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Warriors or Peace Soldiers?

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Abstract

This article explores Danish soldiers' behavior in a Danish battalion involved in the UN Kosovo peace operation. The questions in focus are how Danish soldiers understand the objectives of a peace operation and how this affects their behavior. The soldiers' practices are documented through a sampling of participatory observations and interviews using grounded theory. The conceptual level of analysis, using symbolic interactionism, points to the military organization's habituation to war-fighting as problematic if deployed in a peace operation.

Introduction

Starting with the UN Charter in 1945 a new type of conflict management operation came into being, and so peace operations in the period from 1945 until today have had to develop new sets of concepts, language, policy, organization, and new types of enrollment, preparation and conflict-behavior of soldiers (Pugh, 1997; Boulden, 2001; Tardy, 2004; Kaldor, 2007).

The first generation UN peace operations (1945–1989) were defined and are described as symmetric non-coercive state-state operations with the objective to keep an approved ceasefire after a period of war (Tardy, 2004; Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, Miall, 2005). After the Cold War the pattern in international conflicts was shifting from symmetric to asymmetric conflicts. The number of peace operations grew and new objectives were included. In reality the second generation UN peace operations (1989-1999) were state-society operations with the objective to intervene *in* civil wars (Boulden, 2001: 83; Duffield 2001; Tardy 2004). Consequently the goals of the new peace operations became much more complex than maintaining a ceasefire (Dobbie 1994; Ramsbotham, 2005; Tardy, 2004).

Because of this, the third generation UN peace operations (1999 onwards) have had a focus on internal conflicts which are seen as the causes of larger state conflicts and terror – termed as the root causes (Tardy, 2004). The conflict scenario is thus changing into a state–culture scenario (Kaldor, 1998; Duffield, 2001; Ramsbotham, 2005; Sen, 2008; Pretorius, 2008: 100; Maguen, 2006). This means that deep cultural and religious identity processes become part of the asymmetric conflict. Instead of visible military capacities, soldiers are confronted by blurry cultural symbols, behavior and languages

they don't understand, and they themselves perform cultural practices which the local populations, in turn, don't understand (Duffey, 2000; Rubinstein, 2008; Rosén, 2009).

Contrary to this development, soldiers are still recruited, trained and socialized for an armed defence of a native country, a process which has a deep impact on the professional identity of the single soldier and on the military organization as a whole (Stouffer, 1965[1949]; Janowitz, 1971[1960]; Moskos, 1970 and 1976; Abrahamsson, 1971). And still, even if the military is trained for nation-based war-fighting, it is this institution which carries out the peace operations for the UN.

This development raises questions such as: How do the cultural gestures, signs, significant symbols and rituals of the different national military systems construct the everyday life and the identities of the soldiers in peace operations and additionally, how are local codes, gestures, signs, symbols and habituated everyday life practices interpreted by the UN peace soldiers?

To be able to answer these questions a field study was carried out among Danish soldiers in the early phase of the UN Kosovo peace operation, a runner out of the conflict between Former Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) and Kosovo-Albanians self-government. This article presents the empirical findings of this field study and also the analysis of the concepts, vocabulary and behavior of the soldiers.

The Conflict

When the president of FRY, Slobodan Milosevic, in 1989 suspended the autonomy of the Kosovo-Albanians self-government, going back to 1974, this triggered a serious political crisis between the Serbs and the Kosovo-Albanians, which escalated into a civil-war-like situation. In order to stop a human catastrophe the UN Security Council condemned all acts of violence taking place. The Security Council also stated that the situation formed a threat to the peace and security in the region. Negotiations between the parties were taking place in Rambuillet.

After the collapse of the Rambuillet and Paris negotiations in March 1999, NATO started an intensive bombing campaign. On the 4th of May President Milosevic proposed negotiations. The 10th of June the military negotiations were concluded and the parties signed a contract, which in reality was a plan for the FRY Armed Forces to withdraw from Kosovo and for NATO to deploy forces. NATO ended its air attacks after 78 days.

The same day the UN Security Council passed the resolution 1244, and the night between the 11th and 12th of June the first Russian Armed Forces arrived to the capital of Kosovo and 12th of June 1999 British Armed Forces reached Pristina.

The Resolution 1244

The UN resolution 1244, which the Security Council passed, established a framework for the operation in Kosovo and included both a civilian and a military 'pillar'. The UN peace enforcement operation was named Kosovo Force, (KFOR), and the name of the operation was: 'Operation Joint Guardian'. The KFOR consisted mainly

of NATO forces and it was deployed under one central command. Following the definitions above, the KFOR can be considered to be the first third generation peace operation, a 'peace enforcement' operation.

The task of KFOR was to ensure a secure human environment, so that refugees and internally displaced persons could return safely to their homes. KFOR should also secure, order and freedom of movement for all NGO's which brought aid to Kosovo.

The KFOR-organization

KFOR was built by five multi-national brigades, each with a 'lead-nation' that was responsible for the deployment of the brigade. The lead-nations were: the United States of America, Great Britain, France, Germany and Italy.

All 14 NATO-countries have contributed, but other countries such as Russia, Sweden, Finland, The United Arabic Emirates, Ukraine and Morocco have contributed as well. The contributions were typically of the size of a battalion with its associated support functions: in average 800-1000 soldiers.

The Danish Parliamentary Decision

In its Parliamental decision, B148 of 17th of June, 1999 the Danish Parliament sanctioned that Danish forces were to be deployed in a multi-national force in Kosovo. Originally the Danish involvement comprised of a reduced infantry battalion of about 875 soldiers. This battalion consisted of a staff, a staff company, two armored infantry companies, a tank squadron, a logistics company and signal, engineer and military police units. Additionally, there was a national support element, which was located at the Skopje airport in Macedonia. The battalion was composed of elements from the Danish International Brigade. It was the first time that a battalion of the brigade was activated for a task of this type.

The Danish Battalion

The Danish battalion (DANBAT/KFOR) was part of the French brigade, which in 2001 consisted of approximately 8,600 soldiers. The brigades in KFOR were under operational control of Commander KFOR (COMKFOR), which in turn was subject to NATO-Chief of the Allied Forces Southern Europe. Geographically, the Danish force was located in the northern part of Kosovo. The terrain in this area is hilly and in places impassable. The Danish area of responsibility extended from the outskirts of Mitrovica to the border between Kosovo and Serbia.

The Danish forces were at first placed in two camps; one called Camp Olaf Rye and another called Camp Holger Danish. In January/February 2000 the battalion was reduced to approximately 820 soldiers. In connection with the subsequent rotation of team 2 and 3 in the beginning of August, the battalion was further reduced to approximately 730 soldiers. By the rotation of team 3 and 4 in February 2001, the

battalion was again reduced to approximately 510 soldiers and the Camp Holger Danske was closed. The size of the Danish Force was continually reduced until Camp Olaf Rye was closed in 2009. By 2012, 5 officers are serving in KFOR headquarters.

Method

The participant observations were carried out in the DANBAT/KFOR battalion as a whole, but the majority of the observations were carried out in the attached mechanized infantry company and in its different sub-organizational situations: at observation posts and check points; platoon on alert, in mobile check points; patrols; and company and battalion briefings.

The selected soldiers observed for the duration of the whole deployment were a private first class, a sergeant, a first lieutenant, a major and a colonel. The 5 soldiers were carefully chosen to produce a representative cross section of the organization in terms of purpose, agency, position, function, organization, leadership and institution (n=5). Supplemental interviews were carried out with 21 (n=21) of the 130 infantry KFOR soldiers, total n=26. These interviews were carried out as a consequence of the situations and of recommendations.

