

Non-Violent Campaign and Social Change: Lessons from Liberia and Campaigns to Ban Landmine and Cluster Munitions

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Abstract

The increasing attention on a number of social systems begging for change, especially in the wake of the wave of change that has been blowing across a number of social systems in recent years, points to the growing quest towards systemic change in many social settings and organisations. While the process in bringing about change is an important consideration in the quest for change, it is crucial to understand that a process that embraces a nonviolent approach has over the years proven to be more rewarding. The paper identifies synergy building, unity, credibility, issue framing style, campaign messaging style, consistency, and persistency among others as key ingredients for a successful nonviolent campaign for social change following lessons from Liberia, and campaigns to ban landmine and cluster munitions.

Introduction

For years, the use of a nonviolent action campaign has been featured prominently in political life. There is an astronomical increase in its use in recent times by several movements, leading to significant socio-political reforms or social change. Though many nonviolent movements emphasized overthrowing repressive governments (Martin, 2015: 537), there are a number of others whose focus were on other aspects of social change, including influencing government policies. The attention on nonviolence in this paper is not unconnected to the view of Gene Sharp's concept of pragmatic nonviolence as the most effective method available in the circumstances (Weber, 2003) and in the principled or ideological non-violence viewpoints of Mahatma Gandhi and Martin Luther King Jr. that seek to deal with the causes, rather than the symptoms of the problem in question. The rationale for the use of nonviolence largely rests on the joint conviction that it works instrumentally and that it is ethical.

Also, as a weapon, non-violence is accessible to all and does not seek to alienate the opponent, including the third party. Thus, it can be used to bring everyone on board. It has the potential to end cycles of violence and counter-violence, open windows of opportunity for conversion, and can draw media focus on the issue at stake, as well as often producing a constructive outcome. It is against this backdrop that this paper seeks to explore the concept of nonviolence and put in perspective the lessons following its applicability in the campaign to ban landmine and cluster munitions.

Non-violent social movements

According to Tilli (2003: 262), "social movements involve a series of contentious actions or performances, displays and campaigns by which people, especially a collective group of people make collective claims on others" In the view of Godwin (2006: 3), social movements are "conscious, concerted, and sustained efforts by ordinary people to change some aspect of their society by using extra-institutional means". Whilst

acknowledging the important role of ordinary people in social movements, the influence of elites in further adding value to the process, including those external to the country, cannot be underestimated. A combination of strategy with theory together with effective grassroots movements is important in promoting change in the social system. For Tilly, social movements are a “major vehicle for ordinary people's participation in public politics” (Tilly, 2003: 262). The ordinary people constitute the grassroots mobilisation that gives vigour to nonviolent movements and, according to Jackson (2015: 5), organisational capacity is one key mobilisation tool. A “successful resistance campaign, needs to be able to mobilise participants” (Jackson, 2015: 5) effectively.

There are various types of social movements, and a number of differences (in respect to their commitments, types of change, targets, methods of work, and range) exist between these various types of social movements. Many of them, according to Staggenborg (2015: 1), have used a wide variety of protest tactics in bringing about enormous social changes, influencing cultural arrangements and public opinion, as well as government policies in the process. Reform movements advocate changes of certain norms, customs, or laws that are not acceptable or no longer acceptable to the people in general, such as, trade unions and green movements. Radical movements, by contrast, are committed to fundamental changes of or in the social value systems, such as those demonstrated by the American Civil Rights Movement, the Polish Solidarity (Solidarność) movement, and the South African shack dwellers' movement (Abahlali baseMjondolo.)

Non-violent action for social change

There is an increasing preference for nonviolent campaigns over violent campaigns in the world. Apart from the works of well-known erstwhile leaders of nonviolent movements, such as Mahatma Gandhi and Martin Luther King Jr., who made prominent contributions to thinking about nonviolence (Martin, 2015: 535), the contributions of many other apostles of nonviolent action, including Gene Sharp, have helped increased this preference. Also as stated by Karakaya (2016: 1), nonviolent campaign is found to be increasingly associated with increasing levels of globalization, as it further contributes to its preference over violent campaign.

Non-violent struggle, according to Sharp (2010: 14), is the most powerful means available to those struggling for freedom, not only from the grips of dictatorship, but also from the grips of governance characterized by corruption and greed, marginalization, obnoxious policies, economic inequalities, human insecurities, and above all, violence. Sharp (2010: 17) has emphasized that “achieving a society with both freedom and peace is of course not a simple task. It will require great strategic skill, organization, and planning, and above all, it will require power”. Strategic and skillful planning of a nonviolent struggle is vital in defining the trajectory to freedom. It is on record that “nonviolent struggles have been waged on behalf of a myriad of causes and groups, and even for objectives many people reject” (Sharp, 2003: 4). The issues that have gained the attention of nonviolent struggles are diverse ranging from socio-economic to ethno-

religious, humanitarian and political, and even range from trivial to the fundamentals. It has been used to resist, and eventually prevent oppression as well as promotes change (Sharp, 2003: 4).

Non-violence can be applied personally as a way of life, or collectively as a method of transforming conflict and building societies of peace. In their quest for social change, practitioners of non-violence use diverse and creative methods. They have sought social change through educational campaigns and letters to governments, civil disobedience and non-violent direct action, and through communication via mass media. Non-violent campaigns also apply a huge array of creative protest actions and mass non-cooperation and non-violent interventions, with the aim of redistributing power in society. Regional waves, such as the 1989 revolutions in Eastern Europe and the Arab Spring, are prominent nonviolent protests that have enjoyed popular coverage (Gleditsch and Rivera, 2015: 1) in recent years.

Revolutionary non-violence aims to create conditions for just, peaceful, and sustainable societies that meet the needs of all people. At its core is the recognition that we all have a shared human identity and that life is valuable in and of itself. In modern times, non-violence has been a powerful tool for social protest. The use of information communication technologies (ICT) in raising the level of participation in contemporary times is fast spreading as ICT, has proven to be a useful means of mobilising protestors, as well as “help[ing] to coordinate revolutionary protests” (Lawson, 2015: 18).

A popular belief that is still held by a number of social systems and individuals is that violence and a show of force is the way, but as Lehoucq (2016: 1) posits, civil disobedience fails just as violence in toppling regimes. When it comes to bringing about regime change and social change in general, there is no evidence that violence campaigns succeed more than nonviolent campaigns. In fact, contrary to popular belief, nonviolent campaigns are more effective than violent ones. In comparing the two, Stephan and Chenoweth (2008) drew up a set of 323 violent and non-violent resistance campaigns that took place between 1900 and 2006. They developed specific criteria for classifying campaigns as violent or non-violent and for judging their success, limited success, and failure. Their main findings were that non-violent campaigns achieved a success rate of 53%, compared with 26% for violent campaigns. Furthermore, non-violent campaigns took an average of two years to achieve success while violent campaigns took eight years. As submitted by Nepstad (2015: 1), many people have used nonviolent action to win political goals.

