of the very nature of such disputes. A protracted conflict involves a deep and durable clash over tangible and intangible interests, including multiple values, whether between ideologies, civilizations or belief systems. These basic values are accentuated as the conflict prolongs, creating 'psychological baggage' based on previous rounds of hostility (Brecher and Wilkenfeld, 2000; Brecher, 2008). The involvement of ethnic-NSAs in conflict is also often characterized by durable strife and a low intensity war of attrition. The character of protracted conflict is therefore anticipated to be an apposite platform for ethnopolitical groups to conduct their struggles against better organized and better equipped nation-states.

When nonstate actors are involved in interstate confrontations their status is inferior relative to that of state players. When a small number of crisis actors are

involved, which number by definition refers to the number of states participating directly in crisis, it is expected that well-organized and powerful NSAs would be able to affect the course of the events and take part in forming their termination (Hypothesis 4). When, on the other hand, there are many crisis actors, the power and overall influence of the contending countries prevail, and are therefore expected to decrease the influence of ethnic-NSAs on crisis outcome.

Finally, the rationale regarding the effects of crisis duration on the role of ethnic-NSAs in crises (Hypothesis 5) stems from the differences in the nature of state and nonstate actors. While states operate in an interstate framework, chained to international law and pressures and subjected to public opinion, NSAs usually see themselves as free to ignore most of these rules and restraints. In prolonged international crises it is therefore logical to expect that rival states be drawn into situations where disputes develop according to the NSAs' rules, namely, attritional contention in which states are exposed to increasing international pressures and mounting public opinion. In such circumstances, powerful ethnic-NSAs are more likely to be involved in shaping crisis outcome.

Research Design and Data

The study uses the ICB dataset to test whether and to what extent ethnic-NSAs influence international crises within the changing world order. The unit of analysis is an international crisis. The analysis includes 120 interstate-ethnic crises occurring between 1945 and 2004. In order to examine this theme cross-tabulation and logistic regression analyses are employed, controlling for crisis context and attributes.⁹

Crisis outcome, the dependent variable, relates to the way crises end and its two values are coded as follows:

0. Agreement: All conciliated outcomes between the rivaling parties including formal, semi-formal, or tacit agreements;
1. Nonagreement: All non-conciliated outcomes between the rivaling parties including imposed agreements, unilateral acts and faded crisis. [This distinction was used by Wilkenfeld et al., 2003. A similar distinction can be found in Ben-Yehuda and Mishali-Ram, 2006; and Mishali-Ram, 2006.]

Variables in the Index of NSA Power

The power status of Ethnic-NSAs is measured separately in each crisis, including four variables that are coded and combined in the NSA power index as follows:

Power type examines whether single or multiple power elements characterize the actor's behavior, and which of them is dominant. There are 5 values on the scale of power type:

1. Uni-type political;
2. Uni-type military;
3. Multi-type political-dominant;
4. Multi-type military-dominant;
5. Multi-type equally dominant.

The first two are considered low (coded as 0) and the last three are high (coded as 1) in the final index of NSA power. The Palestinian 'fedayeen' units, for example, had a military mode of behavior alone, while the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), the leading ethno-political actor in the Arab-Israeli conflict since the 1970s, developed a visibly political dimension of activity, alongside its military one.

Power resources refer to the capabilities of the ethnic-NSA in the areas of manpower and weaponry. Manpower refers to active members of the organization. A low level is defined in terms of up to a few hundred men; a high level of manpower involves thousands. Weaponry refers to the amount and quality of arms possessed by the actor. It is measured as low when the actor has only a limited amount of "light" weaponry, e.g., rifles, machine guns and short range rockets. Weaponry is measured as high when the actor has obtained both larger numbers of weapons and weapons with greater destructive capacities, such as medium range missiles and artillery. The four values on the scale of power resources combine the two elements as follows:

1. Both manpower and weaponry low;
2. Manpower high, weaponry low;
3. Manpower low, weaponry high;
4. Both manpower and weaponry high.

The first two values are considered low (0) and the last two are high (1) in the combined index of NSA power. Compare, for example, the resources of the 'fedayeen' and those of the PLO. The former included a few hundred men, who were poorly trained and equipped only with rifles. The latter included thousands of men, many of them involved in the Lebanon civil war. PLO's guerrilla forces in Lebanon were supplied with Soviet weapons, both in larger amount and higher quality.

Diplomatic power relates to the international recognition given by states and is expressed in their moral, political, economic, or military active support. The range of recognition refers to the status of the supporting countries – small/medium states, regional great powers and global great/superpowers. There are 4 values on the scale of diplomatic power:

1. No recognition by any state;
2. Recognition by small/medium powers in the regional/global system;
3. Recognition by regional great powers;
4. Recognition by global great/superpowers.