All of the selected soldiers were observed for a week, at the end of which they were interviewed. The observations and interviews were repeated thrice as the field was observed in three different periods of time during the deployment. By following a specific soldier the field observations were taken to places and situations which could not have been designed in advance by the researcher.

The interviews were all of the open-ended variety, and were all open to enable in-depth exploration of concepts and experiences which appeared during the week of participant observation. Each interview began with open questions asking about the private life of the civil person and the transition-process in becoming a soldier. Often this resulted in spontaneous introductive narratives, which did not need much guidance. This opening also led to a situation of some privacy and trust, which were noticed in the expressions of personal opinions, critique or suggestions. All interviews were audio-captured, transcribed, and later analyzed. An interview lasted for 1½ hours.

Beside participant observations, interviews and taking part in the every-day life in a military barrack over a period of 6 months, data was obtained by gathering official documents of the field, by taking photographs and by down-loading a range of battalions' home pages. The participant observations were all written down or recorded. Recordings cover around 200 hours. Approximately 500 photos were taken.

Following the methodology of grounded theory research, the sampling process was recursive and iterative: "In grounded theory the analyst induces patterns of relationships suggested by data, and they emerge with theoretical codes to relate them" (Glaser, 1992, p. 84). First data is collected in the field, and then coding is started, "constantly comparing incident to incident and incident to codes, while analysing and generating theory. When the theory seems sufficiently grounded in a core variable and in

an emerging integration of categories and properties, then the researcher may begin to review the literature in the substantive field and relate the literature to his own work in many ways" (Glaser, 1992:32). In using this approach, major themes, categories, and gaps in knowledge were identified. As knowledge was gained, more diverse samples were pushed for, in order to shed further light on aspects less known. The recursive process continued until saturation, when no new categories or concepts were emerging, and the sampling was terminated.

At this point, when the emerging theory was firmly grounded and showing its core variable "and in an emerging integration of categories and properties, then the researcher may begin to review the literature in the substantive field and relate the literature to his own work in many ways. Thus scholarship in the same area starts after the emerging theory is sufficiently developed so the researcher is firm on his discovery and will not be forced or preconceived by concepts" (Glaser, 1992: 32).

From this point the "conceptualization going on in grounded theory automatically leaves the time and place of this unit. The theory is no longer generalized to a unit, but to a process which goes on in many other similar units. The higher level of conceptualization of the data makes for a higher level of generalization. (...) The talk in the theory is now of concepts, not units, people or descriptions" (Glaser, 1998: 137). This is where this study has chosen to start integrating and using the concepts from symbolic interactionism.

Symbolic interactionism was used in the analysis as it emphasizes human agency, consciousness, meaning, and process, and because the pragmatist orientation of symbolic interactionism complements the participant observation of field studies.

The basic conceptual framework of symbolic interactionism, which is a term coined by Herbert Blumer (Blumer, 1969: 1; 8) about the studies of the subjective aspects of people's social lives as they continually adjust their behavior to the actions of other people, can be said to have its absolute point of departure in the philosophical pragmatism of Aristotle. Aristotle contended that human learning and knowing is predicated on people's organic capacities for sensory experiences. Consequently Aristotle defined the humanly experienced world as in language, activities and objects which necessitates a pragmatist appreciation (Prus in Reynolds, 2003: 19-38).

The key representatives of German idealism which also influenced symbolic interactionism were Friedrick Von Schelling, Johann Gottlieb Fichte, and George W. F. Hegel, with Immanuel Kant also exerting an influence. Schelling as well as Fichte argued that humans produce the worlds that they inhabit. The thinking of Schelling and Fichte led them to conclude that the human world is a world of its own making, an objectified world of meaning and living, and that form and perception had no humanely existence prior to their objects. The same argument was carried by Hegel, who influenced the thinking and theories of John Dewey and Josiah Royce. On their side both Dewey and Royce influenced the views of Mead, which means that indirectly the thinking of German idealism and the thinking of Hegel and influenced symbolic interactionism (Prus in Reynolds, 2003: 19-38; Reynolds, 2003: 39-58).

The pragmatist tradition was also influenced by nineteenth-century variants of

German social theory like Dilthey, Simmel, Weber, and Wundt. Especially Dilthey with his concept of *Verstehen* (Gulddal and Møller, 1999: 22) appears as an extraordinary intellectual forerunner to the pragmatist tradition as represented by Mead.

The most influential publication on pragmatism for the social sciences has been George Herbert Meads *Mind, Self and Society*. In working with facets of the wider interpretivist tradition related with Dilthey, Dewey, and others, Mead addressed the matters of speech, objects, and language in an attempt to accurately conceptualize group life "in the making" (Mead, 1934).

Even if the different philosophies and theories of symbolic interactionism disagree on different concepts or research procedures, some core concepts can be reached, and that is that symbolic interaction is based on the following assumptions: a) that communication requires the use of shared symbols; b) that self and identity are constructed through interaction; c) that humans create society through interaction; and d) that the symbolization process applies to both verbal and nonverbal communication, because humans create metaphors both for the body and for body actions (Canfield, 2009).

From these overarching assumptions Mead derived at the first basic concepts of Me, I and Self. From these first basic concepts other concepts developed such as: others, mind, agency, face work, symbol, signifier, sense-making, frame of reference, objectification, etc (Canfield, 2009).

The concept of *I* refers to the sensitive, reflexive, more durable part of the self. The concept of *Me* is the proactive part of self, enactive and agentive (Canfield, 2009). The *Self* is a combination of *I* and *Me* in Meadian theory, created through interactions between the two. People create their identities based on the influence of others; parental and peer influence is of paramount importance. So, the *Self* is seen as a symbolic object (Mead, [1934]2005: 202).

To further analyse the many micro sociological relations between military attitudes and military behaviour the analysis also uses the theories of Agnes Heller, as she calls attention to the interconnectedness of mind, body, types of human action, and related varieties of rationality (Heller 1970, 1985).

It is in the repeated actions observed in exercises, drills and briefings that the theories of Agnes Heller become especially relevant. Heller defines three different types of human action: 1) repetitive; 2) intuitive; and 3) inventive actions, which she then relates to different kinds of perception, mind, and reflection (Bech-Jørgensen, 1994: 141). In this respect, Heller (1985, pp.95-100) is inspired by Alfred Schutz' anticipation (project), practice (action), and result (act). Schutz maintains that there are two ways to experience on-going actions – two layers of consciousness which he terms external and internal time. It is the bodily movements, which combine internal and external events into the single time stream, Schutz calls a 'vivid present' (Schutz, 1973, p.216). Here Schutz refers to the thinking of Henri Bergson (1980 [1888], pp.92 *sq.*). Bergson termed one of the two layers of consciousness *durée*, which corresponds to internal time.

External time, which is socially regulated, is what Schutz calls standard time. It is quantified, i.e. divided into uniform, objective elements that can be counted. In this way the external layer of consciousness is organized as a differentiated everyday reality, in

which one episode is distinguished from the other, and attributed with particular meaning and organized into several sequences of cause and effect. The internal dimension of consciousness, 'durée', however, is a continuous flow of internal states of experience and events that are undifferentiated, interconnected and, thus, interfere with one another. Thinking and action cannot be separated. Actual experiences are associated with the past through recollections and memories, and with the future through anticipation. This alternation occurs spontaneously and unreflexively, and is not formulated linguistically (Heller, 1985, pp.95-100).

Heller relates these different forms of thinking / action to Hegel's three spheres of objectification: 1) in itself, 2) for itself and 3) in and of itself (Heller, 1985, pp.89 *sq*). It is this article's argument that these three spheres represent, respectively: 1) the heterogeneous everyday life of the soldiers, 2) the objective of the KFOR mission, and 3) the military institution and its officers (Kold, 2003).