Important distinctions exist between non-violent social change and the non-violent overthrow of a dictator. Non-violent social change is focused on the wellbeing and humanitarian considerations of the people. It seeks to promote human security and advance the removal of institutional frameworks and laws that run against the security and wellbeing of the people, as well as actions that exposed them to human-induced danger, whilst at the same providing better alternatives. Also, non-violent social change is often planned, gradual, and sustained until the needed change is non-violently attained. Non-violence has been adopted and applied by several movements for social change that do not focus on opposition to war. Some examples include the banning of

landmines and cluster munitions, banning of chemical and biological weapons, the struggle to win civil rights for African Americans in the United States led by Martin Luther King Jr., and the campaigns of non-violence in the 1960s to protest the treatment of farm workers in California (led by César Chávez), as well as the non-violent campaign of Leymah Gbowee and a group of women in Liberia. The nonviolent action of this movement in Liberia helped to “embrace the possibilities of a negotiated settlement” (Maharaj, 2015: 22). On the other hand, the non-violent overthrow of a dictator is focused on bringing about change in political leadership. It often elicits more repressive reactions from the dictator against the non-violent group that seeks to remove him or her from power. Generally, non-violent action can be spontaneous, such as that experienced in Egypt and Tunisia, or planned, such as the campaign to ban landmines.

Some of the cases involving the use of a non-violent struggle to bring about social changes include the democratic struggles in Tibet, Zimbabwe, Iran, Belarus, and Burma. Sharp (2003: 5-7) further documented the use of non-violent struggles in conflicts involving religions, economic, and international political matters, as well as struggles against slavery and colonial rebellion. Also, Sørensen and Johansen (2016: 1) identified the nonviolent escalation of unrecognised conflicts as potent tools in struggles against tyranny, injustice, and human rights violations.

Although non-violent struggles differ from case to case, Sharp (2003: 10) identified two crucial or special processes that may be present in certain non-violent struggles, but not all. These are an ability to defy and at times to reverse the effect of repression, and an ability to undermine and sever the source of power of the opponent. Activists in the Occupy Movement used methods of nonviolent action (Martin, 2015: 538), whilst a number of prominent nonviolence researchers and educators (such as Robert Burrowe, James Lawson, and Janet Cherry) have had personal experience with using nonviolent action (Martin, 2015: 540).

The two approaches to nonviolence include principled and pragmatic approaches. The principled approach emphasizes human harmony and a moral rejection of violence and force or coercion, while the pragmatic approach views conflicts as normal and sees the rejection of violence as an efficient means or way of confronting or challenging power (Weber, 2003: 250). Gene Sharp, however, argued that nonviolent action should be used for pragmatic rather than religious or ethical purposes, and that the two approaches are different in their motivations, assumptions, and implications. According to Weber (2003: 1) principled nonviolence underscores “human harmony, moral rejection of violence and coercion”, whilst pragmatic nonviolence views the “rejection of violence as an effective way of challenging power”. The pragmatic approach get things done and may even foster a nonviolent way of life (Weber, 2003: 264-265) and remains effective in tackling conflicts.

In fact, between yielding and waging an armed struggle is strategic nonviolent struggle. It is the most realistic alternative for pursuing political change. Sharp described it as “non-violent struggle that has been applied according to a strategic plan that has been prepared on the basis of an analysis of the conflict situation, the strength and weaknesses of the contending group, the nature, capacities and requirements of the technique of non-

violent action, and especially the strategic principles of that type of struggle” (Sharp, 2003: 38).

To progress in a strategic non-violent approach in building infrastructures for peace (Irene, 2015: 1), advocates for policy change and promotes social change in any society, practitioners of nonviolence or nonviolent activists and researchers committed to nonviolent approach must emphatically move the idea or concept of the strategic non-violent approach or struggle from “theory to practice if political and social change must be brought about” (Helvey, 2004: 25). There is also the need to work towards influencing the strengths and loyalties in three areas. First, the group must seek to continually increase its strength and the strength of its supporters. Secondly, the group will gain strength as it opens up to active participation from members of the civil society who are similarly affected by the problem of a culture of violence that permeates the length and breadth of the country. Thirdly, the nature of non-violent struggle will make it possible for the group to win ample support, even among members from the other side of the divide, including those in the government. Complete and sole dependence on a nonviolent approach commonly begets sympathy for the group or participants involve in the struggle. The ability to get support even from opponents or some of the opponents and neutral groups expands the sphere of influence for the nonviolent group.

Generally the concept of non-violent social change is operationalized within certain assumptions, such as the belief that people are important, and that if given a chance, people are able to handle the affairs of their lives in a manner that is good, in addition to the belief that people are able to decide what kind of society they want for themselves.

The guidelines for action are important in forming an agreement among members of the non-violent group on the details of behaviour that is acceptable during non-violent action. These guidelines are also shared with other groups in alliance or coalition for the non-violent struggle. The general agreement and acceptance of these guidelines creates greater insight on what is expected of everyone in the action. The availability of such a clear set of criteria makes it easier to know who belongs to the action in order to avoid sabotage. As such, those who do not conform to these arrangements must not be incorporated in the action, as this will result in a discordant tune in conducting the action and eventually frustrate the engagement.

It is also important to clarify in advance to members of the nonviolent group, their opponents and the third party as the case may be, that the nonviolent group will truly be nonviolent in its actions. What that means must also be well spelt out in exact terms, and effort must be made by the nonviolent group to act in such a manner as to ensure that everyone’s action is in line with the stated manner. This will make it easier to deny accusations of violent behaviour and blackmailing from opponent, and thus help build a reputation as a truly nonviolent and trustworthy group.

Methods available to social movements

The range of methods for carrying out social changes in the society, as summarised by Schutt (2010: 136), are presented in table below.