The first two values are regarded as low (0) and the last two as high (1) in the overall index of NSA power. The ‘fedayeen’, as an example, received the support of the Middle Eastern Arab states, mainly Egypt. Egypt was a medium regional power in the 1950s, and has been a regional great power since the late 1960s. In later years, the power status of the ‘fedayeen’ was therefore high in this category of power. The PLO also started off with the recognition and support of regional medium powers, some of which became regional great powers in the Middle East.

Institutional power refers to the level of institutional development in the organization and the existence of a recognized leadership. Two values are assigned in this variable:

1. Minimal/low level of institutionalization;
2. High level of institutionalization.

The first value is considered as low (0) and the latter as high (1) in the index of NSA power. The Palestinian ‘fedayeen’ units are an example of a disorganized actor which operated sporadically against Israeli targets along the Egyptian and Jordanian borders, with no coordination between the various groups. The PLO, on the other hand, was characterized from its early years by recognized leadership and well-developed organization, with multiple coordinated institutions. In the mid-1970s, the organization achieved international recognition and support, and became a powerful player in the regional conflict.

Control Variables

As mentioned above, four control variables are tested, including context and crisis attributes. The context variables include the period within which the crisis takes place and the presence of Protracted Conflict (PC). The crisis attributes include the number of crisis actors and the duration of the international crisis.

Period divides the years under study into two phases: 1. the *Cold War* (between 1945 and 1990); and 2. the *post-Cold War* period (between 1991 and 2004). Since these two periods differ in their time frames, the analysis refers to relative results in each period, in order to identify major tendencies and changes over time.

Protracted Conflict (PC) is defined as a process which involves hostile interactions extending over long periods of time with sporadic outbreaks of open warfare (Azar, Jureidini and McLaurin 1978: 50). The present study adopts Brecher and Wilkenfeld’s (2000: 5) operational definition of protracted conflict, which includes at least three international crises between a pair of states within a period of at least five years. The two values of this variable are: 1. *PC crises*, and 2. *non-PC crises*.

Number of crisis Actors counts the states that are direct participants in the crises, namely, those states whose foreign policy/national security decision makers perceive three necessary and sufficient conditions according to the ICB definition of crisis: a threat

to basic values, an awareness of finite time for response and a heightened probability of involvement in military hostilities (Brecher and Wilkenfeld, 2000: 3, 20).¹⁰

Crisis Duration is taken from ICB (BREXIT) where it measures the elapsed time, in days, from crisis breakpoint to endpoint (Brecher and Wilkenfeld, 2000: 50). In this study 'duration' was recoded into an ordinal variable, and its values are assigned a scale of four sub-categories: 1= 1-14 days; 2= 15-61 days (between 2 weeks and 2 months); 3= 62-183 days (between 2 and 6 months); 4= more than 184 days (more than 6 months).

Data Analysis and Discussion

The brief survey of the ethnic-NSAs under study includes 54 actors that participated in 120 international crises during the period 1945-2004, whilst differing in the location of their activity and in the scope of their involvement in crises. Appendix I presents a list of these actors along with the ICB crises in which they were involved and their overall power status as evaluated at the time of each crisis. Among the most recognizable actors in Africa we find the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa, the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) in Namibia, and the National Union for the Independence of Angola (UNITA). Among the best-known actors in Asia we witness the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), the Mujahideen in Afghanistan, Kashmiri Muslim militants such as Leshkar-e-Tioba (LeT), the Afghanistan-based Al-Qaida and the Chechen rebels. Among the salient ethnopolitical actors in Europe we may observe the Bosnian Serbs, Muslims and Croats in Yugoslavia, as well as the National Organization of Cypriot Fighters (EOKA) in Greece. Prominent nonstate actors in the Middle East include organizations like the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), Hizbullah and Islamic Jihad.¹¹ (See Appendix I.)

As mentioned above, the analysis of ethnic-NSAs in crises refers to 'interstate-ethnic' crises, namely, to those ICB international cases that involve states and ethnic-NSAs as contending parties, and does not include 'interstate' crises where sovereign states are the only rivaling players. An examination over time shows that there is an increase in the relative rate of ethnic-interstate crises in the post-Cold War years examined here. [For the list of ICB crises see the ICB dataset at <http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/icb/>.] This relative increase in ethnicity-related international crises expresses the growing role played by ethnic-NSAs in international conflict in recent years, as will be discussed below. But does the increase in ethnic-NSA participation in worldwide crises over time correspond with greater power and a more significant effect on crisis dynamics and outcomes on their part?

Ethnic-NSA Power and Crisis Outcome

When compared to state power, ethnic-NSAs possess different traits and levels of power. The index of NSA power, presented in the theoretical framework above, allows us to both analyze trends of ethnic-NSA power over time, and examine the hypotheses regarding their influence on crisis outcome.