In this article some of the central concepts from symbolic interactionism are applied on the military: on the soldiers socialization processes; the soldiers face work, acts, language; on the objectified symbolic military world; and on the micro-processes of the military every-day life of the soldiers changing the military institution.

And so, when put in use, it is the attitudes of the comrades, the *Others*, in the combat group, which constitute the military organized *Me*, which the person reacts toward that as an *I*. As a *Me* the person is conscious of himself as an object – in this case as a soldier. He then reacts to himself in terms of the military attitudes the other soldiers (*Others*) have toward him. His self-appraisal is the result of what he assumes to be the appraisal by the *Others*. The *Me* is the self as conceived and apprehended in terms of the point of view of significant others (the combat group) and of the military community at large. The *Me* reproduces the habits and the rules, the organized codes and expectations of the military community (Mead, [1934]2005: 202).

The *I* in contrast, is the answer which the individual makes to the military attitude which the other soldiers take toward him when he assumes an attitude toward them. What appears in consciousness is always the *Self* as an object, as a *Me*, but the *Me* is not conceivable without an *I* as a unique subject for which the *Me* can be an object. The *I* and the *Me* are not identical, for the *I* is something different from what the military situation itself calls for.

The military *Self* appears as a result of the acts of the *I* integrated with the role-based identification of the *Me* with the *Others*. In the article this division is perceived and used as the difference between the person's private psyche and feelings, the private *I*, and the military *role* and *function* related to the military organization, the *Me*. This military *Me* establishes a situational framework in interactions with the other soldiers, the *Others*, to which the personal *I* reacts (Mead 1934: 301).

The experience of being a soldier influences the *Mind*, which is a dynamic, socially oriented behavioral and processual entity that enables the soldiers to make sense of the military behavior and act accordingly. That is, as a result of the military socialization a certain *Agency*, which is the ability of soldiers to enact military lines of action on their own behalf to adapt to military conditions, is learned.

In the military every-day life of the recruits, *Role-taking,* (Mead, [1934]2005) shows as the ability to put one-self in the place the other private build shared understandings. The joint social institutional production of military meaning (Mead, [1934]2005: 297) refers to the fact that the soldiers cooperate and participate in military actions, thus creating new soldiery relations, routines and objectifications. The semantic representation of the objects in one's life, whether they are physical, psychological or social are the building blocks of meaning (Mead, [1934]2005: 203).

This Sense-making is the interpretative activity of creating meaning of self, others and interactive behaviors. The Communication between the soldiers requires the use of shared symbols (Mead, [1934]2005: 293). This Symbolization applies for both verbal and nonverbal communication. The shared symbols help soldiers interpret military behaviors and as such constitute a military Frame of reference.

The military attitudes which total in what Bengt Abrahamsson terms 'the military mind' (1972: 38) is expressed both in verbal and nonverbal communication as different forms of facework (Goffman, 1955: 41). The *Self* is involved in nonverbal communication; lines of action are formed, based on the sense of *Self,* and adapted to the actual military conditions. People perform multiple roles in life, such as being a lover, a parent, a child or a soldier, and in these situations people perceive and learn how to act appropriately to avoid personal embarrassment – or in the danger of combat.

Ethics – Consent in a War Zone

Institutional Consent. Before the field study started, both the Danish Defense Command and the Danish Defense Academy got the description of the research project, including description of field method. Both the object of study and the freedom of the researcher to use the research method which suited the object were accepted. So a general institutional consent was obtained.

Soldiers' Consent. The soldiers were asked if they wanted to participate in the interviews, and were told that it was an absolutely free choice. Their expressed consent was obtained and recorded at the beginning of each interview.

Combat Group Consent. Back in Denmark and prior to the deployment all the soldiers in advance had been informed that they were being subject to research and that this was the reason for my presence. In many situations consent consisted in the form of implied consent which was not and could not be expressly granted by the single soldier or the combat group, but in that they accepted that I openly was doing recordings, interviews, writing down observations, and participating in operations.

Public Consent. Other situations were of a more public kind: actions at a check point, morning drill, briefings etc. Such open situations were considered public and open, not only by this researcher but also by others.

Results

The subsequent concepts are the results of the coding process: 1) *Uncertainty of the objective* of the KFOR mission among the privates was dominant. Two *dominant* concepts in the field were observed: a concept of "war" and a concept of "peace". The two concepts had different qualities as "war" was intertwined with the many military symbols in the camp, whereas "peace" was a central part of the discussions between the soldiers. Still, the pattern of the coding showed "war" to be dominant over "peace". 2) *Institutional inertia.* The concept of "inertia" was observed in the "merging" of organization and persons in a wide-ranging setting of continuous bodily routines such as morning drill, salutes, training, parades, and so forth. The drill every morning consisted of symbolic acts referring to Danish territory, national spirit, the people, wars, and victories. These bodily routines were supplemented by the structures of the military such as uniforms, weapons, and insignia; signs that were always visible and which fashioned symbols and thus meaning. 3) *The concept of organizational separation.* The organizational and corporeal separation of the officer and the sergeant and the first private appeared to result in the officer symbolizing "mind", and the first private symbolizing "body". 4) *Concept of obedience.* The organizational relation between officers and privates was one of "obedience", which in turn seemed to result in a deficit in *meaning* as obedience "intervened" between the action itself and the objectives of the actions, and this led to a loss in the privates' ability to meaningfully orientate, resulting in a tendency to becoming passive. 5) *Concept of loosing meaning*, which resulted in passiveness, loss of orientation, and excessive behaviour.

A central question the sampled concepts put is *why* the concept of war was dominant over peace in a peace operation? This question activates another question, and that is *how* 'meaning' is produced in this military context ? A second question the sampled concepts raised is what deeper processes the 'institutional inertia' consists of, and *if* or *how* these deeper processes relate to the professional identities of the soldiers?

In order to answer these questions the article is taken to the next conceptual level for more analysis. First different representative excerpts from each concept are presented then they are analysed using theoretical concepts from symbolic interaction.

Uncertainty of Objective

Having arrived in Kosovo, I spent my first week with a combat group at a combined observation post and check point, named Delta 2-6, participating in military every-day-life activities such as car searching, patrolling, observing, eating, sleeping, and repairing equipment. I also followed one private closely after having received his consent. At the last day of the week, we sat down outside the house of Delta 2-6 and did an interview: "Q: why are you here? A: Well ehm.. . *really* . .. why I'm here in Kosovo? Q: yes . what are you doing here? A: Well really I had finished military [draft period, CK] there [in Denmark] . and then eh I didn't know what I was to do when I was through . so I could just as well try it . and get an experience out of it . then get it into the papers

too .. [add this experience to his resume] " At the end of the interview, I asked the private whether this was a military or a civilian task. And he answered "both and". This answer was similar to what was later that week expressed at the checkpoint during an informal conversation. We were 3 privates and I. At the checkpoint we small-talked; and among other things we talked about what they were doing and what it felt like: ". it's bloody strange when one arrives as an ordinary soldier . right . one has never . like controlled others or anything like that . and then all of a sudden one gets a police-like authority . right . thrown in our head . right .. " If you are thrown something in your head you're probably surprised. Something being thrown in one's head suggests being confronted by something unexpected, which one is unprepared for. One can ask how these tasks can possibly come as a surprise to the privates after being in the military for more than a year. Next, the private was asked whether this was a military or a police operation: "Private1: ..damned if I know.. Private2: ..it's a mix . right .. ahm there's not much military about us now anyway . right . now it's just control and control . ha [laughs].. but ok that's the way it is . right."

It was observed that the privates' motivation expressed for joining Danish KFOR was 'getting an experience', as well as getting *it* into their 'papers'. Other privates referred to family-members who also served in the military as motivating them to enlist. Thus, the privates didn't place their motivation for enlistment in ideology, religion, politics, war, or peacekeeping, but in personal motives.