Table 1: General methods of building social change

Method	Description	Assumption	Appeals to	Primary Users	Main Strengths
Physical Force	This involves using threats of physical harm to coerce people	It based on the assumption that people are better influenced through physical threats	It appeals to context involving control, confrontation, security, status, hierarchy	Includes security agents- military, police, intelligent agencies, rebels, militants, militias, armed, unionists, thugs, and gangsters	Effective for individuals, groups, or organisations with most strength or power
Political Force	It involves using political authority for policies implementation	It based on the assumption that the people will follow along if authorities change	It appeals to status, hierarchy and attention	Political Authorities	Often backed or supported by laws. It appears democratic and moral, & its relatively good in the implementation of decisions
Economic Force	This involves use of political or physical force as well as hire agents or personnel in policies implementation	The use of economic offer or the sway or influences people better	It appeals to control, hierarchy & material possessions	This includes corporate organisations, organized crime syndicates and the rich	Efficient, moral, and appears democratic as well as effective at enforcing decisions
Advertising, Propaganda	Propaganda persuade & convince people by repeatedly bombarding them with the same message	Assume that people are influenced or swayed via repeated & sufficient emphasis on same thing	Control	Corporate organisations, business, politicians & people	Often quite Effective
Engineering	Change or transform the physical or social surrounding of people in such a way that affect & influence their views	Adaptation of Perspective to the surrounding is possibility	Rationality, control	Urban planners, & corporate managers, as well as management consultants	Good at rectifying destructive or inefficient surrounding
Rational Persuasion	Persuade people via arguments based on	Assumed that human beings	Rationality, Autonomy	Scholars, lawyers,	Effective at finding out the

	facts & research	are rational & experience mind change amidst evidence that are reliable		activists, & lobbyists	root causes of something, & can bring out relevant data or information
Emotional	It appeals to human consciences or ideals	Individuals are better swayed via emotional appeals to their conscience or or ideals	High ideals	Nonviolent activists, religious & spiritual individuals	Uplifting & attends or focuses on the positive
Emotional appeals to fear, anger & hatred	It appeals to people's prejudices or fears & anger	Invoking peoples' fears & prejudices is the best to sway them.	Directness, anger	Lobbyists, lawyers, militant & activists	Tap into emotions' gut, effective in mobilizing people
Fellowship & personal support	Frequently creates a warm communal Environment of people	Kindness & commu can sway or influence people to resolve their conflicts amicably	Love, warmth and joy	Religious or spiritual, persons, therapists & activists	Largely uplifting, & creates cool & good feelings in people, also effective in bringing individual that are new together
Nonviolent Confrontation	Mobilises people to tackle or address social problems by confronting the social problem directly in a non-violently way	Nonviolent confrontation breakthrough emotional blocks & can effectively or remarkably influence & sway people	Directness, confrontation	Nonviolent activists	Effective, uplifting, and empowering

Source: Schutt (2010)

As indicated in above table, the means for bringing about social change include the use of physical force, political force, economic force, advertising or propaganda, engineering, rational persuasion, emotional appeals to ideals, emotional appeals to anger, hatred or fear, fellowship and personal support, and nonviolent confrontation. Physical force involves the use of pressure, force, and threats of physical attack to conduct the

needed change, and rests on the belief that people are better influenced if they are physically threatened or attacked. This approach usually appeals to those who are in control of security, such as the military and the police, as well as violent groups. This approach is dangerous, in that it breeds violence and promotes bloodshed, which is unhealthy for human and societal development. The use of political authority, force and power to implement policies or execute plans is often traced to those having political authorities. Status (such as position, wealth, and charisma) and hierarchy in power holding or authority are important considerations here, and this means often draws its might or power from legislations. The means associated with the application of economic threats focuses on the hiring of people to execute policies or programmes, and draws from the assumption that people can be influenced on the grounds of economic considerations. This tool is usually welcomed by those who control the economic power of the societies, such as the wealthy people and corporate organizations. It is, however, anti-democratic and elitist in nature.

The use of advertisements and propaganda is centred on the idea that people can be persuaded through repeatedly bombarding them with the same thing. This means can be controlled and it is often used by corporate organizations and politicians. It is very effective but manipulative in nature, as well as undemocratic, as it can be used to buy people over against their natural intentions. Engineering, as a means, seeks to modify people's socio-physical ambience to influence their view, drawing from the assumption that people will normally adjust their perspective to their environment. This tool is commonly applicable to urban planners, corporate managers, and management consultants. It relies on expertise and specialized knowledge, and gathers its effectiveness in correcting destructive or inefficient vicinity. Rational persuasion drives its objective through arguments anchored on research, facts, and figures, believing that reliable evidence changes people's minds. This method is often appealing to scholars, lawyers, lobbyists, and activists, as it is far reaching in digging down to the root causes and exposure of vital information. However, it is only available to people with specialized knowledge in the field and it is also time consuming, analytical, and detached. The approach involving the use of emotional appeals is directed to the conscience and ideals of people, capitalizing on the assumption that emotional appeals and ideals have a great tendency to sway people. This method is readily utilized by religious and spiritual leaders as well as non-violent activists. The method appeals to people's anger and fears. It is based on the assumption that people can easily be swayed by invoking their fears. The means is readily applied by lawyers, lobbyists, and militant activists. Fellowship and personal support approach operates on the assumption that kindness and communal relationships help people to resolve their conflicts. As such, the method is focused on bringing people together in a warm and communal setting and appeals to the sentiment of harmony.

It is readily used by therapists and activists alike. In the same vein, non-violent confrontation is also readily applicable to activists, especially nonviolent activists, and it is effective, uplifting, and empowering. It seeks to mobilize people to confront the

problem non-violently, drawing from the assumption that nonviolent confrontation can cut through emotional blocks and sway people remarkably.

Change must be conducted in a way that is in line with what the group wants. The group needs to ensure that the actions actually bring results in progressive change. To achieve this, the entire action must be clear and comprehensive, and the information dissemination must be adequate and be done well in advance. There should also be an adequate number of supporters on the ground. Also, the actions need to be visual, simple, and direct, as well as timely and largely domestic or close to home. The current position or issue on the ground must be exposed and should be connected to how harmful it is to the people and how it violates the principles that are largely embraced by the people.

The non-violent group, must thereafter, present a more viable alternative and justify why such an alternative is superior to the one against which it is advocating. The group should also endeavour to capture the summary of the messages in a picture, as this helps to convey a clearer message to those who are ignorant or unaware of the content of the campaign. The group must strive to ensure that people feel comfortable with its actions and conduct, and should commence with moderate tactics and demands that are simpler, consolidating as the support increases. Also, their actions must stay consistent with the ends (i.e. ‘actions and ends consistency concept’ is respected) and such actions must also be viewed as socially acceptable behaviour.

The group needs to incorporate respected and prominent persons to support them, and there must be detailed an explanation on the need and reasons for their actions. These actions need to effectively challenge the status quo or established order, and compel or trigger a response to it. It is sensible to come up with plausible demand that is capable of undermining the status quo, and thus advance structural change that engenders more democratic participation and supports more rational decisions, as well as uplifting people and promoting human security and humanitarian needs. The action may also advance an atmosphere that inspires and encourages people to question authority as well as think for themselves, trust their own opinions, and act according to their own consciences (empowering).