Applying the four attributes of the combined power index (power type, power resources, diplomatic power and institutional power), the results, presented in the 'total' column in Table 2, show that the scores of most of the ethnic-NSAs examined here were at the extremes of the scale: the largest proportion, 35%, showed maximal power status ('4'), followed by 23% with minimal power status ('0'). Some of the ethnic-NSAs attained intermediary levels of power status: 8% scored '1', 18% scored '2', and 16% attained a power status score of '3'. The Arab Liberation Army in the Palestine Partition crisis (1947), for instance, had a score of '0', meaning minimal power. The PLO, on the other hand, having developed significantly since the mid-1970s, obtained a score of '4'. Considering the nature of nonstate actors it worth noting that about a third of the ethnic-NSAs under study (35%) reached maximal power status (meaning that they scored high levels of power in all four categories of the index), and most of the actors (51%) scored the two highest power status ('3' and '4') in the combined index. However, this finding does not necessarily indicate that most of the ethnopolitical groups in world politics are powerful players. It may instead imply that powerful actors are the ones most likely to cross the threshold of international crises, being able to participate in the hostile interactions in which sovereign states engage.

When looking at the interstate-ethnic crises occurring between 1945 and 2004 it is noteworthy that most of the cases, 64%, terminated in nonagreement outcomes. Hypothesis 1 anticipates that the power status of ethnic-NSAs affects crisis outcome. Specifically it postulates that the greater the power of the ethnic-NSA in a crisis, the more likely an agreement outcome. The cross-tabulation results indicate that extreme values in the power index, low ('0') and high ('4'), correspond with agreement more often than the middle values ('1-3'), as presented in Table 2. In crises where the ethnic-NSAs possessed minimal power status, 44% of the cases ended in compromise ($X^2=6.955$ $p=.1$). When these actors had power status of '1', the rate of agreement at the end of the crises declined sharply to 10%. In crises involving ethnic-NSAs with power status values of '2' or '3', the rate of agreement gradually increased to 23% and 32% of the cases, respectively. Finally, agreed-upon outcomes were achieved in 45% of the crises where the ethnic-NSAs held the maximal power status level of '4'. The Kashmir II crisis (1965) illustrates crises with low power ethnic-NSAs, and the War in Lebanon (1982) exemplifies cases with high power ethnic-NSAs, each of which ended in agreement. Unconsolidated Pakistani "freedom fighters" who began infiltrating into the Indian-controlled Vale of Kashmir, triggered the Kashmir crisis. After further escalation into a full-scale war between India and Pakistan, the crisis ended with a semi-formal agreement, as expressed in the

Tashkent Declaration. The weak ethnic-NSA did not take a major part in the crisis-war, or in its abatement. The PLO, on the other hand, played a major role in the 1982 Lebanon War. At this stage the organization was already a powerful and developed actor. The crisis ended with the (abortive) peace agreement between Israel and Lebanon, but not before PLO forces completed their withdrawal from Lebanon.

Table 2: Ethnic-NSA Power Status and Crisis Outcome 1945-2004

Ethnic-NSA Power Status	Crisis Outcome				Total		
	Agreement Outcomes		Nonagreement Outcomes				
	N	% within power status	N	% within power status	N	% Within	all crises
0	12	44%	15	56%	27	23%	
1	1	10%	9	90%	10	8%	
2	5	23%	17	77%	22	18%	
3	6	32%	13	68%	19	16%	
4	19	45%	23	55%	42	35%	
Total within Outcome	43	36%	77	64%	120	100%	

$X^2=6.955$ $p<.7$

The percentages in the 'total' cells do not add up to 100%, since the total in each row refers to all crises, not to power status alone, and in the columns to all crisis outcomes.

Since 'outcome' is a dichotomous dependent variable, logistic regression is an appropriate method for estimating the impact of ethnic-NSA power on crisis outcome. The findings show a positive relationship between the level of ethnic-NSAs' power and the way crises end ($B=.584$ $p=.01$), thereby supporting Hypothesis 1. Setting aside crises involving ethnic-NSAs with minimal power status, it is found that the greater the power of the ethnic-NSA in a crisis, the more likely an agreement outcome.

However, it is interesting to note that the rate of agreement in cases with extreme low and high NSA power status (rating '0' and '4') is so nearly identical and uniformly high. This is more easily explainable in the former case, that of a weak NSA. When ethnic-NSAs are very weak, almost non-existent as organized political actors, their part in the events and their effect on the results are marginal. Thus in these cases, crises are more likely to develop in much the same way as purely interstate ones, which, as previously mentioned, are more likely to end in agreement outcomes.