Towards the end of the following week I interviewed the sergeant. Confronted by the same question, the sergeant gave almost the same answer as the private. The sergeant is almost the same age, just about 2 years older, and has a craftsman education, while the younger private had not yet completed secondary education: "Q: and why are you here now? A: experience! Q: Experience? A: yes .. that is .. I've .. really always been speculating if I should travel . when I was through doing something . but it . damn it didn't really develop into something.." Towards the end of the mission, after having spent extended periods of time with this sergeant I was talking with him about the whole tour. Again, we were out at Delta 2-6, this time barbecuing, so it was quite informal. At one point in the conversation, the question of task came up again: "Q: ok . this task . what kind of a task is it . is it a military or a civilian task .. what are we into? A: it's a civilian task that only the military can solve . I should think ."

During the third week a lieutenant was observed. In the closing interview I asked him the same question: "Lt: . what we do is as a matter of fact a very police-like task . eh like a little police-slash-military task . that's . and then there's really the civil [aspect] in it . which is something humanitarian . so it's really a big mix of something civilian . military .. and to a great degree . or high degree police . police-like task."

The major, in his interview, gave new answers: "Q: what kind of a task is it? . pause. A: I . we actually create security . that's what we have to . it's as simple as that . but then of course it really isn't that simple when one looks at it from from eh . the side of the locals ." Throughout the interview the major talked about international security, and also related KFOR to the task of producing 'security'.

The last person to be interviewed was the colonel, who, to the question about task, answered: ".. actually we can talk about an inner circle and an outer circle, and it is to maintain a kind of stable milieu also in our outer periphery . that takes a deployment . in which . in which Danish forces do good in securing a stable development in an area, which really is placed far from us . but still has some impact on Europe . so an outer screen of security for Europe."

To conclude: when asked about the task, the different soldiers gave varying answers dependent on their organizational position and experience. The answers could be grouped as the privates' 'individual motives' arrived at via the major's focus on 'international security' to the colonel's answer regarding 'national security'.

Another important aspect of the observations was that the soldiers' interview-answers differed quite a bit from a) their everyday conversations and b) from the symbols they produced.

When observed talking together about tasks and the local population the soldiers expressed rather different attitudes than in the interviews. It was observed that the words, signs and symbols produced were about nation, war and winning and not about the UN, policing, conflict and conflict resolution. This was observed in the dictums of the platoons, in the names of the different 'roads' inside the camp, on the weekly task schedule of the 1st company, which had a watermark with a piranha saying: "Seek, escalate, defeat"; on the APVs, (armored personnel vehicles) named Piranha, signs were painted as on the WWII airplanes with their "kills", only this time the motif was the name of a local village and a date for the riot; and on the inside of the toilet doors there were captions articulating the tough feelings and thoughts of the soldiers. So an overall difference was observed between what the soldiers *said* during interviews and what they *did* talking together and what they *did* together. These different presentations and answers indicated that different understandings of the operation's objective as well as different identities were in the making.

The privates, during this period, produced two distinct expressions: discursive expressions regarding the task and physical symbolic expressions of war and death. It seemed, they were struggling with two different identities originating from either the official political discourse regarding the new objectives of KFOR, or from the traditional military symbolic discourse expressing the acts of war.

The identities of the sergeants' seemed to be in a dilemma – as they were not full members of the group of privates and not full members of the leader group which consisted of officers. Still, they were asked to take part daily in the platoon briefings. During these briefings the sergeants were observed to perform poorly, not being able to giving answers to even basic questions. The sergeants didn't have separate briefings or meetings where they could build a frame of reference and an independent sergeant's identity, from which they could give a sergeant's answer.

Regarding the company officers' identities, the officers had known each other privately long before the tour. This was explained by the major, who told that when he was selected as the next company leader he could then select the lieutenants he knew and liked the most. The major explained, as did the captain, that his choice to become an

officer was a choice for life. Two of the lieutenants said they would leave the military to get a civilian education, and the two others considered themselves to be officers for life. During the time of observation, the officers had all been together for around 2½ years. The major and captain were classmates and so knew each other for a period of more than 7 years – both privately and professionally. All 6 officers had gone through the same recruitment procedures, the same tests, the same school (there is only one Army's Officer School in Denmark); they had roughly been on the same military maneuvers and had similar stories to tell from their time as lieutenant officers. They also told me how they spent much of their leisure time together and how much they liked each other's company. Two of the lieutenants shared an apartment and declared they would be friends for life. Thus the officers' first role expectations, developed when attached to positions in the military had probably developed into deep *internalized* identities. This *internalization* was observed in several situations and dimensions. It included not only the mind, but also the body: the officers were observed to perform a specific bodily schema when sitting, walking, waiting, and so on. (see *Organizational Separation*, below)

The concept of *uncertainty* expressed by the privates and sergeants may derive from the political processes of the UN itself, as a UN peacekeeping operation has no direct foundation in the provisions of the UN Charter (Boulden, 2001: 13), which means that an operation falls between the Chapters VI and VII. And, perhaps adding to the confusion of the soldiers a missing Chapter may cause, both the existing chapters "use the broad phrase 'international peace and security' rather than 'war' or even 'use of force.' This choice avoided the definitional problems, so acutely evident in the league's experience, of needing a formal declaration of war before becoming involved." (Boulden, 2001: 10). This central, and for the soldiers very relevant question, however "remains one of ongoing debate." (Boulden, 2001: 15). So, what can a soldier say – and not the least *do*?

The concept of uncertainty, however, also mirrors another quite different but also fundamental problem, which is the difference between the logic of words and the empirical actions of psychology and sociology (Zahavi, 2001: 15). The logic of words and concepts in the answers given by the soldiers is *not* empirical science and does not deal with actually acting objects. The logical discourse of the soldiers' explores ideal structures and laws, and the research in them is characterized by their inner logic. Contrary to logic, psychology and sociology are empirical sciences that explore the behavior of actual human individuals and groups. To confuse logic with psychology or sociology is a fundamental mistake that ignores both the basic ideality of logic, and the fact that its validity is independent of experience. Absolute validity of logic can never be found in the empirical nature of psychology or sociology. Thus, the fundamental problem is that interviews as observation about behavior should distinguish between the *object* of perception and the *act* of perception. While the *act* is a mental and bodily process and evolves in time and has a starting and end point, this is not so for the principles of logic (Zahavi, 2001: 15). The agency of soldiers is also heavily influenced by repeated bodily actions of a tacit nature (King, 2006). This experience is unreflexive and unformulated, and consists of senses and feelings (Bergson, 1980; Heller, 1970; King, 2006). These

internal, undifferentiated, and diverse events are transformed, through reflection, into an external military world of structures, time, and events (Kold, 2011). This way, the bodily movements intertwine the soldiers' internal state of mind with the external symbolic order. So, when the acting soldier discursively expresses his/her experiences and thoughts, the soldier's lay interpretation of the stream of experience can differ quite a bit from the observed everyday behavior. Such a difference is a normal observation in both anthropological and sociological field studies. Because, an interview or a survey (both discourses) will not be able to fully address the habituated military every-day life of the soldiers: "There is broad agreement among social scientists that people are often unable to reliably and validly perceive and report on the causes of their behavior. People are not fully aware of the causes of their behavior – not because of Freudian psychodynamics but simply because most cognitive processes occur below the level of awareness." (MacCoun, Kier & Belkin, 2006: 647) So, when soldiers in interviews try to explain their behavior they do not give answers on the basis of true introspection and repeatedly fail to detect experimental factors (abstract questions about peace) influencing their behavior. Thus, the soldiers' explanations are not based on introspective access but rather on a priori common sense and lay theories (Kold, 2013). In their answers they will use the a priori categories they have learned listening to public discourse at home or during military teaching and drill. This, then, brings us back to the ongoing and diffuse development of the different definitions of UN Peace Operations. The soldiers in their discursive answers try to connect past words and experience to future objectives with the military concepts which are being communicated to them (Kold, 2011). This probably makes the soldiers talk of war instead of peace operations.