Specific methods of non-violent action

Three categories of methods identified by Sharp (2010: 79) are protest and persuasion, non-cooperation, and intervention. Protest refers to “the act of challenging, resisting, or making demands upon authorities, power holders and/or cultural beliefs and practices by some individuals” (Godwin, 2006: 3). Of the aforementioned categories, protest and persuasion fits into the objective of this research as methods to advocate for alternative approaches represented in infrastructures for peace to institutionalise peace in Nigeria, in the context of the failure of the current approaches by the government to address the problem of violence in the country. This method brings to public view and awareness what the nonviolent group is challenging the government with (Goodwin, 2006: 34), with the aim of garnering more support for the group’s actions. Sharp (2010: 70-81) listed 78 methods of nonviolent campaigns or actions that fall under the category

of protest and persuasion, within which context this research is designed to be carried out. These, according to Sharp (2010: 70-81) include the following:

- Formal statements: These include group or mass petition, public speeches, signed public statements, letters of opposition or support, declaration of indictment and intention, declarations by organizations and institutions.
- Communications with a wider audience: These involve the use of leaflets pamphlets and books, slogans, caricature and symbols, records, radio and television, banners, posters and displayed communications, newspapers and journals, skywriting and earth-writing.
- Symbolic public acts: These involve prayer and worship, display of flags and symbolic colours, protest disrobing, wearing of symbols, delivery symbolic objects, symbolic lights, paint as protest, symbolic sounds, and display of portraits, symbolic reclamations, new signs and names.
- Pressures on individuals: These involve vigils, haunting officials, fraternization, taunting officials.
- Processions: These involve parades, pilgrimage, marches, motorcades and parades.
- Public Assemblies: These involve protest meetings, teach-ins, and assemblies of protest or support and camouflaged meetings of protests, Sharp (2010: 70-81).

Other methods, such as non-cooperation and non-violent intervention, are also effective in bringing about social change. Helvey (2004: 36) described non-cooperation as “withdrawal of cooperation”. Its objective is to make governance tedious for the government, drawing from the fact that no government can survive without the support or the cooperation of the people. It often involves the use of strikes to conduct nonviolent campaigns. Non-cooperation is further subdivided into social non-cooperation, economic non-cooperation and political non-cooperation.

Social non-cooperation is essentially centred on boycotting or shunning officials and supporters of the opposition or regime. The people cut them off from social interactions and, as such, refuse to involve them or associate with them on any social issue. In the case of economic non-cooperation, the intention is to pull down the economic incentives of the regime or opposition, since governments depend on revenue to carry on with their services. This may include non-payment of tax or strikes that generally lead to economic instability. Political non-cooperation is, however, focused at the rejection of the authority of the government, regime, or opposition that is a victim of the nonviolent campaign, thereby affecting the regime’s primary source of power. The use of declarations and manifestos, as well as other documents, to express the rejection of the authority of the regime, including its legitimacy, is utilized in the conviction of the

people that the regime has lost its right to exercise authority. This is then consolidated by the use of civil disobedience to further frustrate the government into disintegration. Specific methods of non-cooperation, compiled by Sharp (2010: 79-86), are contained in table below:

Table 2: Methods of non-cooperation

Ostracism of persons	Non-cooperation with social events, customs & institutions	Withdrawal from social system
Social boycott, selective social boycotts, non-action, ex-communication, interdict	Suspension of social & sport activities, boycott of social affairs, student strikes, social disobedience, withdrawal from social institutions	Stay-at-home, sanctuary, flight of workers, collective disappearance, protest emigration (hijrat)

Source: Sharp, (2010)

Table 3: Methods of economic boycott

Action by consumers	Action by workers & producers	Action by middle-men	Action by owners & management	Action by holders of financial resources	Action by Governments
Consumer's boycott, non-consumption of boycotted goods, policy of austerity, withholding of rent, refusal to rent, national consumers' boycott, international consumers' boycott	Workmen's boycott, producers' boycott	Supplier's and handler's boycott	Trader's boycott, refusal to let or sell property, lockout, refusal of industrial assistance, merchant's "general strike"	Withdrawal of bank deposits, refusal to pay fees, dues & assessment, refusal to pay debts or interest, severance of funds & credit, revenue refusal, refusal of governments money	Domestic embargo, backsliding of traders, international seller's embargo, international buyer's embargo, international trade embargo

Source: Sharp, (2010)

Table 4: Methods of economic non-cooperation via strike

Symbolic strikes	Agricultural strikes	Strikes by special groups	Ordinary industrial strikes	Restricted strikes	Multi-industry strikes
Protest strike, quickie walkout (lightning strike)	Peasant strike, farm workers' strike	Refusal of impressed labour, prisoners strike, craft strike	Establishment strike, industry strike, sympathetic strike	Detailed, limited, selective, & slowdown strikes, strike by resignation, working-rule strike, reporting "sick" (sick-in)	Generalised strike, general strike

Source: (Sharp, 2010)

A method involving combinations of strikes and economic closures is regarded as an economic shutdown. This method of political non-cooperation involves the rejection of authority and is often carried out by withholding or withdrawal of allegiance and refusal of public support, as well as literature and speeches advocating resistance. Further examples of citizen's non-cooperation with the government include boycotting of legislative bodies, elections, government employment and positions, government departments, agencies and other bodies. Additionally, it can include withdrawal from government educational institutions, boycotting of government-supported organizations, refusal of assistance to enforcement agents, removal of own signs and place-marks, refusal to accept appointed officials, and refusal to dissolve existing institutions. Citizens' alternatives to compliance involve reluctant and slow compliance, non-obedience in the absence of direct supervision, popular non-obedience, disguised disobedience, refusal of an assemblage or meeting to disperse, sit-down, non-cooperation with conscription and deportation, hiding, escape, false identities, and civil disobedience of illegitimate laws.

Action by government personnel includes selective refusal of assistance by government aides, blocking of lines of command and information, stalling and obstruction, general administrative non-cooperation, judicial non-cooperation, deliberate inefficiency and selective non-cooperation by enforcement agents, and mutiny. Whilst domestic governmental action often involves quasi-legal evasions and delays and non-cooperation by constituent governmental units, that of international governmental action usually includes changes in diplomatic and other representation, delays and cancellations of diplomatic events, withholding of diplomatic recognition, severance of diplomatic relations, withdrawal from international organizations, refusal of membership in international bodies, and expulsion from international organizations.

Nonviolent intervention is the third method described by Sharp. It basically focuses on disrupting an established structure or policy, and the establishment of new structures or policies. The status quo receives more direct challenges by this method and it is more assaulting and repressive than the other methods previously described. Helvey (2004: 40), further stated that acts of intervention can debilitate and possibly hasten the collapse of the pillars of support of the target object or structure, if is guided by a well suited strategy and plans.