When the ethnic-NSAs are very strong, however, possessing high levels of the various categories of power, their role in the occurrences is much more salient and the dynamics are different. In such crises, the ethnic-NSAs are expected to affect crisis

interactions and outcomes. Since ethnic-NSAs usually do not play by state defined 'rules of the game', do not follow international law and do not maintain diplomatic procedures for crisis abatement, when powerful ethnic-NSAs are involved it is reasonable to expect nonagreement outcomes. However, when ethnic-NSAs have high-level power status, including developed institutions and the support of powerful patrons, states are forced to consider them in the management of the crisis. Hence, the findings indicate that powerful ethnic-NSAs are likely to be part of the process of crisis resolution. This process most often includes involvement and support of other states, which may lead to an agreed-upon outcome.

The first two control variables relate to crisis context. More specifically, the effects of ethnic-NSA power on the way crises end are tested taking into account the period within which the crisis occurs and the existence of a protracted conflict (PC). Hypothesis 2 anticipates that the influence of powerful ethnic-NSAs on crisis outcome is greater in post-Cold War crises than in crises occurring during the Cold War period. The results of the logistic regression, presented in Table 3, indicate that period is a significant explanatory factor in crisis termination with agreement, supporting the rationale of Hypothesis 2 that the changing nature of the global system makes room for the increased influence of ethnic-NSAs in international events. When looking at the power status of the 54 actors under study in a comparison between the two periods, it is found that while 27% of the ethnic-NSAs that participated in crises in the Cold War era were weak, scoring the lowest power status ('0'), only 4% of the ethnic-NSAs in the post-Cold War years were as weak. While 31% of these actors scored maximal power status ('4') in crises within the Cold War period, such powerful ethnic-NSAs counted as much as 52% of all crises in the following years ($X^2=6.367$ $p=.01$).

These results are not surprising considering the character of the new world order, where ethnic conflict is the most common form of armed intrastate conflict. [See Marshall and Gurr, 2003. See also the Integrated Network for Societal Conflict Research (INSCR) program website, and the State Failure dataset within it <<http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/stfail>>.] Moreover, kinship ties often exceed interstate borders and fuel international conflict, so the behavior of politically active ethnic actors, especially their transnational activity, frequently initiates tensions among states focused on ethnic issues. The increase of ethnic-related crises is accompanied by a modification in crisis behavior in a way that considers ethnic-NSAs interests, skills and rules of conduct. These changes accord with Rosenau's (1990) observation that the changing world order no longer involves a powerful state system as a sole determining force, but shares the world with a less structured and complex system of nonstate actors. Thus, as expected, the proliferation of nonstate actors in the post-Cold War era appears to correspond with the greater influence these actors have on global relations due to the new resources and skills they have acquired.

Table 3: Binary Logistic Regressions of Ethnic-NSA Power and Crisis Outcome^a

<u>Variables</u>	<u>Agreement in Outcome</u>
Ethnic-NSA Power	0.109*
Period	7.152**
Protracted Conflict (PC)	0.154
Number of Actors	-0.329*
Crisis Duration	-0.274*
Number of cases	118
Percentage of cases predicted correctly	73.9
Nagerkerke R Square	.292

^a All values in table are standardized B values.

*P<.05, **P<.01

Based on the relatively limited power of nonstate actors as compared to states and their tendency to conduct prolonged wars of attrition, it was anticipated that protracted conflict would be a suitable platform for their struggles. Thus, Hypothesis 3 suggests that the influence of powerful ethnic-NSAs on crisis outcome would be greater in crises that occur within a context of PC than in crises that take place in non-PC situations. The logistic regressions, however, do not support this rationale, as PC was not found as a significantly influential factor in crisis outcome. These results may stem from the behavior adopted by states in such protracted conflicts. Since PCs involve a cluster of states (two or more) that contend over repetitive issues within a constant region, the context is well-known to the rivaling sides, both state and nonstate players. These players are also 'learning' entities that design their policies during and between crises, according to their familiarity with other players in the PC. In this context it may be difficult for ethnic-NSAs to gain advantage and become significant participants who affect crisis dynamics and outcomes. Hypothesis 3 then, is rejected.

The other two control variables consider crisis traits. The first relates to the number of crisis actors, the second to the duration of the crisis. Hypothesis 4 anticipates that the lesser the number of crisis actors, the higher the influence of powerful ethnic-NSAs on crisis outcome. The results, shown in Table 3, indicate that indeed there is a strong negative relationship between the number of crisis actors and the effects of ethnic-NSAs on crisis termination. NSAs seem to be capable of affecting uncomplicated situations where only a few states are involved as direct participants. In such conflict

circumstances their relative powerful status, (as measured according to NSAs' power traits), is a useful one, which enables the ethnic-NSAs to influence crisis development and termination. The small number of states involved as crisis actors seems to make room for increased influence of the ethnic-NSAs, as the participating states are drawn into disputes played by nonstate rules of the game, where they have to deal with crisis behavior such as cross-border infiltration, guerilla warfare and terror. When many countries are involved as crisis actors, it appears that interstate interactions and concerns become the dominant factor that shape states' behavior, overshadowing the role played by ethnic-NSAs. Hypothesis 4 is therefore accepted.