Institutional Inertia

The concept of institutional inertia emerged by sampling a lot of observation of bodily routines. The bodily routines were dissimilar: some military-institutional, some related to the different combat groups and some personal. Some of the institutional routines were organizational-functional, some weapons-related, while others were of a more traditional national kind. The performed routines seemed to mix with reason, leadership and objective of mission, and to go on endlessly-routinized with much inertia and without much reflection or knowledge as to why these, mostly military, routines were carried out.

Military Routines. One of the central routines was the morning and the evening drill. At a fixed time every morning and evening all the companies of the battalion, each at different places, formed a big square U-formation. At the same time the colonel met with all the majors of the companies for the battalion drill. In the drills of the companies, the platoons and combat groups met face-to-face with the institution and performed their specific bodily routines. This way the organization 'materialized' every morning and was evident in flesh and blood, from the 1st privates to the colonel. The soldiers' bodies were lined up in the different platoons and awaiting collective information. This formation makes the different functions and positions of this organization visible to the privates. A

noticeable physical and symbolic distance could be observed from the captain, who stood unaccompanied in the middle, to the lieutenants, who were each standing head to and in front of their platoon. In each combat group the sergeant was the first in the front line of soldiers.

A series of repetitive bodily movements and routines constituted all the drills, which were accorded by rank and orders. The orders were given exclusive of any nouns; thus the *person* or *individuality* was left out and the orders were *collective* and functional. These bodily routines took place as a bodily answer to imperative orders (Weick, 1993; King, 2006; Siebold, 2007).

The observed military routines can be defined as repetitive acts. Repetitive acts are habituating acts, which make it unnecessary for the single soldier and the military organization to define every situation anew (Berger and Luckmann, 1966; Heller, 1985; Gebauer and Wulff, 2001). These bodily routines, with their vivid present (Bergson, 1980), contained a silent stock of military knowledge (Berger and Luckmann, 1966: 71). This way, many different military situations become subject to already objectified definitions. Even alternative acts such as peacekeeping and peacebuilding become subject to military standardization (Winslow, 1998).

Habituation is central to the soldiers' experience of self. During the action, identification is taking place between the self and the objectivated meaning of the act, as the performed act in the moment of the vivid present (Bergson, 1980; Kold, 2011) is defining the self-perception of the soldier and does so from the perspective of an already objectified meaning (Berger and Luckmann, 1966: 91). As these military objectifications are accumulated, a full sector of the soldier's consciousness is structured by these objectifications. Part of the self is, in other words, objectified by specific socially understandable typifications. This selected part becomes a "military self", which can be subjectively perceived as separated from and even opposing the individual's civilian self in its totality (Berger and Luckmann, 1966: 92). As a consequence the soldiers' military selves are objectified by already existing military typifications which do not seem to include and support UN peace operations.

Routines in Command and Communication. The form of communication, being dominated by rank and function, added to the inertia of the military institution. In the subsequent case, it is the next commanding sergeant 'NK', of the 3rd platoon who is communicating the observed sergeant at the Delta 2-6; the gunner 1 also interferes in the communication:

> "NK: then I need to see your 'Junior Woodchucks Guidebook' and your signal orders… Gunner 1: and a signal order . I'd really like one . NK: but you don't get that – I was told – it's not for all – only for you – [the sergeant is looking for his books, CK] NK: I must *see* that you've got it – physically see it – and you do alright – that's nice All: thank you.. . …. Sgt: didn't some of the others have it? NK: then you must maintain minimum crew . there are 10 men out here . and the rest you must send in .. to the camp Sgt: okay .. NK: for 'KONURO' equipment [riot equipment, CK] . …. Sgt: what are they allowed to drive in NK: 1 Piranha ..

> eeh .. but it must be like this that when you are standing down there now . the Piranha stands down here . and when you stand down there then it is down there .. you'll have to coordinate that yourself .. Sgt: yes . .... Sgt: . we've broken open the locks on my .. we have to figure out that too [NK looks very resigned, CK] Sgt: yes . but . what were we to do .. really? NK: I don't know . Sgt: then you bloody got to get out here with some keys . and the ones you got you obviously can't find . so then it was .. NK: no but the . the.. Sgt: it doesn't matter . now . they are broken . so now.. NK: yes yes .. but it's four padlocks . with the same key ... that's the problem Sgt: yes but what can we do? NK: I don't know Sgt: alright . all you can do is to give me an earful ."

This short piece of communication is marked by short key phrases, in which the verbs of the sentence are held in imperative – in commands from the NK and short questions from the sergeant. The sentences are about tasks and rather detailed. NK's sentences are structured by instructions and rules. The personal demarcations take the form of vocal swearing and face work – that is, in bodily demarcations, which cannot be read out of the text, but are very visible, especially with the sergeant.

Language objectifies shared human experiences and makes them understandable to everybody in a linguistic collective (Berger and Luckmann, 1966: 86f). Similarly, military language is transformed into an accessible place for the depositing of enormous accumulations of military meaning and experience, which can be deposited over time and transferred to future military generations. As a system of signs with its specific "logic", military language socializes the individual into the patterns of a military person (see discussion about role-taking below). Military language also transforms experience into specific types which become subject to special categories (see obedience below). This way military language produces systems of classification through which the soldier can distinguish between "members" and "non-members" of the hierarchical military organization. This enables the soldiers to coordinate and navigate through specific zones of military intimacy and their related actions (Berger and Luckmann, 1966: 91).

As we have seen, the language of the Danish KFOR soldiers is divided into different organizational hierarchical dialects with vocabularies that refer to specific forms of action. The officers and the sergeants are addressing the privates as a collective, military unit, without pronouns. Verbs used to describe tasks are mostly kept in passive voice with no agent, or in the short imperative form.

In the above presented case the two persons, a senior sergeant and a sergeant, are talking to each other without using "I", "you" or "he" in singular, instead they use the plural form of the pronoun "you". With personal communication restricted to the sergeant swearing, breaking off his own sentences or being all red in the face, with no singular pronouns and with verbs in imperative, this kind of communication the individuals are left out and rather function is talking to function.

Contrary to the exclusion of the private's individual identity the major often referred to "I" and "me" when he talked about the whole company's acts. This "I" was included *in* and informed by the organization, whereas the privates were excluded *out* and

not informed, but ordered. This is very close to the description of the behavior of the Center and Periphery persons and groups described by Galtung (1974: 61; 94).

Routines of Structures, Rotations and Functions. Everywhere in this organization the material surroundings are dominated by *protection* - walls and buildings, sandbags, armor, routines of control, and so on, placing signs and telling a story of potential attack and combat. Several of these defenses are decorated with signifiers such as names, short proverbs, inscriptions, flags, and orders symbolizing hierarchy, control, war, national victory, and survival.

The privates are constantly rotated between such different settings with different functions. This on-going rotation makes it hard for the soldiers to reflect on the meaning of why they perform the way they do (Hale, 2009: 308). In the total circle of functions the soldiers are not rotated to a place, phase or situation of reflection and feedback (Winslow, 1998: 361). Instead they are simply doing as they are told. As an example of this: during observation of the sergeant at the main entrance as platoon on alert he was reading a book intensely – or as intensely as he could, being constantly interrupted. I asked him what he was reading:

> "Q: what is that? A: it's 'BB-guard' Q: what? A: permanent regulations Q: ah .. ok ... are they different than in Denmark? A: nope . there's always . there's always something one must . what now in a situation with sharp [ammunition, CK] . if one has to shoot at others who . I like .. what to do in the main guard in case they raise alarm . aaand . there are some regulations regarding dress and such things . it resembles a lot to eh . normal guard."