Strategic planning for nonviolent social change

The design and adoption of an effective strategy can strongly influence the success of non-violent struggle (Sharp, 2003: 19). Strategic non-violent action involves engaging in non-violent struggle in a manner that ensures the freedom of the people from the challenges with which they are confronted. It increases the chances of success and enables the non-violent group to channel their strength in the direction of their set goals and objectives (Sharp, 2003: 19). Strategic planning commences with clear or obvious objectives drawn from policy goals. Its efficacy is anchored on plans with "clear intent, keeping mission consistent with capabilities, providing attention to detail, and anticipating responses by the opponent" (Helvey, 2004: 76). It is important to calculate

the course of action required to bring about effect a transition from the status quo to the desirable future state (Sharp, 2010: 40).

Sharp (2003: 19-20) emphasises that the nonviolent group must have a correct understanding of the entire context in which the nonviolent struggle operates, and of which its action is directed. Also, the group must be able to recognize the natural distinction between where the group is and where the group desires to be, including that the group must be able to evaluate possible obstacles to the attainment of its set goals, as well as factors that facilitate their actions. It must be able to assess both the strengths and weaknesses of their opponent(s) and third parties, as well as the advantages and limitations of the latent or possible course of action it chooses to adopt. The group must select a viable course from its existing list of alternatives or options or rather come up with a different one entirely. The group should be able to identify a general action plan, which will eventually inform the actual method and tactics of operation for the realization of the key goal, involving the steps required to implement the strategic plan. Sharp (2003: 20) has named grand strategy, strategy, tactics and methods as different levels of planning and action.

Grand strategy

Sharp described grand strategy as the general idea that coordinates, drives, and directs the entire resources for the attainment of the objective(s) of the non-violent group and/or the opponent. It involves an evaluation of the justification for the plan of action, factors that may sway the situation, and the choice of the technique for the operation, as well as the allotment of tasks and resources for the struggle (2003: 20). Strategy is focused on how to achieve the set of objective(s) in the best way. It is the rolled out plan for the practical action, designed to distribute, adapt, and apply the means available for the realization of the set objective. Strategy is the key conception of how to develop the campaign in a way that promotes the compatibility of the various components connected together, so as to achieve the desired objective for the struggle. When choosing a strategy, Jackson (2015: 2) opined that a resistance or nonviolent group should choose the strategy that the group believes will be most successful. Bob (2005: 1) further suggests that considering what strategy will attract the most internal and external support is one of the main ways the nonviolent or resistance group will attempt to ensure success. Strategy is operated within the context of grand strategy and considers the result of each action, as well as involves the design's wider action plans, and considers what is required for the attainment of success with the chosen technique.

Strategy

The key considerations for the design of strategy for nonviolent action according to Sharp (2003: 21) include the following:

The objective(s) of the group:

The objectives of the nonviolent group must be clearly spelled out, so as to guide and help the group stay focus on its goal.

The objective(s), resources and strength of the opponent:

It is important for the nonviolent group to investigate the objective, resources, and strength of the opponent, and compare the findings to theirs. This will help the group to know whether it will be able to sustain the nonviolent struggle (Sharp: 2003: 21) as well as have idea of the resources and strength required to defeat the opponent.

The place and role of third parties:

The support of the third party is important in the nonviolent action of the group, (Sharp: 2003: 21). However, the role of the third party must be well defined in the struggle in order to establish when, how and where the third party support is needed most.

Courses and means of action of the opponents:

Nonviolent group needs to identify the courses and means of action of the opponent, in order to be able to plan properly and implement strategies to defeat the opponent.

Courses and means of actions of the nonviolent group:

Nonviolent group must work to evaluate the course and means of its action. This will enable it to know what is available and what need to be introduced to counter the opponent and win the struggle.

The techniques and requirements for success cum dynamics and mechanisms of change:

It is important for the nonviolent group to develop techniques required for achieving success in the nonviolent struggle, (Sharp, 2003: 21). It needs to examine the dynamics and mechanisms of change with a view to applying the right techniques and mechanisms to bring about the needed social change.

Tactics:

Tactics and the method of nonviolent action are crucial in the implementation of the strategy. Protest tactics, according to Staggenborg (2015: 1), have been used by many social movements to bring about social change. Tactics can be described as a narrow or limited plan of action, which is anchored on the idea of how best to use the means available to advance a given struggle in order to attain, as part of a broader strategy, the restricted objective. It is concerned with limited action within the framework of strategy, which in turn is operational within the context of grand strategy. Tactics are best suited for shorter time duration, applicable in a smaller area in terms of geography or institution, and by a limited number of people, as well as for more narrow objectives. Sharp (2003: 21) noted that a tactic is comprehended within the overall strategy of a campaign and how the group shall act in a given situation, as well as being largely concerned with the application of a method of action of the non-violent group. Methods can therefore be

described as a particular “means of action within the technique of non-violent struggle” (Sharp, 2003: 22).

The Campaign to Ban Landmines

The Ottawa process or the negotiation of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention brought forth a ‘new model of diplomacy’ involving non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and governments in a cooperative working relationship. The International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) commenced in 1991 “when representatives of two NGOs - the Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation in Washington DC, and Medico International in Frankfurt, began to commune with the aim of cooperating to organize support for specific mine victim assistance projects” (Mekata, 2000: 145). According to Thomson and Reuters Foundation (2013: 1), it was until 1992 that the movement to outlaw the weapons of landmine and cluster munitions fully took off, following the formation of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) by a group of humanitarian activists.

The ICBL adopted a non-violent action approach in its campaign and advocacy to ban the use of anti-personnel mines. Methods of nonviolent action were used at various levels, including in protests at meetings of government leaders or international bodies (Martins, 2015: 538). The ability of ICBL to build a network of hundreds of organizations (Hubert, 2000: 8) into its non-violent campaign was critical to the success of the project. The flexibility in the network, or structures adopted by the network of organizations involved in the campaign, created space for the organizations to adopt strategies suitable to their unique environments.

The multi-dimensional approach to the campaign added colours to the quality of the advocacy, as it drew the attention of NGOs, individual experts, the ICRC, states, and multi-lateral organizations, as participants in the campaign. Furthermore, the network included groups who were focused on human rights, humanitarian assistance, children, peace, disability, veterans, medical support, mine action, development, arms control, religion, the environment, and women..