Finally, Hypothesis 5 postulates that the longer the duration of the crisis, the greater the influence of powerful ethnic-NSAs on crisis outcome. The results indicate that there is a positive relationship between crisis duration and the effects of ethnic-NSAs on crisis outcome. The rationale of Hypothesis 5 thus stands: while prolonged crises tend to expose the disputing states to increasing international pressures and mounting public opinion, they seem to enable ethnic-NSAs to conduct the crisis according to their rules and drag rival countries into attritional struggles where state superiority is no longer effective. In shorter crises, on the other hand, it appears that the state concentrates its powerful resources and controls crisis dynamics more effectively, surpassing the role played by even powerful ethnic-NSAs in the dispute.

In summary, powerful ethnic-NSAs affect international crises, and would be better to do so under circumstances that suit their power resources and skills, namely, in the post-Cold War multi-centric world system, in crises that involve a small number of states as direct crisis actors, and in prolonged international hostile situations.

Conclusions

Ethnic conflict and global terrorism are amongst the central issues in the international agenda, generating both intrastate and interstate confrontations. Such issues stand behind the basic hypothesis of this study, that many ethnopolitical groups are meaningful players in today's globalizing world, and thereby necessitate a study of whether and to what extent ethnic-NSAs make a difference in international crises.

The contribution of this essay has been both theoretical and empirical, enriching the research on international conflict with a nonstate dimension and expanding our knowledge about the role of ethnic-NSAs in crises. First, a theoretical index was designed to enable us to measure the relative power status of political NSAs participating in central world events. The index provides a tool for IR scholars and students studying worldwide events involving both state and NSAs as contending parties, e.g., ethnic conflict, civil war and terrorism. It enables an assessment of the power status of those actors who are not well defined by territorial and sovereign means, nor by formal

governance and economic strength, yet their part in central world events is becoming increasingly significant.

During the years 1945-2004, 54 ethnic-NSAs were involved in 120 interstate-ethnic crises. Many of these actors were poorly organized and developed, while many others were powerful and well developed. The most common power status of ethnic-NSAs under study was, in fact, maximal. When looked at over time, it is evident that there is a tendency among these groups towards rising power status, as many ethnopolitical actors have gained power resources and skills in recent years, making them more prominent in the dynamic new world order.

Referring to the main research question, it was indeed found that ethnic-NSAs make a difference in international crises. The findings indicate that the more powerful the ethnic-NSA, the more likely an agreement outcome. Developed, well-organized and well-supported NSAs seem to resemble state actors in crises. As their power status increases so does their standing as a negotiating entity. This is true however, only when one sets aside crises with minimal power status NSAs. In these cases, the logic of the main hypothesis is rejected: when the least powerful ethnic-NSAs (rating '0' power status) are involved, agreement outcomes are most likely to be achieved. In fact, the high share of agreement outcomes in crises involving ethnic-NSAs with minimal power status is almost identical to the rate of agreement in interstate crises, which do not involve ethnic-NSAs at all. Interestingly, so is the picture when the most highly developed and powerful ethnic-NSAs (rating a power status of '4') are involved. Ethnic-NSA power status is therefore found to be an important explanatory variable in crisis outcome. When nonconsolidated ethnic-NSAs and when most consolidated ethnic-NSAs are involved in crises, agreement among the contending parties is likely to increase.

When controlled by the context of events and by crisis attributes, it was found that ethnic-NSAs gain greater influence on crisis dynamics and termination when these conditions best fit their power traits and skills, namely, in the multi-centric order of the post-Cold War period, in crises that involve a few or even a single crisis actor, and in durable confrontations.

From a theoretical perspective, this inquiry suggests that understanding ethnicity-related international crises calls for a multi actor approach. The results have implications for the view that NSAs inevitably play a negative role in resolving international conflict. Apparently, the effect of their involvement in crises is dependent upon their status. Powerful political organizations may well play a part in negotiating crisis termination and shaping agreed-upon outcomes.

From a policy perspective, the results point out that leaders of powerful political organizations are interested in the legitimacy derived from the position of a negotiating body in the context of international crises. One obvious drawback is the lack of effective conflict management techniques in crises involving nonstate opponents. In international crises, state actors often refuse to discuss resolution with nonstate players who frequently challenge their very existence and threaten their integration and stability. However, to be

effective, crisis management should involve NSAs, especially the most powerful NSAs, that were found more likely to be involved in recurrent crises. Third-party political intervention, particularly mediation, may be useful to produce new relational configurations and possibilities for resolving the dispute. Ending a crisis with agreement between the disputing parties in the short run is believed to reduce the likelihood of recurrent crises, thereby contributing to long-term conflict resolution.