Just as in Delta 2-6, the main entrance has its regulations, just as all parts of the camp have their specific regulated functions. This means that it becomes hard to separate behavior from function and function from structure, and so on: everyone is wearing uniforms that tell a story of their position and function in the institution. Behavior becomes collective – and thus gains in inertia. This story is supported by the other symbolic objects and functions: when talking with the sergeant, behind me on the wall the M95 guns were placed in a line, as are the fragmentation-vests, all ready to be used, just as in Delta 2-6. Mounted on the desk of the main guard is a radio, with which the privates on guard constantly used in a very controlled and schematized way to communicate with the drivers of the different military vehicles driving in and out of the camp. Thus, the materiality, function as signs, which become significant in the soldiers understanding of the operation and so they write or draw on them, externalizing their lay interpretation.

The military institutional world works on the soldier's role-taking as an objective reality with a certain stock of knowledge not accessible to the individual person's consciousness (Berger and Luckmann, 1966: 79). The military, Camp Olaf Rye, and all its signifiers and symbols can be perceived as such an objectified reality to which the soldiers are accordingly habituated (Snider, 1999). As a result, soldiers share specific objectives and certain behavior which is externalized. Thus, by its mere existence, the

military institution with all its structures, tools and weapons controls the soldiers' behavior and channel the behavior in a certain direction, even if other directions are possible (Berger and Luckmann, 1966: 73).

Backstage Routines of a Combat group. In the first week of fieldwork the combat group at the Delta 2-6 was observed. At OP/CP the main duties of the privates were observation in the OP, checking of cars and their drivers at the CP, and the so called social patrols. The patrols, sent out, seemed more motivated out of personal curiosity, interest or boredom than out of explicit military decisions. When asked, the privates supported this interpretation by telling me that the week at Delta 2-6 was one of their favorite duties as this was 'o-free' zone, meaning: no officers around.

The time off-duty was spent on sleeping, eating, doing nothing, playing pc-games or watching TV-series. The backstage life in the Delta can best be described as an undifferentiated jumble of social activities, contrary to the structured and differentiated power and control of the front stage. Related to this, the privates in their conversations constantly shifted between little backstage doings and outside tasks. A conversation could go like this:

> "Private 1: .. and then he said that it wasn't to be .. there should be radio .. minimal .. radio contact .. the reason why it was used by the platoon leader .. Private 2: ... aaah stop that ... where are the white plastic bags ... Private 1: . plastic bag? .. they lie I think right eeeh .. in the drawer .. in the bin room ... or eeeh ... Private 2: . there were . there were 5 or.. Private 1: there were 5 who were .. w . wounded ... that were the ambulances driving through here .. with the wounded ... Private 1: what .. yea .. there's no more over the [communication-] net any way . do you have a eh . eh a tush pen . Private 2: .. why don't you just throw it .."

Behind the protection walls and barbed wire, the isolated life had its own dream-like pace in contrast to the structured external world, a *mode of being* which the privates themselves called 'guard mode'. In this isolated world the sense of time was reduced. During interviews and small talk it was observed that more of the privates did not to know what day it was, and that they were confused as to what happened when. This confusion seemed to reduce the private's sense of social causality. This was observed in the privates' constant asking what day it was and in their constant questioning sentences:

> "Private 1: .. what's happening . ? Private 3: I think we are to be deployed .. Private 2: They say something about a panzer mine in Zubin Potok . and that 5 or 6 have been killed or wounded..! Private 3: . panzer mine . probably more like a hand grenade . Private 1: . are we to go in or what . do you have your konuro equipment here? Private 3: mine is in our fab [the 'prefabricated' container in which the soldiers lived, CK] in the camp . Private 1: but we do get it . before deployment? Private 3: . don't know.."

When confused about social causality, another consequence was that the privates'

understanding of the social conflicts among the local population is also reduced.

A close familiarity within the combat group was observed to develop during my stay at the Delta. This 'family-like' relation was also expressed by the sergeant during an interview, in which he talked about his primary up-bringing of the privates:

> "A: what the hell does it then do . really .. then one don't get that . culture shock . there are *really* many to whom it is good to get away from his mom .. I came to feel that myself . that one has to shine your boots yourself . Q: what do you mean by culture shock? A: what can I say . when one gets in and then suddenly all your rights are taken away . Q: yes? A: they don't decide a damn thing [for themselves] the first long time when they are in the military . Q: that's a culture shock? A: yes I think so . yes . Q: yes? A: where you before . then you could do what you liked . now you have to ask permission to go to the toilet . right . say Sir . and . there's somebody who decides when you are to get up and decides when to go to bed . you are really deprived a lot of .. rights . Q: what's good about that? A: really . I think that you eh . I think at least I myself have got another insight into myself."

When observed from the inside of the combat group, this primary group seemed to form a loose composition of family-like relations between the privates. But, when observed from the outside the private was part of a military structure, definitions, directives and orders that were defined from above by the organization.

Because the combat group is the primary group to the private, in many ways the combat group resembled a family as a unity of interacting persons (see also: Stouffer, VOL I 1949: 412; Erickson, referring to Burgess in Reynolds, 2003: 511; Winslow, 1998: 357). In families relations are intimate, intensive, relatively enduring, particularistic, and diffuse as were the relations of this combat group. During the week in Delta 2-6 a diffuse mixture of family-like acts were carried out: the privates were talking "privately" with each other, eating, watching Danish TV or playing pc-games while they constantly asked questions or stated opinions regarding the tasks of the external world. Thus the activities and relations of the privates had a diffuse heterogeneous character (Erickson, in Reynolds, 2003). It was a *closed* family, as the privates were tied up with each their tasks; they couldn't just leave their positions on the road of the checkpoint or on patrol. They were bound by routines, brotherhood, family and military rule. Additionally, the communication lines in and out of the combat group were limited resulting in the sergeant, the lieutenant and the major becoming the "looking glass selves" to the privates (Erickson, referring to Cooley in Reynolds, 2003: 524).

The general diffuse conversation between the privates, going back and forth between own doings and outside tasks was, characterized by two distinct directions: an "upward" direction reflecting the individual micro level *feelings* of the private's *I* trying to confirm, support, and continually recreate perceived structures, and a "downward" personal *Me* direction which comprise of shaping forces that do not originate in the individual but in the military (Franks, in Reynolds, 2003: 794).

The privates thus related to each other as both "persons" and as "individuals". The

distinction is important as the "downward" role-taking of the *persons* is characterized by the organizational statuses the privates hold and the roles they play. So, while members of the combat group related horizontally to each other as *individual* family members, they were also aware of the vertical roles each person played in the combat group and outside of it in the battalion in general.

This way, the privates' interactions formed a *classical* combat group with its brotherhood. The concept of combat group was "publicly" displayed and recognized by the battalion and the other soldiers every day in the collective drill as in other acts. The conceptualization of "combat group" became objectified through internalizing and externalizing interaction with the other soldiers and, over time, part of what is meant by "a combat group" as a basic institution of the military (Stouffer 1949; Caforio, 2006: 64).

Institutional inertia is a complex concept; it consists of several components which support each other through different routines, bodily routines, concepts and language, structures and everyday life. Together they form an objectified military culture with certain schemas that the private must learn in a certain way.

Organizational Separation

The military organization is separated in many different ways: by hierarchy, function and rank; by secrecy, information and knowledge; by power and influence; and by symbols, rituals, traditions and norms.