The various groups regularly shared political strategies, campaign activities, achievements, and ideas on how to address challenges, and saw “dialogue and learning as an important way” (Allen, 2015) of moving forward. More importantly, “instead of being each other’s adversaries, governments and civil society decided to work together toward achieving a common goal” (Brinkert, 2003: 784). Some of the specific nonviolent campaign methods, mechanisms, and strategic planning implemented in the campaign to ban landmines include “preparation of expert studies, mass promotional material, lobbying of government from below, and representation at or around inter-governmental conferences” Hubert (2002: xi). The multiple strategies utilized in the campaign included a combination of knowledge-based efforts at persuasion and lobbying, while protest and persuasion remained the general nonviolent methods adopted for the campaign.

The qualities that the campaigns generally shared included credibility (drawing from the practical experience of experts working on mine issues), co-ordination (unity of

action), pressure and persuasion (enhanced decision-maker awareness of the magnitude of the issue), division of labour (exploited comparative advantages of various organisations involved in the campaign), building from below (employed regional meetings and grouping for grassroots access), and building partnerships between humanitarian advocates and states who were sympathetic to the cause. The organizations involved in the campaign had both the legitimacy and experience required to bring about the right strategies for norm compliance. The campaign successfully forged alliances with like-minded groups and states to propel the campaign to maximum success. ICBL ensured proper mobilisation of participants, as it remained fully aware that a successful campaign needs to be able to mobilise participants. According to Jackson (2015: 5), “one key mobilisation tool is organisational capacity and the ability to effectively communicate with a campaign’s potential base support”, and ICBL was robust in this.

The conclusion of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) created opportunity for further diplomatic initiatives. The opportunity was readily explored by pro-ban states and civil society organisations to advance the campaigns. Also, the willingness of political leaders in the core states of the campaign to take diplomatic risk, such as, the announcement of the proposal to sign the convention to ban anti-personnel mines at the end of 1997, by Lloyd Axworthy (the then Canadian Foreign Minister), during the October 1996 strategy conference, helped to re-generate the required energy, passion and drive for the campaign. Furthermore, the ability to draw on the taboo against biological and chemical weapons was significant in bringing to fore the mine ban norm, of which failure would have resulted in difficulties in the construction of similar norms for anti-personnel landmines.

In addition, rather than that of disarmament, the position of the campaign against anti-personal mines was framed as a humanitarian issue, giving room for the norm to be built on existing humanitarian principles. According to MacFarlane (2000: 5) “the humanitarian imperative is best served, not by avoiding the political process, but by consciously engaging it”. One striking part of this aspect was the flexibility at which different organisations found various bases to support the campaigns, drawing from their own organisational mandates. For instance, Human Rights Watch (HRW) and the ICRC regarded “landmines as a human rights and humanitarian law issue, while groups such as Medico International, Physicians for Human Rights and Handicap International saw it as a medical and public health issue, while others, such as the Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation, saw it as a matter of dealing with the consequence of war in a social and developmental sense” (Anderson, 2000: 150).

Furthermore, the tactic of “moral leverage politics of producing a shaming list - The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly-” (Clarke, 2008: 6-7), which enlisted the countries that produced, stockpiled and/or used landmines, was an impressive one for the campaign, as many governments initiated lobbying to have their countries included on the “good” list. This drew more support for the campaign to ban landmines, as well as strengthened the ICBL tactic of shaming to induce norm adoption. The moral leverage was further strengthened by the use of symbolic politics that involved the utility of visual tools such as the creation of shoe piles, representing the lost limbs of landmine victims to underscore

the humanitarian impact of landmines (Clarke, 2008: 6-7). Finally, the simple, easily understood message – a complete and comprehensive ban of the campaign, nothing more and nothing less-- further added value to the overall work.

Finally, another interesting dimension of the humanitarian advocacy is connected to the campaign messaging, the nature of the objectives, and the ways issues were framed (Cave et al., 2006: 63). ICBL coined a simple and easily understood message of a complete and comprehensive ban, nothing more and nothing less. Whilst national campaigns focused the twin objectives of increasing public awareness on the danger of mines and lobbying of government officials to support complete ban, the effective use of “visual media including travelling photograph exhibits, video highlighting the impact of mines, and televised documentaries” (Cave et al., 2006: 32) were not unrecognised as viable tactics that contributed to the success achieved.

The issue of landmines caught the attention of many people around the world. The growth in the consciousness and need among individuals and NGOs to ban anti-personnel mines further stimulated ICBL action. The ICBL’s committed attention to domestic campaigns and raising the consciousness of NGOs on the issue, as well as encouraging national campaigns in different countries, in order to share their strategies and activities.

Individuals and NGOs worked collaboratively together towards ensuring remarkable progress was made in the campaign and lobbying. The initiative in the United States was heralded alongside with other NGOs by Senator Leahy, who also wrote to Handicap International France to keep pressurizing the French Government to call for a CCW conference and review Protocol II (Mekata, 2000: 149). With support from other civil societies, Handicap International succeeded in persuading France to request a CCW review conference in February 1993. The 1993 United Nations General Assembly’s forty-eighth session led to the adoption of a resolution calling for a review conference of the CCW. Belgium became the first country in the world to ban the production, stockpiling, trade, and use of anti-personnel mines. Whilst Belgium imposed a ban in March 1995, Norway followed suit in June 1995. Handicap International played a key role in promoting Belgian parliamentary consciousness and action on the issue. The 1995 CCW conference was held in Vienna and concluded without amending Protocol II, but rescheduled a meeting of technical matters in January 1996 and the Review Conference in March 1996. The opportunity offered by the Review Conference was capitalized upon by the ICBL in lobbying the government delegates with a demonstrated expertise and confidence, and this further helped to fortify the relationship between governments and NGOs, in addition to consolidating the credibility of ICBL on the mines problem.

Following the signals that the CCW negotiation might not succeed in securing a comprehensive ban on landmines, a spirited effort in favour of the ban began to build up from the outside, and increased interaction between government and civil society within the context further opened up cooperation between pro-ban governments and the ICBL during the Ottawa process. The first NGO-government meeting was organised by the Dutch campaign in Geneva on the 17th of January 1996, (Cave et. al, 2006: 55). In October 1996, Canada also hosted a government meeting with a focus on how to ban and forge a ban agenda in Ottawa. In attendance were about fifty governments and twenty-

four observer states, the ICBL, UN agencies, and the ICRC. Lloyd Axworthy invited participants of the Ottawa meeting to return to Ottawa in December 1997 to sign a treaty, and also expressed the willingness of Canada to work with the ICBL in an open partnership.