The centrality of power to international politics has long drawn the attention of many scholars, the study of which resulted in multiple approaches and perspectives. The analysis of NSA power presented here combines measurements from the realist paradigm (e.g., military capacity) and from the liberal school (e.g., institutional power) yet does not imply that these are the only means by which to assess power in the international arena. Instead it recognizes that conceptualizing and measuring power is a complicated task that can be carried out in multiple ways, considering the multifaceted nature of world politics and with regard to the context of empirical study. [See for example the volume on *Power in Global Governance*, edited by Barnett and Duvall (2005), and specifically pp. 2-23 in the editors' introduction (chapter 1) about conceptualizing power.]

Moreover, the examination of the role played by ethnic-NSAs in international crises does not suggest that they are the only meaningful actors, alongside the state, in current world politics; nor does it indicate that ethnic-NSAs are to be examined in conflict situations alone. Alternatively, this essay focuses on prominent actors playing an increasingly significant part in major world occurrences as expressed in international crises. At the same time, it is apparent that to describe a whole picture of power, nonstate actors and the changing world order, further research is required. Thus, it is hopeful that the results of this work will pave the way for research that will promote a broader view of past and present international dynamics, by developing a comprehensive theory of conflict, crisis and war in an ethnically complex and multi-actor world. Future research should also look at the roles and effects of NSAs beyond conflict, and add further perspectives of power resources relevant to the examined actors and the changing world order.

Notes

1. On studies regarding state power and its role in conflict see for example: Bloomfield and Moulton, 1997; DiCicco and Levy, 1999; Geller, 1993; Kugler and Lemke, 1996; Wagner, 2000. See also the literature review below.
2. The ICB project introduced the concept of crisis initiator and analyzed multiple types of entities that trigger international crises, including nonstate actors/ethnic groups.
3. Harff and Gurr (2004) pointed to the increasing occurrence, since the 1960s, of ethnic groups demanding rights, and becoming the major source of domestic and international conflict in the post-Cold War world. See also Carment and James, 1997: 1-2; and the Minorities At Risk (MAR) project <<http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/mar>>.
4. According to Marshall and Gurr (2003), even though a decline in the rate of new ethnic conflicts was evident in the late 1990s, ethnic conflict remains the most common form of armed intrastate conflict today.

5. While I expect that non-ethnic NSAs demonstrate unique and interesting characteristics they are not within the scope of this study, which examines ethnically-defined NSAs in international crises. The analysis also excludes NSAs defined by economic, environmental, or other non-political identity.
6. Empirical research in IR indicates that many of the nonstate actors involved in international crises are ethnic actors. See the ICB dataset <<http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/icb>>; Ben-Yehuda and Mishali-Ram, 2006; Gurr, 2000; Smith, 1981; Smith and Hutchinson, 1996). These actors have a unique ethnic identity as well as political goals, usually involving autonomy or independence.
7. Ben-Yehuda and Mishali-Ram (2006: 55-56) defined *interstate-ethnic* crises as a series of events in which state adversaries participate along with ethnic-NSA(s), as opposed to *interstate* crises, where all actors are sovereign states. The two types of crisis also differ in the issues over which the parties contend. Brecher and Wilkenfeld (2000) also consider the centrality of the ethnic dimension in crises, and distinguish between *ethnicity related* and *ethnicity driven* cases. In the former, ethnicity is expressed in terms of the presence or absence of an ethnic component in a crisis. In the latter, ethnicity is the preeminent causal factor in the behavior of a crisis actor. This study adopts the definition of Ben-Yehuda and Mishali-Ram, according to which, like in ICB, the analysis include cases where the ethnic dimension is prominent as well as crises where it is less so. In so doing, the study adopts the broader definition, which is closer to ICB's ethnicity-related variable.
8. An international crisis can involve several NSAs, and the measurement of their power is made for a particular actor per case. Where more than one ethnic-NSA is involved the major one is coded, according to the context of the events. However, there are crises, usually relating to civil wars, where several NSAs are involved and it is not obvious which of them is the major actor. Often in such crises, the ethnic actors confront each other, with different states supporting the various groups. In such cases the most powerful ethnic-NSA is the one coded.
9. In order to verify the reliability of the index of NSA power tested here, 30 of the 120 international crises were coded by a backup coder, a graduate student at Bar-Ilan University, resulting in an intercoding reliability score of .80.
10. According to ICB, these three conditions derive from a change in the state's internal or external environment, creating a threat to basic values such as existence, influence, territorial integrity, political regime survival, and economic welfare, and guide decisions and actions of states.
11. Some ethnic-NSAs were involved in many crises over time, e.g., the Popular Front for the Liberation of Western Sahara (Polisario) which participated in 10 international crises from 1973 to 1989, and the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) and its armed wing, the Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA), which struggled against the white colonial government in Rhodesia, through 7 crises between the years 1973 and 1983. Most of the ethnic-NSAs, however, participated in only a few or even a single international confrontation, e.g., the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) in 1990 and the Somali National Movement (SNM) in 1987.