The enlisted men are immediately at the beginning of military service separated into different hierarchical, functional and commanding positions as privates, sergeants and officers and sent to 3 or more different schools that are distinct in terms of location, training and socialization (Moskos, 1970: 38). This initial and organizational physical and mental separation was maintained in Kosovo, and seemed particularly important for the officers to maintain, and could be observed in different forms during the tour (Stouffer, VOL I 1949: 363).

From the beginning of deployment the officers lived in their own quarters, which were called the 'front camp' and the sergeants, together with the privates, lived in a part of the camp called the 'back camp'. The significance of this, was that it could not refer to the actual physical position as the privates lived almost in the middle and the officers to one side of the camp. Rather, this must have been an expression of the symbolic centrality of the officer.

Just after the arrival of the battalion in Camp Olaf Rye, a small part of the cantina was separated from the rest of the cantina by movable sound-walls, repainted and decorated. The tables were covered with tablecloths; photographs of the Danish Queen and of central Danish barracks were put up on the walls. This was now the officers' part of the cantina only. This separation provoked several of the privates who commented it and tried to sit there. They were asked to sit in another place, and did so.

One more example: during the warm summer, 2 plastic-swimming pools were donated to the camp. One swimming pool was put up in the officers' part of the camp even if they were an absolutely minority of the camp population. The rest of the soldiers

had to make do with the other one, which got rather packed. Like the cantina section the privates weren't allowed in the officers' pool.

During the first interview with the sergeant, he spoke about his feelings towards the organizational separation between the rank and file and the officer group:

> "Q: and relating to your superiors .. how do you expect that the development will be .. that you will have a better social relation to them or .. A: I don't think so .. damn I don't think so .. really we eh .. we get along .. to a certain level .. and then of course there are . this thing . officers and sergeants separately . and KC [the major, CK] does much of that .. to him its ... Q: yes? A: I don't know.. Q: so you are separated ? A: yeah a bit Q: why? A: mmm I don't know .. he just does .. really the officers .. or the o-group as they are called right .. and us .. we mind a bit ourselves."

Institutions always have a history of which they are products and which they reproduce. For the military this history is closely intertwined with the history of State, Power and People. As such the history of the military institution constitutes an objectified culture to which the enlisted soldier has to relate. As an objectified deposition of knowledge the military also carries with it institutional "memory" of old wars, former technologies, and former socializations of privates and officers as deep institutional codes that are carried in traditions, rituals and routines.

The objectified depositions of knowledge positions the enlisted men in a range of identities and roles. These identities are learned in the different schools of the military, but are also prepared by the civil society at large. Therefore, more identities are at work: first the nation-state identity of the enlisted individual and next the identity as a private, sergeant or officer. These identities have changed with the development of the nation-state, citizenship, the notion of the People (Berger and Luckmann, 1966: 86) and the stratification of the civil society.

The objectified deposition of knowledge regarding the military institution and draft makes the young man expect and prepare for a certain schema of experiences at this stage in his life. He expects his officer and sergeant to perform as the objectified officer and as the objectified sergeant.

These objectified depositions hold historical performances which are maintained in the military even if the officers and the soldiers no longer know why they are taught and performed. At some point they simply become codes of value (honor) and positions or signifiers of being in the military; signifiers adding to the symbolic order, meaning and behavior of privates. (Janowitz, 1960: 50f; Winslow, 1998: 354)

Obedience

The organizational separation of the officers and the rank and file deeply influence the relation between the two groups, and the concept of this sample transforms into one of obedience.

Case: during the observations at Delta 2-6 I was sitting in the living room with a first private when suddenly the major entered the room. He said that he war inspecting all the check points to see if they had their signal orders and if the binder was in order and up-to-date. The privates quickly fetched the binder and put it on the table for the major to see. However, while the private was getting the binder, the major had gone out of the room. After returning with the binder, the soldier sat down in the sofa again. When the major returned to the room, he without delay started to scream at the soldier: "Get your ass of that sofa, GODDAMMIT, and get me that signal order as I told you to and do it now!!!" The private immediately got up while he replied: "But I already got the book; it's right there on the table...!" However, the major was already on his way out the room once again, without listening to the soldier and without seeing the binder. Realizing that the major was already on his way out, the private instead handed the book to the sergeant. The private sat down mumbling with a low voice: ...soldiers with stars...!" As I couldn't hear what he said, I asked him what he'd said, and he repeated: "Soldiers with stars that ... well that's what we always say: soldiers with stars have no brains." I then asked him: "Does this happen often?" The soldier laughed: "Yes ha ha... all the time, but you get used to it ... that's just the way it is...!"

A couple of days later I had a similar experience. Just after having had a bath I went – steamingly clean and all red in my face - to the cantina for breakfast. As I was about to enter, I was called back to wash my hands:

> "Captain [in a rather loud voice]: You must wash your hands! CK: yes . but I've just been showering .. Captain: doesn't matter . you must wash your hands! CK: but it makes no sense . I'm not getting any cleaner! Captain: might be . but you must wash your hands! Private: that's the law.. CK: but it's absurd . my hands can't get any cleaner . Private: that's the law ."

I ended up washing my hands in the grayish soap water in the sink. Obviously the whole situation and the washing of my hands were not about hygiene and meaningful behavior, but about power and regulation of uniform behavior (Procter, 1920: 37).

A week later I was sitting in the cantina beside a private from the staff company. We were small-talking, and he told me different things about his deployments, and I asked him if this tour was different compared to the other tours:

> "A: I don't know before things have settled down .. But they are .. here the focus on clothing is unbelievably high Q: why..? A: something about that we have to be professional . look more right I think Q: what's that got to do with professional? A: Don't know.. Q: Is it something you talk about a lot? A: Yes! . nods and looks resigned. ... Q: what could one do? A: One could give us more leeway Q: why don't they do that then? A: good question ... it's not a club for discussions . Q: somebody said that? A: yes . the Military hasn't got a very democratic way of leadership ... as he said 'it's not a club for discussions'."

What we hear, is that the private makes a link from 'uniform' to a 'lack of leeway' to no 'club for discussion' to 'he' to 'military' to non-democratic leadership. This privates' story was later supported by the sergeant in his answer to my question:

> "Q: how do you then make decisions? A: it's me who makes the decisions Q: it's you? A: but I think .. I listen to what they say . but it's me who makes the decisions . unless I allow him . Q: sorry? A: unless I allow him . and then I also say . now it's you who decides"

On the one hand it seems to be more important that the privates do what they're told than what reason and meaning they make of a situation. On the other hand, the result is that it's hard for the privates to know what they must do, because decision-making processes take place in the head of the major, the lieutenant and even the sergeant as internal dialogues are not shared with the privates. As the officers say, "this is not a club for discussion."

This was observed to reduce the privates' ability to learn from experience about social causality, from their experience and to decrease their ability to meaningfully orientate in situations of conflict and even combat. They often simply had to guess what to do. Some did guess, and if right, was praised afterwards; others guessed wrong and got an earful; many became passive.

Analyzing the person's participation in military actions, it must be understood that the person does not take part as a total person, but rather in terms of recruited, trained and specialized capacities or statuses; in short as a military special self. When a soldier becomes involved in the maintenance of military obedience, he also becomes committed to a specific representation of the military special self. In the case of military obedience, the soldier becomes to himself *and* others the sort of soldier who follows this actual rule. In the case of the officer, he becomes dependent upon the assumption that the privates will perform their obedience to him, as their treatment of him will express a conception of him as an officer. In constructing himself as the sort of officer who treats privates in a specific way and is treated by them in a specific way, he must make sure that it will be possible for him to act and be this kind of person. So, for the officer there are situations in which the obligation of giving orders or an earful to privates is something the officers *must* do if he is to retain the image he has come to have of his military special self (Goffman, 1956).