The September 1997 Oslo meeting, which came up ahead of the December meeting, provided a forum on whether there should be a total ban on landmines or whether states that were not yet ready for a total ban should be accommodated in the new treaty. This opportunity afforded countries like Japan, the United States, and Australia to attempt a modification to the text, but the core group of states supporting the ban resisted such efforts, leading to the withdrawal of the proposal by the United States at the very last minute. This led to the adoption of the text in September 1997. The Mine Ban Convention was then finally signed by 122 countries in December 1997 during a special ceremony in Ottawa. By 2007, about 155 countries had signed the treaty. ICBL has been relentless in its proactive and ongoing engagement, and this has contributed to the growth of the mine ban community to 159 members in 2012, with South Sudan and Tuvalu joining the treaty in 2011, while Finland acceded in January 2012 (*Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor*, 2011: 3).

Campaigns to ban cluster munitions

The approach to the campaign to ban cluster munitions could be said to assume a similar pattern to that of anti-personnel mines. The Cluster Munitions Campaign (CMC) imitated the ICBL basic structure, in that it also has a semi-hierarchical structure with a campaign coordinator and a steering committee that is drawn from selected member organisations that constitute the CMC members. There is also no central office or permanent secretariat for the said structure saddled with the onus to manage the campaign.

The said hierarchical structure, coupled with unity of purpose, helped to promote coherence in CMC communication strategy. Furthermore, the characteristics of the movement and the issue allowed CMC to reframe cluster munitions in humanitarian rather than military terms (Clarke, 2008: 11), as a weapon type with serious humanitarian and socio-economic impact (Cave et al., 2006: 1). The success of these strategies was in the short term manifested in the reversal of the British government's position on the issue of the cluster munitions ban, which in May 2008 recognised the unacceptable harm to civilians by the weapons against its initial stand, which opposed the full ban of cluster munitions. The strategy, which also caught the acceptance of many other states, culminated in the adoption of the Convention on Cluster Munitions in 2010.

Like the ICBL, the CMC also adopted multiple mechanisms which, among others, included the use of mass promotional materials and the preparation of expert studies. These multiple strategies further included lobbying, and knowledge-based efforts, among others, while protests and persuasion was the nonviolent method adopted for the campaign. The expert meeting-- put together in 1994 by the ICRC on certain weapon systems and the execution of mechanisms in international law to deal with the cluster

munitions-- marked the beginning of the journey towards the prohibition of cluster munitions. However, government interest and proactive approaches in handling the humanitarian effects of cluster munitions and other Explosive Remnant of War (ERW) did not pick up until appreciable collaboration between NGOs and ICRC was established. The use of cluster munitions in Kosovo and the increased consciousness of the humanitarian effects of ERW further spiced up the mobilization and activism. The explosive remnants of war posed a big challenge for those working in post conflict areas, and it also became more obvious that the ERW problem in Kosovo was more evident than in places such as Sudan, Iraq, and Afghanistan (Human Rights Watch, 2002), and was even seen in some places as a greater humanitarian problem than landmines.

This development contributed to the build-up of momentum among NGOs, with the influential actors during the Mine Ban Convention calling for a moratorium on the use of cluster munitions. These NGOs also published their impacts alongside other remnants of war, as done by the case of the ICRC (Human Rights Watch, 2002). The ICRC meeting in Nylon, Switzerland in 2000 drew attendance of governmental experts and other experts. The meeting's goal was to be incorporated in 2001, during Geneva's second review conference of the CCW (ICRC, 2000) talk on the explosive remnants of war. This creative blending of field-based evidence and political campaigning, as well as lobbying, perfectly fitted into the framework of the CCW. The Netherlands, together with 24 other co-sponsoring states, came up with a proposal during the December 2000 preparatory committee meeting, ahead of the 2001 Review Conference, that the issue of explosive remnants of war be addressed at the conference (Wiebe, 2003: 101-102).

Landmine Action and Mine Action Canada are two NGOs that worked together from 2001 to 2003, with support from the ICRC, to raise awareness or consciousness about ERW among other campaigners on the margin of landmine meetings. There was also support to awareness raising by informal Australian papers, which "highlighted the post-conflict problems caused by Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) and cluster munitions" (Herby and Nuiten, 2001: 195) There was also the launching of other campaigns, including the clear up campaign in the United Kingdom: Landmine Action and the Diana, Princess of Wales Memorial Fund, and a global petition for a call for action on cluster munitions, as well as other Explosive Remnants of War (ERW).

The involvement of more NGOs on the matter led to the formation of a loose coalition in April 2003. The coalition, christened Cluster Munitions Coalition (CMC), was officially launched in November 2003 in an event organised in the Hague, hosted by Pax Christi Netherlands, and funded by the Dutch Government. This event, together with the Irish Government-funded 2003 conference in Dublin on Explosive Remnants of War and Development by Pax Christ Ireland, became the first clear interaction on the issue between governments and NGOs.

The campaign received support from the Dutch Government. Consequently, it initiated annual meetings in the Netherlands with selected NGOs and state representatives. The interest shown by pro-ban states led to their regular invitations to be part of series of informal meetings organised by the NGOs. Others who were also part of such meetings were Human Rights Watch, Landmine Action, and Mines Action Canada.

Protocol V was, however, adopted in 2003. Of immense value in the education of states on ERW was the field-based research that the NGOs, United Nations, and the International Committee of the Red Cross injected into the process, while individuals also played important roles too. The Australian Ambassador (Ambassador Luck) and Indian Ambassador (Ambassador Rakesh Sood) played vital roles in ensuring goodwill among states so as to achieve a reasonable outcome on ERW. Vital in the securing of relevant protocol was the role of the Netherlands Ambassador and the CCW coordinator, who brought about divergent state positions. The protocol was viewed as a significant addendum to international humanitarian law and its efforts to mitigate the negative impact resulting from unexploded and abandoned ordnances.

The campaign to ban cluster munitions, which started in 2003, eventually culminated in the adoption of the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) in 2007. However, it was not until 2010 that the Convention on Cluster Munitions entered into force, while the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Treaty entered into force in 1999. Among the parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions, Spain was the first signatory to complete stockpile destruction. Spain was also a party to the Amended Protocol II on landmines and Protocol V on explosive remnants of war. The efforts of the Cluster Munitions Campaign at universalising the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM), has continued to gather momentum and, as of 2011, 15 signatories had ratified the CCM, while three non-signatories acceded. This development, therefore, brought the total number of ‘states parties’ to 67 at the end of 2011, as the transnational advocacy for the ban of landmine and cluster munitions continued to enjoy support. According to Clarke (2008: 5), “the success of trans-national advocacy campaign in the realm of human security is strongly correlated with the substantive characteristics of the issue itself, the individual and structural level attributes of the advocacy coalition involved and the dynamics of the partnership between this coalition and like-minded state actors”. Indeed, the adoption of the Convention on Cluster Munitions in 2010 represents a fruitful reward emerging from the campaign to ban cluster munitions.