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Appendix I

Ethnic-NSAs in International Crises 1945-2004

Ethnic-NSA	ICB International Crisis	Period(s)	Ethnic-NSA Power Status
Abkhaz separatists in Georgia	407 Georgia/Abkhazia, 1992	Post Cold War	4
ALA – Arab Liberation Army and Palestinian bands	120 Palestine Partition Israel Independence, 1947	Cold War	0
ANC - The African National Congress	323 Mozambique Raid, 1981	Cold War	3
	339 Lesotho Raid, 1982		3
	355 Botswana Raid, 1985		3
	360 S. Africa Raid on Lesotho, 1985		3
	365 S. Africa Cross-Border Raid, 1986		3
ADFL - Alliance of Democratic Forces of the Liberation of Zaire-Congo	421 Zaire Civil War, 1996	Post Cold War	4
AOL – the Army for the Liberation of Sahara	160 Ifni, 1957	Cold War	0
Apodeti - Popular Democratic Association of Timorese	264 East Timor, 1975	Cold War	4
Awami League, in Pakistan	242 Bangladesh, 1971	Cold War	1
Bosnian Croats in Yugoslavia	403 Yugoslavia II: Bosnia, 1992	Post Cold War	3
Bosnian Muslims in Yugoslavia	403 Yugoslavia II: Bosnia, 1992	Post Cold War	3
Bosnian Serbs in Yugoslavia	403 Yugoslavia II: Bosnia, 1992	Post Cold War	3
BRA - Bougainville Revolutionary Army, in Papua New Guinea	404 Papua New Guinea/Solomon Islands, 1992	Post Cold War	2
Chechen Rebels	440 Pankisi George, 2002	Post Cold War	3
CRD – Congolese Rally for Democracy	444 DRC-Rwanda, 2004	Post Cold War	1
El-Qaeda	427 US Embassy Bombings, 1998	Post Cold War	4
	434 US-Afghanistan, 2001		4
EOKA - National Organization of Cypriot Fighters	257 Cyprus III, 1974	Cold War	3

Ethnic-NSA	ICB International Crisis	Period(s)	Ethnic-NSA Power Status
FAN - The Armed Forces of the North, in Chad	304 Chad/Libya IV, 1979	Cold War	4
FAP - The People's Armed Forces, in Chad	304 Chad/Libya IV, 1979 321 Chad/Libya V, 1981 342 Chad/Libya VI, 1983	Cold War	3 3 3
FLNC – Congolese National Liberation Front, Katangan exiles in Angola	277 Shaba I, 1977 292 Shaba II, 1978	Cold War	2 2
FNLA - National Front for the Liberation of Angola	260 War in Angola, 1975	Cold War	4
Free Goa volunteers	151 Goa I, 1955 190 Goa II, 1961	Cold War	1 1
Fretilin - Revolutionary Front of Independent East Timor	264 East Timor, 1975 432 East Timor II, 1999	Cold War Post Cold War	4
FROLINAT - Front de la libération nationale du Tchad	243 Chad-Libya I, 1971 288 Chad/Libya II, 1978 290 Chad/Libya III, 1978 304 Chad/Libya IV, 1979 362 Chad/Libya VII, 1986	Cold War	2 4 4 4 4
Greater Togo Movement, in Ghana	174 Ghana/Togo Border I, 1960	Cold War	0
Greek Cypriots	202 Cyprus I, 1963 223 Cyprus II, 1967	Cold War	4 4
Hizbullah - The Party of God	374 Syrian Intervent. in Lebanon, 1987 409 Operation Accountability, 1993 418 Operation Grapes of Wrath, 1996	Cold War Post Cold War	4 4 4
Islamic Jihad	443 Haifa Boming, 2003	Post Cold War	2
JeM - Jaish-e-Mohammed	435 Indian Parliament Attack, 2001	Post Cold War	4
JKLF - Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front	392 Kashmir III: India /Pakistan Nuclear crisis, 1990	Cold War	2
Katangan secessionists in the Congo	176 Congo I-Katanga, 1960	Cold War	1
LeT - Lashkar-e-Toiba	436 Kaluchack, 2002	Post Cold War	4
LTTE - The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam	378 India Intervent. in Sri Lanka, 1987	Cold War	2
MPLA - Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola	260 War in Angola, 1975 308 Raid on Angola, 1979	Cold War	4 4
Mujahideen in Afghanistan	303 Afghanistan Invasion, 1979	Cold War	2