Loss of Meaning

During the tour, the privates were observed to carry out some rather characteristic social processes which were observed to relate to difficulties in understanding the purpose of specific operations. The observed processes were due to their dynamics termed 'loss of meaning.'

One characteristic representation was the quiet and introvert behavior of some of the privates. One example of this group is this private who had a basic feeling of being

without any influence. He said: "You have no influence on anything at all, it's … it's very frustrating, but it's … you learn to live with it." Further into the interview the subject focused on the many drills and bodily routines. When asked what he thought about the drill and address of the captain or the major, he answered: A: "yea well, it depends on what he says, because sometimes he also says something that is reasonable .. and other times then .. then you just stand there and think a little, that, well it's all right that he says all that, but in some way it's just moral speech again, right .. the great Il Duce speech he gives once in a while, right .. it's .. I think .. for some it works .. some, they think it's good enough to listen .. some they get a better moral from it .. but personally I think it's .. damn, it's .. it doesn't change bloody much for me .. it doesn't .. me personally it doesn't .. but I know there's some that .. that .. that…" Q: "What feelings does it cause in you?" A: "Feelings? Q: Are you angry, or are you tired, are you fatigued, or …" A: "Yeah, again I am, what can you say .. one can use the word passive, you are being activated or you can say, one shuts the whole brain down, right, and then you stand in your own little world, and then you just stand .. well .. that's the way it is…" This way, this private describes having different reactions when addressed by the officers, and explains that his reaction is one of passiveness, and that he shuts down his "whole brain."

Another characteristic behavior was the excessive use of hard core porn, mainly seen with the privates. This behavior lasted for approximately 2 months. As an example: in the prefabricated living container (fab) where I stayed for the first 5 weeks my fab-mate spent most of his time and energy on finding and buying a PlayStation. The games he bought were a football game and an interactive porn-game. Thus the fab was crowded with privates playing hard-core porn games. This behavior went on for the whole first period. When I returned to commence my second stay, the characteristic use of porn had gone down somewhat, although other distinct behaviors could still be observed, such as constant bodybuilding and pc gaming (war games).

A third characteristic behavior was the aggressiveness expressed in graffiti on the inside of the toilet doors. This graffiti, which was already observed during the pilot study, was clearly an expression of aggression targeted at both the officer group – especially the colonel - and the local population. For instance, one inscription said: "APPENDIX TO PERMANENT REGULATIONS DANBN: BATCH [i.e. the colonel] MUST DAILY RECEIVE AT LEAST ONE ROACH FROM ONE IN THE GROUP OF PRIVATES". Another inscription, which targeted the local population said: "Shoot a perker [nigger, CK] and be happy. Shoot 2 and get in heaven." It seemed that the aggressions of the privates were divided either into an "upward" aggression toward the officer group, or "outward" toward the local population.

Confronted with a concept of 'loss of meaning' taking its departure in the observation of internal and external targeted aggression, it is useful to return to Mead (1934) and his notion of the 'generalized other'. Applying Mead to the understanding of military socialization, a person's military self-concept is socialized as he becomes a military object to himself through military social experience. Nevertheless, soldiers do not only become military objects as they experience themselves from the standpoints of

other soldiers within their combat group, but also from the generalized standpoint of the nation to which they belong (Cockerham, in Reynolds, 2003: 500). The generalized objective of the KFOR operation was one of peace and consequently the vertical esprit de corps would logically pivot around this objective (Kold, 2013).

However, the social cohesion of the primary group is not a logical one, but of an emotional, bodily and functional character. What binds the group horizontally together is it's emotional and functional nature, which are expressed in its activities. As described earlier, soldiers are habituated to share the norms, values, vocabulary, outlook, and symbols of their organization. In this sense military units are essentially tribes (Cockerham, in Reynolds, 2003: 497).

So, when soldiers express passiveness, excessive or aggressive behavior, this is part of being socialized to being a member of a combat group. A combat group that finds its origin in fighting an enemy, which is the reason why the soldiers express reactions to a discrepancy between the discourse of the vertical esprit de corps of a peace operation (with a blur purpose) and the tacit horizontal social cohesion of the combat group (Kold, 2013).

The Dominating Category

To make sense of the situations the soldiers interpreted the many military signifiers of the military organization. These signifiers come in many forms: language, military equipment (weapons, vehicles, radios and so on), organization, bodily routines, rituals, and so on. These signifiers were then linked in a string of already objectified and dominating meanings which included nation-state, enemy, protection, battle, war, and winning. At the end of this line the dominating category of the privates came to be: *war.*

Discussion

During the observed period the soldiers experienced civil riots in the center of Mitrovica but no military enemy and no war-like battles. The civilian population in the area of responsibility consisted mostly of elderly, disabled or very young people who had not been able to flee. The buildings, vehicles, symbols and people faced here did not correspond to the privates' objectified image of an aggressive enemy. Also, the privates only had sparse interaction with the local population. The observed civil-military interaction consisted in the few words spoken at the checkpoint, the mobile checkpoint, and during the social patrols – only here it was the sergeant who spoke on behalf of the combat group. The rest of the duties of the combat group took place inside the camp. Thus, partly due to the superficial contact with the local population, the privates were simply not able to interact, learn and understand much about their culture and the on-going conflict.

This is not the image of a UN peacekeeping operation intervening into a symmetrical war between two nation-states; rather, it is the image of a Danish battalion

participating in a third generation UN peace enforcement operation, representing the change taking place in UN peace operations. At the same time as change was taking place in the understanding and definition of peace operations, wars also changed gradually from symmetrical nation-states wars (1648-1945), via liberation wars (1945-70) and civil wars (1970-90) to what has been termed 'new wars' (post 1990) (Creveld, 1991; Kaldor, 1998; Münkler, 2002).

As a consequence the objectives of especially the third generation of UN peace operations have changed profoundly, confronting them with new dynamics. The dynamics of 'new wars' are different from the 'old wars' in that they can be hard to detect and differentiate from criminality; they don't differ between civilian population and military personnel - on the contrary they target the population; they have no direct political target and are not a carrier of a nation-state-project; they have no front or rear, and no center of gravity; they are fluid and blur forms of calculated violence which soon takes the form as a way of life to the young mercenaries or insurgents.

This development seems to cause a 'security gap' between the UN peace soldiers and the reality of the 'new wars', because despite this fundamental change, the public, the political and, as we have seen, the military discourse are still "using security concepts, drawn from the dominant experience of the Second World War". This, however, does not reduce insecurity, but "rather they make it worse." (Kaldor, 2007: 10) Thus, according to Kaldor, the UN peace operations confronted by 'new wars' needs a new language: "It is the way we currently perceive security, the 'old war' language we use, that prevents us from finding new solutions." (Kaldor, 2007: 10)

This study, however, suggests that not only new concepts are needed, but that a further practical integration of concepts and vocabulary with the instruments of force and the habituation of using force in UN peace operations is needed, in order for them to be clearly differentiated from the processes taking place in war operations. If not developed, the UN peace operations risk ending up as endless 'new wars'.

Limitations

The study may be criticised for not being supported by enough data and that more data ought to be collected. It should be noted that at the end of each operation the Danish Battalion seizes to exist. Therefore it is not possible to 'go back' to get more data. It is possible to go back to the military institution as such; however, this would raise new problems as the present peace operations have changed rapidly. Thus, this specific study is limited to a very narrow period of Danish participation in UN peace operations and therefore its capacity to generalize is also limited. However, some of the routines described are general and can still be observed in today's Danish peace operations and could also be found in observations of earlier war operations. In this respect there are several similarities which support the observations of this study.

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