From nonviolent struggle to negotiated settlement: the Liberian experience

Nonviolence has a rich history. Over the years, nonviolent actions have been known to largely contribute to bringing about various desired specific changes, and challenge social norms and unjust authorities. A number of examples exist, from Gandhi’s nonviolent struggle against British rule in India that led to India’s independence in 1947, and Martin Luther King Jr.’s struggle to win civil rights for African Americans in the United States, to the Arab Spring uprising of 2011 (Nepstad, 2015: 1). Cesar Chavez’s nonviolent campaigns against the treatment of farm workers in California in 1960, and the uprising in Indonesia against President Suharto, as well as the French Huguenot resistance in the era of World War II, are a few other examples. However, what seems not to have enjoyed much attention in the practice of nonviolent struggle is the challenge of social change after a ruler is deposed (Martins, 2015: 537). It is, however, on records that a number of nonviolent struggles led to specific changes.

Leymah Gbowee led a nonviolent women's movement in Liberia, demonstrating how the nonviolent struggle moves into a process to produce a specific change. In the quest to bring about desired change, practitioners of nonviolence use diverse and creative methods. They sought to create conditions for just, peaceful, and sustainable societies that meet the needs of all people. This is largely anchored on the recognition that we all have a shared human identity and that life is valuable in and of itself.

The nonviolent campaign of Leymah Gbowee and a group of Liberian women helped to achieve peace in Liberia after 14 years of civil war. *Pray the Devil Back to Hell*, a 2008 documentary, chronicles the remarkable story of the Liberian women who came together to end a bloody civil war and bring peace to their shattered country. The first civil war in Liberia broke out in 1989 while the second civil war broke out in 1999. Over 250 people were killed in Liberia and many women were violated by militias as a result of the war.

When the war subsided, Leyman Gbowee gathered Liberian women for nonviolent protests. The Women of Liberia Mass Action for Peace commenced with a few local women praying and singing in a fish market. It eventually became a mass movement with thousands of Christian and Muslim Liberian women. They gathered in Monrovia for months in defiance of Charles Taylor, who was the country's president at the time. Their actions further resonate "how moral clarity, persistence and bravery to raise voices against war and restore sanity to land" (Gbowee & Mithers, 2011: x) is significant to the attainment of desired change of nonviolent action. To ensure they stood out, they wore white t-shirts and head scarves, organized prayers for peace and handed out flyers with inscriptions, "We are tired! We are tired of our children being killed! We are tired of being raped! Women, wake up – you have a voice in the peace process!" (Gbowee & Mithers, 2011) For the sake of women who could not read, some of the flyers had only simple drawings. The staged protests the women organized also involved the threat of a sex strike, as they resolved to deny their partners sex until they stopped fighting, laid down their weapons, and made peace.

Their actions eventually led Charles Taylor to grant the women, about 2,000 of them, a hearing on April 23, 2003. In her speech during the hearing, Leyman Gbowee said, "They were tired of war, of running, of begging for bulgur wheat, and of their children being raped" (Gbowee & Mithers, 2011). She added that they were taking the stand to secure the future of their children, because they believed, as custodians of society, tomorrow their children will ask, 'Mama, what was your role during the crisis?' (Gbowee & Mithers, 2011). In the process of the meeting or hearing, the women succeeded in their plan to pressure Charles Taylor into promising to attend peace talks in Ghana. The women indeed manifested the virtues of faith and courage in conducting their nonviolent action, and as expressed by Leymah "if you have unshakeable faith in yourself, in your sisters and in the possibility of change, you can do almost anything" (Gbowee & Mithers, 2011: 230). The Women of Liberia Mass Action for Peace was very much conscious of the fact that the "success of campaign is due in large part to excellent grassroots organization" (Jackson, 25: 2), as their campaign structure was organized to ensure effective mobilization of grassroots participants.

Though the Ghana peace talks took some months before they came up, the women remained consistent in their nonviolent action during the peace talks, with Leymah again leading a sit-in with hundreds of Liberian women at the hotel where the peace talks were taking place. They worked together to take action to improve their lives as the women stayed sitting in the hallway, held signs, screamed silently, and held the delegates hostage. At a point when the men wanted to leave the hall (after General Abdulsalami Abubakar, former Nigerian head of state, who led the peace talks, announced in amusement that Leymah and her troops had seized the hallway), the women threatened to rip off their clothes. Knowing full well that in Africa, it is a curse for a married or elderly woman to deliberately bare herself, the men stayed back in the hall. With the support of Abdulsalami Abubakar, who was sympathetic to the women, they were allowed to sit outside the negotiating room during the following days, as they ensured the "atmosphere at the peace talks changed from circus-like to somber", (Gbowee & Mithers, 2011: 163), enabling a peace agreement to be reached.

The signing of the Accra Comprehensive Peace Agreement on 18 August 2003 brought a new dawn to Liberia because the war came to an end in a matter of weeks after the signing of the agreement that also saw Charles Taylor went into exile in Nigeria. The experience further brought to fore the importance of nonviolent action as a rewarding means to seek social change, and, according to Nepstad (2015: 1), win political goals, since "tyranny will never succeed and goodness will always vanquish evil" (Gbowee & Mithers, 2011: 229).

The important roles played towards achieving social change for peace in Liberia by Liberian President, Ellen Sirleaf, and peace and women's rights activist, Leymah Gbowee, earned them-- alongside Yemeni democracy activist, Tawukul Karman-- the 2011 Nobel Peace Prize.

Conclusion

Synergy building was critical to the progress made during the ICBL and CMC campaigns and advocacy to ban landmines and cluster munitions. For instance, both the International Campaign to Ban Landmine (ICBL) and the Cluster Munitions Campaign (CMC) began their operations under one structure in 2011. In both ICBL and CMC campaigns the framing of the advocacy or campaign issues as being humanitarian, and the coalition among stakeholders as well as the strategies and tactics adopted for the campaigns largely contributed to the success recorded in the project.

The campaigns to ban anti-personnel mines and cluster munitions are clear cases of international non-violent campaigns that shared similar strategies, tactics, and structures in carrying out their international advocacy. A number of the methods of the campaign were in line with what Gene Sharp described in the methods and approaches required for nonviolent campaigns. The campaigns indeed showed that consistency and persistency as well as unity are not only important attributes, but also largely rewarding in the attainment of target results. These attributes also came into play in the Liberian nonviolent campaign that led to the negotiated exit of Charles Taylor, brought the civil

war to an end and promoted democracy in the land, freedom from the claws of a dictator, and peace for the Liberian people. These are crucial lessons for every nonviolent campaign and advocacy group.

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