Ethnic-NSA	ICB International Crisis	Period(s)	Ethnic-NSA Power Status
Nagorno-Karabakh Council – secessionist Armenians	401 Nagorny-Karabakh, 1991	Post Cold War	1
NLC – National Liberation Committee, in Congo	211 Congo II, 1964	Cold War	2
Pakistani freedom fighters in Kashmir, Kashmiri Muslim militants	119 Kashmir I, 1947	Cold War	0
	216 Kashmir II, 1965	Post Cold War	0
	431 Kashmir IV Kargil, 1999		2
Palestinian ‘fedayeen’ and infiltrators	143 Qibya, 1953	Cold War	0
	149 Gaza Raid, 1955		0
	153 Qalqilya, 1956		0
	220 El Samu, 1966		1
	226 Karameh, 1968		1
PFLP - Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine	229 Beirut Airport, 1968	Cold War	2
	270 Entebbe Raid, 1976		2
PLO - The Palestine Liberation Organization	236 Cairo Agreement - PLO, 1969	Cold War	2
	238 Black September, 1970		2
	265 Lebanon Civil War I, 1976		4
	289 Litani Operation, 1978		4
	327 Al-Biqā Missiles I, 1981		4
	337 War in Lebanon, 1982		4
Polisario - Popular Front for the Liberation of Western Sahara	357 Al-Biqā Missiles II, 1985		4
	261 Moroccan March, 1975	Cold War	2
	268 Nouakchott I, 1976		2
	280 Nouakchott II, 1977		2
	285 French Hostages/Mauritania, 1977		2
	299 Tan Tan, 1979		3
	305 Goulmime-Tarfaya Road, 1979		3
	312 Operation Iman, 1980		3
	332 Galtat Zemmour I, 1981		3
	375 Sand Wall, 1987		3
PUK - Patriotic Union of Kurdistan	390 Galtat Zemmour II, 1989		2
	419 Desert Strike, 1996	Post Cold War	4
Redshirts – separatist Pathans (Pashtuns in Afghanistan)	129 Pushtunistan I, 1949	Cold War	0
	150 Pushtunistan II, 1955		0
RPF - Rwandan Patriotic Front, Tutsi exiles in Uganda and Burundi	205 Burundi/Rwanda, 1963	Cold War	0
	394 Rwanda/Uganda, 1990	Post Cold War	1
	426 DRC Civil War, 1998		3
SNM - Somali National Movement	373 Todghere Incident, 1987	Cold War	2
South Ossetia separatists	445 South Ossetia-Abkhazia, 2004	Post Cold War	4

Ethnic-NSA	ICB International Crisis	Period(s)	Ethnic-NSA Power Status
SSA - Shan State Army	437 Myanmar-Thailand, 2002	Post Cold War	2
SWAPO - The South West Africa People's Organization	291 Cassinga Incident, 1978 302 Raids on SWAPO, 1979 313 Operation Smokeshell, 1980 331 Operation Protea, 1981 347 Operation Askari, 1983	Cold War	4 4 4 4 4
TMT - Turk Mukavemet Teskilati and the Turkish Community in Cyprus	202 Cyprus I, 1963 223 Cyprus II, 1967	Cold War	2 2
UCK - The Kosovo Liberation Army	430 Kosovo, 1999	Post Cold War	2
UDT - Democratic Union of Timorese	264 East Timor, 1975	Cold War	4
UNITA - National Union for the Total Independence of Angola	260 War in Angola, 1975 297 Angola Invasion Scare, 1978 380 S. Africa Intervent. in Angola, 1987	Cold War	4 4 4
WSLF - Western Somali Liberation Front, and Somali tribesmen	179 Ethiopia/Somalia, 1960 201 Kenya/Somalia, 1963 208 Ogaden I, 1964 282 Ogaden II, 1977	Cold War	0 0 0 1
ZANU - the Zimbabwe African National Union (& ZANLA – Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army), in Rhodesia	267 Operation Thrasher, 1976 273 Nagomia Raid, 1976 276 Operation Tangent, 1976 278 Mapai Seizure, 1977 286 Chimoio-Tembue Raids, 1977	Cold War	4 4 4 4 4
ZAPU - the Zimbabwe African People's Union (& ZIPRA – Zimbabwe People Revolutionary Army), in Rhodesia	250 Zambia Raid, 1973 267 Operation Thrasher, 1976 273 Nagomia Raid, 1976 276 Operation Tangent, 1976 283 Rhodesia Raid, 1977 293 Air Rhodesia Incident, 1978 300 Raids on ZIPRA, 1979 307 Rhodesia Settlement, 1979 345 Maitengwe Clashes, 1983	Cold War	2 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3